

# Climate Talks Spotlight

## Verification

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Trust & Verify

Negotiations on the implementation of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol proceeded slowly at the 10<sup>th</sup> Meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies to the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), held from 31 May to 11 June in Bonn, Germany. A slow pace was perhaps inevitable as negotiators struggled to comprehend the implications of the design and implementation of this far-reaching agreement. In the case of utilisation of the land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector in meeting targets, scientific uncertainty added to the problem, and negotiators agreed to wait for the publication of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on the subject next year before making decisions. But a more significant block to progress was that parties are still deeply divided on some of the fundamental principles of the Protocol. One of these is the extent to which parties should be allowed to meet their emissions targets using the Kyoto Mechanisms (Joint Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanisms and Emissions Trading). The EU proposal to cap the use of the mechanisms was so vehemently opposed by the other developed countries that it was agreed to defer all discussion to a later date. Other disputed points of principle, such as the type of participation in the Protocol required of developing countries, will continue to impede negotiations.

No-one expected these meetings to make landmark decisions. The Buenos Aires Plan of Action, agreed last year, allows parties to the sixth Conference of the Parties (late 2000) to decide how to implement the Protocol. This encourages decision-making to be largely deferred until then. In the meantime, the Subsidiary Body for Science and Technical Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) continued work on the technical and procedural details of the Convention and its Protocol.

Verification was an important part of the meetings' agendas. Separate contact groups were set up to consider draft guidelines for the preparation of national communications from Annex I (developed countries) and reporting by non-Annex I parties. In addition, a joint working group on compliance met for the first time. On verification, as in other areas, progress was slow and yielded mixed results. Parties continued to emphasise the need for transparent and verifiable systems, but were less enthusiastic about agreeing to the obligations necessary to realise them.

The contact group on Annex I national communications probably made the most headway. This group was carrying forward previous work on guidelines for the preparation and reporting of national annual reports, as required under both the Convention and the Protocol. The communications will consist of two parts: the greenhouse gas inventory and a report covering all aspects of a party's implementation of the Convention and Protocol. Discussions on the guidelines for reporting national inventories ran smoothly. A key part of the new guidelines is a Common Reporting Format (CRF), devised to permit all parties to compile their inventory in the same way. Electronic reporting is being encouraged to improve efficiency and verifiability. The SBSTA and SBI agreed the guidelines and will recommend to the Conference of the Parties (in October 1999) that parties use them for a two-year trial, starting with submissions due in April 2000. Thereafter the guidelines would be reviewed, taking into account the experiences of the parties and the FCCC Secretariat and any new technical advice available.

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Progress on the guidelines for the non-inventory part of national communications was slower and showed some worrying trends. The non-inventory part of the national communication is intended to provide the information required to assess a party's compliance with all aspects of the Convention and its Protocol. While discussions were not concluded and will continue at the next meetings in October, some parties appeared to be attempting to restrict or obscure the information they will be required to submit. For example, the US attempted to remove or shift elsewhere elements of the reporting requirements on energy intensity per unit of GDP, emissions per capita and GDP per capita. Requirements to report energy intensity (total primary energy supply per unit of GDP), total primary energy supply per capita and state support for transport, forestry and industry sectors were also enclosed in square brackets in the draft text, signifying a lack of consensus.

Parties also appeared to be attempting to streamline the information required on financial resources and technology transfer to developing countries. Last, the mandatory requirement (under both the Convention and the Protocol) for parties to provide a quantitative estimate of the impacts of their climate change policies and measures was placed under a non-mandatory chapeau in the draft guidelines. NGOs will be closely watching this group in October to ensure that the text is not permanently emasculated.

Discussion in the contact group on non-Annexe I communications focussed on developing country capacity to prepare national inventories and reports. Annexe I parties were keen to discuss revisions to reporting guidelines for non-Annexe I parties, including broadening the amount of information submitted. The non-Annexe I parties insisted that consideration of their communications should focus on their financial and technical difficulties in preparing the reports. They were particularly concerned that the Global Environment Facility is not adequately fulfilling its role of providing funds for

developing countries to prepare their communications. This deadlock effectively thwarted progress and further discussion was deferred to the next meetings.

