Export control over nuclear and other radioactive material
European Union export controls on dual-use goods
The European Union has developed a control list of dual-use items which is updated on a regular basis. Under the EU regime, controlled items may not leave the EU customs territory without an export authorisation. Additional restrictions are also in place concerning the provision of brokering services with regard to dual-use items and concerning the transit of such items through the EU.
The EU Export control list is available at the European Commission website. Also see the Common Military List of the European Union.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 to encourage the limitation of the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for biological, chemical and nuclear attacks. The regime has 34 members.
Please see the MTCR website for more information: English, French
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) comprises 48 nuclear supplier States that voluntarily co-ordinate their export controls governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related equipment and technology to non-nuclear weapon States.
The NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, while not hindering international trade and co-operation in the nuclear field. The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms.
Documentation (INFCIRC/254 series)
First document (1978)
The guidelines were originally agreed to in 1977, and transmitted to the IAEA for publication in 1978. They set out fundamental principles for export controls, and define an export control trigger list and agreed common criteria for technology transfers. The guidelines prohibit the use of exports from being used in any nuclear explosive device. The guidelines also touch upon the transfer of facilities and technologies used for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, uranium enrichment and heavy water production. The guidelines set up a requirement for physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, mandate re-transfer controls as well as general acceptance of the Zangger Committee Trigger List.
First Revision (1992-1993)
This revision clarified parts of the trigger list, and brought it up to date with the more detailed Zangger Committee list, but also adds a new category of goods to be put under export controls (namely so-called dual use items). Some 65 items are on the dual use list. Composed of two parts, the revised INFCIRC/254 describes the export control regime for nuclear and nuclear-related dual use items, and lists these commodities. The new regime became effective on 1 January 1993. All subsequent revisions build on this revision. Additions:
|INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Add.1 – Argentina||INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 2/Add.1 – Argentina|
|INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Add.2 – Russian Federation||INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 2/Add.2 – Slovak Republic|
|INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Add.3 – Slovak Republic|
First modification, with additions:
INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Mod.1/Add.1 – Finland and Spain
INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Mod.1/Add.2 – Argentina Second modification:
INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Mod. 2
Third modification, with addition:
INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/Mod.3/Add.1 – New Zealand
Second Revision (1995)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 2 Addition:
INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1/Add.1 – Russian Federation Modification with addition:
INFICIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 2/Mod. 1
INFICIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 2/Mod. 1/Add. 1 – Russian Federation
Third Revision (1997-98)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2 Additions:
|INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 1/Add. 1 – France||INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2/Add. 1 – Russian Federation|
|INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 1/Add. 2 – Finland||INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2/Add. 2 – Belarus|
|INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 1/Add. 3 – Australia||INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2/Add. 3 – Turkey|
|INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 1/Add. 4 – Cyprus||INFCIRC/254/Rev.3/Part 2/Add. 4 – Russian Federation|
Fourth Revision (2000)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.4/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.4/Part 2 Additions:
Fifth Revision (2002)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 1 (corrected), INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 2 (English, Arabic, French, Russian, Spanish)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 1/Add. 1 – Norway
INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 1/Add. 2 – Australia
INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 1/Add. 3 – Slovenia
INFCIRC/254/Rev.5/Part 2/Add. 1 – Brazil and Romania
Sixth Revision (2003)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 1 (English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 2 Addition:
INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 1/Add. 1 – Brazil and Romania
Seventh Revision (2005)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 1, INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2
Eighth Revision (2006)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1/Add. 1 – Denmark (English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish)
The Zangger Committee, sometimes referred to as the ‘NPT Exporters Committee’, harmonizes implementation of the NPT’s requirement to apply International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to nuclear exports. The Committee has 38 Member States.
Zangger Committee Documents
Multilateral nuclear supply principles of the Zangger Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/17)
Multilateral nuclear supply principles of the Zangger Committee (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.15)
Zangger Understandings (communications received from States) (INFCIRC/20/Rev.2)
Zangger Committee – INFCIRC/209 series
First Document (1974)
The Zangger Committee Understandings were reached in 1974, and published by the IAEA as two separate memoranda. The memoranda, known as ‘trigger lists’, contribute to the understanding of Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT. They give definition to the provisions contained in this article and provide procedures for the export of materials and equipment described therein.
First Revision (1990)
INFCIRC/209/Rev.1 Developments in nuclear technology brought about the need to clarify parts of the trigger list contained in Memorandum B of INFCIRC/209. Four modifications were made under this first revision, which are contained in INFCIRC/209/Rev.1/Mod.1, 2, 3 and 4, and consolidated in INFCIRC/209/Rev.1.
The first modification clarified parts of the trigger list, which refer to plants for the production of heavy water deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed or prepared therefore.
Modification Two INFCIRC/209/Mod.2
The second modification clarified parts of the trigger list which refer to equipment especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium, and to primary coolant pumps.
Second Revision (2000)
INFCIRC/209/Rev.02 (English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish)
Developments in nuclear technology brought about the need to expand the trigger list. The second revision to INFCIRC/209 amended the trigger list to include a new entry entitled plants for the conversion of uranium and plutonium and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor.
Third Revision (2014)
INFCIRC/209/Rev.3 (English only) The trigger list was amended in 2014 in order to more clearly define the standard of implementation that all Member States of the Zangger Committee regard as essential for the fulfillment of the Understandings. Amendments previously approved (published as INFCIRC/209/Rev.02/Mod.1 and INFCIRC/209/Rev.02/Corr.1) were also incorporated into the revised list.