### Island States Rush to Ratify

Since the last report in *Trust & Verify* in April, another 4 small island states—Cyprus, Jamaica, the Federated States of Micronesia and Niue—have rushed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, along with odd-man out Georgia. The island states clearly sense a threat to their very existence from climate change. The 13 states parties to the Protocol are now:

Antigua & Barbuda  
Bahamas  
Cyprus  
El Salvador  
Federated States of Micronesia  
Fiji  
Georgia  
Jamaica  
Maldives  
Niue  
Panama  
Trinidad & Tobago  
Tuvalu

The discussions in the Joint Working Group (JWG) on Compliance were the first formal airing of views by parties on dealing with non-compliance under the Protocol. While the Convention has set up a Multi-lateral Consultative Process to deal co-operatively with implementation problems, Article 18 of the Protocol asks parties to 'approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of consequences taking into

account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance'. The JWG was established at these meetings to start tackling this requirement.

The JWG made a slow start, as the G77/China group was not able to contribute to the discussion until it had formulated a negotiating position at the end of the first week. Despite this, talks continued, focussing on: identification of compliance-related elements, including gaps and suitable fora to address them; design of a compliance system; and consequences of non-compliance. Key issues to be resolved include: whether the system should apply to all Protocol obligations or just some of them; who would have the authority to trigger the system; the form, if any, that a body to deal with compliance should take; and whether agreed automatic consequences for non-compliance would be applied. A questionnaire covering all the issues was devised for parties to complete by 1 August 1999. All parties emphasised that they could only give initial views at this time and it was agreed to hold an informal workshop in October to help parties better understand the subject.

Outside the formal meetings, verification was a popular topic of discussion. Green NGOs are keen to ensure that creative accounting does not reduce the



environmental integrity of the regime, while the business community wants to ensure that credits gained under the Kyoto Mechanisms will be reliable. Scientists at the meetings may have been glad just to get away from politics and down to technicalities.

Verification was also the central theme of two events. First, the Programme on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, a joint project of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), presented its work on good practice in inventory compilation, aimed at reducing the uncertainties and inconsistencies in inventories. Second, the FCCC Secretariat hosted a panel discussion on verification under the Clean Development Mechanism. Both events demonstrated that much useful work is proceeding in this area, but that a large number of issues remain to be resolved.

Clare Tenner

### Book Review

*Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 1998/9*  
edited by Helge Ole Bergesen, Georg Parmann and Øystein B. Thommessen  
(Earthscan Publications, London, 1998)

This is the seventh yearbook produced by the Institute Fridtjof Nansen, all others having been published under the title *Green Globe Yearbook*. Although the title has changed, the aim remains to comprehensively assess the achievements of international co-operation towards sustainable development. Verification, compliance and implementation matters loom large.

The main body of the *Yearbook* consists of reference information assembled under the following headings; Agreements on Environment and Development, Inter-Governmental Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations and Country Profiles. This is prefaced by five short papers in a section entitled 'Current Issues and Key Themes' which admirably set the context for the drier material that follows.

The first paper, by Richard Sandbrook, gives an authoritative, and rather depressing, analysis of the mixed progress in the 25 years since the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. He describes the rise to popularity of 'green' issues and the institutionalisation of the term sustainable development, but laments that, despite the flood of articles, conferences and international agreements, the world has not fundamentally changed its approach to the environment. In particular, institutional mechanisms still do not exist to make the trade-offs required between the environment, the economy and social and cultural considerations.

The other papers describe lessons that can be drawn from case studies. The first, by Eleonore Schmidt, describes how forest industries, indigenous groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are trying to join forces to define standards for

sustainable forestry and establish an authoritative labelling system that can earn the confidence of consumers. The Forestry Stewardship Council is an interesting possible model for future collaborations that aim to protect the environment without recourse to intergovernmental negotiations and treaty-making. Sebastian Oberthür looks at the problems of maintaining co-operation between countries with very different objectives in an agreement. He describes the conflicts within the International Whaling Commission and how these affect its operation. Two papers illustrating positive aspects of international institutions follow. First, Olav Schram Stokke notes the value of the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution. Although the regime has many deficiencies (including a 'clearly inadequate compliance system'), he concludes it has been successful in persuading countries to avoid disposal of waste at sea by providing an arena for international compromise, a focus for public attention, co-ordination of technology transfer and financial support. Similarly, Farhana Yamin uses the example of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development to emphasise that institutions can play a valuable role. She apportions blame for the apparent failure of many agreements and institutions to the fact that the tasks given to them are often over ambitious.

This inspired choice of subjects provides an overview of the many ways in which international collaboration can be achieved, and the successes and shortcomings of different approaches. Although these examples are all drawn from the environment field, the lessons will be of interest to those working on other international issues. With regard to verification, a number of messages emerge concerning the need to tailor compliance systems to each situation and to be



prepared to review and change such systems as circumstances and experience evolve.

The largest segment of the reference section describes international agreements. Forty-three are summarised under the headings: objectives, scope, time and place of establishment, status of participation, affiliated instruments and organisations, major activities, secretariat, finance, rules and standards, monitoring and implementation, decision-making bodies and key publications. Additionally, a map for each agreement shows at a glance which countries have signed and/or ratified. The consistent format and clear layout make it easy to compare agreements for any given aspect and a wealth of information is conveyed in a concise manner. The only drawback is that the descriptions use the language of the agreements themselves, which makes reading the longer entries rather laborious. There is no attempt at an analysis of the facts presented, which is probably just as well, since each reader will be looking for something different. However the section closes with a useful table showing the degree of participation in each agreement, by country. A minor criticism of these tables: although the layout is clear, the dots used to represent the degree of participation are various shades of grey which are not easy to distinguish from one another.

The sections on inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and NGOs are also organised under clear and consistent headings. Information on IGOs is particularly useful in helping the reader see the responsibilities of each and how they are linked to work on environment and development issues. The

information given on NGOs is much shorter, limited to objectives, activities and contact details. Only 24 NGOs are listed and at first glance it is not clear why these were chosen from the plethora of possibilities. Why, for example, is Atmospheric Action Network East Asia included when other regional organisations are not? Despite a couple of such oddities, this section is a useful starting point for any study of international NGOs.

Last, there is a set of country profiles which rotate each year. These are composed entirely of statistics on such matters as their economy, compliance with reporting requirements in international agreements, financial contributions to agreements and IGOs, and environmental performance as measured by indicators such as emissions and biological resources. The small number of countries covered (19) and the relatively arbitrary choice of indicators of contributions to international progress on environment and development, make this section less useful than the others. Nevertheless, it does convey an impression of the range of circumstances surrounding different countries' participation in international processes.

In summary, the great value of the *Yearbook* is that it compiles a wealth of up-to-date information in a concise and user-friendly format. Just enough analysis is presented to be useful without overshadowing the primary data, and the whole lot is topped with punchy opening papers.

Clare Tenner



## Verification Watch

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### Korean Underground Site Given All-Clear

The on-site inspection of an underground site at Kumchang-ni in the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) by US inspectors from 18-24 May revealed no evidence of a suspected nuclear facility. The US delegation was permitted to conduct all activities agreed to in the US-DPRK agreement of 16 March 1999. This included measuring the dimensions of all underground areas at the main complex, videotaping them and photographing above-ground facilities supporting the site. According to an official US State Department statement, the US delegation saw no evidence of DPRK efforts to conceal any portion of the facility. The statement added,

'Excavation of the complex, as currently configured, was almost complete but a great deal of additional finishing work remained to be done with almost all of the tunnels still bare rock. Moreover, there was no indication that equipment was ever installed at this location'.

Based on the evidence gathered and its review by US technical experts, it was concluded that:

- The site at Kumchang-ni does not contain a plutonium production reactor or reprocessing plant, either completed or under construction.
- Given the current size and configuration of the underground area, the site is unsuitable for the installation of a plutonium production reactor,



especialy a graphite-moderated reactor of the type North Korea has built at Yongbyon.

- The site is also not well designed for a reprocessing plant. Nevertheless, since the site is a large underground area, it could support such a facility in the future with substantial modifications.
- At this point in time the US cannot rule out the possibility that the site was intended for other nuclear-related uses although it does not appear to be currently configured to support any large industrial nuclear functions.

The US has concluded that, at present, the underground site at Kumchang-ni does not violate the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework which prohibits further attempts by North Korea to produce nuclear weapons. As agreed between the US and the DPRK, the next US visit to the site will take place in May 2000 and will include examining its feasibility for commercial use.

The *Washington Post* quoted a US official as saying that the site at Kumchang-ni had taken thousands of workers about a decade to build, making it unlikely that it was meant as a decoy. The official noted that there were no signs of the amenities of an underground shelter, and that it could not be adapted for nuclear energy material reprocessing without drainage. An administration official said that the ability to get into the tunnels at least showed that the DPRK foreign ministry or someone more senior could force the military to open up a facility for inspection.

Sources: US Department of State Spokesman James P. Rubin, 'US Concludes North Korea Underground Site Not Nuclear', US Information Agency (USIA) text, Washington, DC, 25 June 1999; Steven Mufson, 'Secretive North Korea Leaves Many Guessing', *Washington Post*, 9 July 1999, p. A27.

### Israeli-Swedish Team Develops Explosive Sniffer

A team of Swedish and Israeli experts has developed a device which may outperform and replace the explosive-finding dog. Resembling a vacuum cleaner, the device absorbs air and exposes it to a small crystal which contains an antibody that evaporates if the air contains traces of TNT. The device can determine the presence of TNT in a 25-square-metre area.

The initiative for the invention came from a group of weapons engineers who left Bofors, the Swedish arms maker, in the mid-1990s to found a new company Biosensor Applications Sweden. Biosensor has used the technology developed by Hebrew University biochemist Professor Itamar Willner to build a prototype of the sniffer device. So far, it has detected TNT in about 300 tests and is about to undergo its most serious—in a minefield. Only after that will it go into general production.

## Verification Bytes

- Verification of demilitarisation by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), as provided for in the 21 June Demilitarisation Agreement, is being conducted by the NATO military force in Kosovo (KFOR). According to the plan, which guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci signed and presented to NATO, the KLA had 30 days to surrender all its heavy weapons and 30 percent of its small arms. Nineteen collection sites were established throughout Kosovo. To date the demilitarisation has gone to plan, although violations have been reported (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News, Prague 21 July 1999)

- Talks to end the 11-month civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo became stalemated in late June over a verification issue: Congo and Zimbabwe were dissatisfied with proposals for the formation of verification committees to oversee the peace process (*International Herald Tribune*, 29 June 1999, p. 7)

- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted a safeguards inspection of the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences outside Belgrade, Yugoslavia on 3-4 June; it found no 'indication that the status of the nuclear material at the facility had changed' (IAEA Press Release, 8 June 1999)

- At its annual meeting beginning 7 June in Vienna the Board of Governors of the IAEA authorised the IAEA Director General to conclude Additional Protocols for strengthened nuclear safeguards with Norway and the Republic of Korea (*IAEA Newsbriefs*, vol. 14, no. 2, April/May 1999, p. 3)

- The UN Security Council sanctions committee for Angola has recommended the deployment of civilian monitors throughout Angola to investigate reports of sanctions-busting: 'We're not talking about big battalions', committee chairman, Ambassador Robert Fowler of Canada, said. The monitors could number fewer than 100 (Thalif Deen, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 June 1999, p. 14)

- US intelligence agencies report that they have no evidence that Iraq has resumed its weapons of mass destruction programmes since the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) withdrew on 16 December 1998, just prior to a 3-day US/UK bombing campaign (*International Herald Tribune*, 16 July 1999, p. 10). Meanwhile the UN Security Council has been unable to agree on a replacement for UNSCOM: two competing resolutions, one sponsored by the UK and the Netherlands and backed by the US, the other sponsored by China, France and Russia, have so far proved irreconcilable.



Biosensor officials say that, after final tests, the sniffer will go on the market later this year. Its projected price is between \$US15,000 and \$US25,000 per unit, compared to the estimated \$US70,000 cost of an anti-mine dog's training, not to mention the salary of an experienced handler each canine requires.

Source: Beile Grunbaum, 'Scents of Security', *Jerusalem Report*, 8 June 1999, p. 39.

### British Company Allegedly Sells Landmines Explosive to US Army

Royal Ordnance, a subsidiary of British Aerospace, the UK's largest weapons manufacturer, is allegedly exporting RDX, a key explosive component of anti-personnel landmines to the United States. Royal Ordnance has a five-year £55 million contract as the US Army's sole supplier of RDX. Police have reportedly forwarded a file for investigation by UK Customs and Excise after a complaint from the Campaign Against the Arms Trade. If substantiated, such exports would put the UK in violation of the 1997 Landmine Ban Treaty (Ottawa Convention). Treaty parties are forbidden to assist other states to acquire landmines. The US has neither signed nor ratified the Ottawa Treaty.

The UK Landmines Act, passed by the British Parliament last year, makes the export of anti-personnel mines or components a crime punishable by up to 14 years in jail and/or an unlimited fine. Steve Abney, spokesman for the US Army's Industrial Operations Command, which oversees American arsenals and munitions factories, reportedly confirmed that it was technically feasible for Royal Ordnance RDX to be used in anti-personnel mines and nothing in the contract would prevent such use. Roger Berry, a Labour MP on the Joint Committee on Strategic Exports which monitors overseas sales of military equipment, said the UK Department of Trade and Industry should have demanded a

'contractual element preventing the material being used in landmine manufacture'.

Source: *Independent on Sunday*, London, 27 June 1999, p. 1.

### Remote Sensing for All

In the April 1999 edition of *Trust & Verify* (p. 9) it was reported that three US-based commercial satellite companies, which will be able to supply satellite imagery with an unprecedented resolution of 1 metre, would only be permitted to provide such data to the US government. In fact, according to the UK National Remote Sensing Centre, the imagery will be available commercially. This is likely to revolutionise the use of satellite imagery by non-governmental organisations and commercial companies alike.

Source: Derek Morris, Remote Sensing Society, UK.

### Holum on Verification

John Holum, former Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) which was absorbed by the State Department in April, testified before the US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on 28 June. The Committee was considering his nomination to the new post of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. He made several comments on verification, including giving a reassurance that in protecting the 'central qualities' of the old ACDA within the State Department measures would be taken to 'insulate our verification and compliance judgments from competing pressures. It includes the means for unvarnished views on matters such as non-proliferation policy and performance to be aired interagency, and taken to the highest levels, even to the President of the United States'. He vowed to continue to work to protect US 'verification assets'.

Source: US Mission to NATO, *Security Issues Digest*, no. 123, 28 June 1999, at <http://usa.grmbl.com/s19990628f.html>

### Verification Quotes

*This is nothing but a groundless fabrication as it is a cock-and-bull story that can be made only by those who are suffering from mental derangement. Their talk about 'missile development' through 'transfer of technology' is also a sheer lie, which does not deserve even a passing note. We make it clear again that the launching of missile and satellite is the shining result of our highly developed 'juche' (self-reliance) oriented science and technology.*

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), official news agency of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), commenting on US Congressional rumours that North Korea has obtained technology transfers from a third country to help it develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, Reuters, Tokyo, 6 July 1999.

*We don't know what it's supposed to be.*

Unnamed US official commenting on the North Korean underground site following the US on-site inspection, quoted in *Washington Post*, 9 July 1999, p. A27.



## VERTIC/UNIDIR 'Getting to Zero' Seminar

VERTIC's 'Getting to Zero' project, funded by the Ploughshares Fund and the W. Alton Jones Foundation, is to be rounded off with a seminar in Geneva on 29 July organised jointly by VERTIC and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Representatives of delegations to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) have been invited, as well as academics and non-governmental organisations. The authors of VERTIC's four 'Getting to Zero' reports will speak to their papers and field questions. The four presenters are:

- Patricia Lewis, 'Laying the Foundations for Getting to Zero: Verifying the Transition to Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons'
- Tom Milne, 'Verifying the Transition from Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons to Zero' (the paper is co-authored with Henrietta Wilson)
- George Palocz-Horvath, 'Virtual Nuclear Capabilities in a World Without Nuclear Weapons'
- Suzanna van Moyland, 'Sustaining a Verification Regime in a Nuclear Weapon-Free World'.

The session will be chaired by Trevor Findlay, Executive Director of VERTIC, and Patricia Lewis, Director of UNIDIR. The four papers are available from VERTIC.

## New Grants

The Ford Foundation has granted VERTIC \$US100,000 for the coming year for its arms control and disarmament verification programme. The funding permits VERTIC to employ its new Arms Control and Disarmament Researcher, Dr Oliver Meier, as well as funding programme research activities. VERTIC is grateful to the Ford Foundation for its continuing generous support.

The Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust has granted VERTIC and the International Security Information Service (ISIS) £13,239 to fund their relocation from Carrara House to Baird House earlier this year. VERTIC is especially appreciative of this generous financial support to defray such major unexpected costs, particularly since the Trust is already providing VERTIC with 3-year core and re-development funding.

## Richard Butler to Join Consultants Network

Richard Butler AO, former Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission for Iraq (UNSCOM) and former Australian Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, has agreed to join VERTIC's International Verification Consultants Network. Mr Butler, who is currently Diplomat-in-Residence at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, will bring a wealth of verification experience to VERTIC's Network.

## VERTIC Visitors

Recent visitors to VERTIC have included:

- Richard Latter, Deputy Director, Wilton Park
- Professor Michael Caldwell, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA
- Pan Weifang, Political Counsellor, Chinese Embassy, London
- Pablo Kang, Third Secretary, Australian High Commission, London.

## Staff News

*Trevor Findlay* gave interviews on Kosovo verification issues to ten BBC regional radio stations on 10 June and to BBC 24-hour television news. From 14-16 June he attended a conference at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) on the Kyoto Protocol. On 23 June he gave a seminar at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) in London entitled 'Verification: What Now?' to members of the Working Group on Weapons of Mass Destruction and International Security Policy. He attended another seminar there on 'Why the US Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Chemical or Biological Weapons' given by Professor Scott Sagan of Stanford University on 6 July. He finished proof editing of his book *The Blue Helmets' First War: Use of Force by the UN in the Congo 1960-64*, which is being published by the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Nova Scotia, Canada.

*Clare Tenner* attended the 10<sup>th</sup> Meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies to the Framework Convention on Climate Change from 31 May to 11 June, held in



Bonn, Germany. She also went to the follow-up conference on 'Implementing the Kyoto Protocol' held by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 14 and 15 June.

Also, on the 14 June Clare attended the launch of the Royal Society report *Nuclear Energy: The Future Climate*. On 16 June Clare joined representatives of British Environmental NGOs at a meeting with the Indian Minister for Environment and Forests, Mr Suresh Prabhu, at India House.

From June 28 Clare participated in a one-week EC-funded advanced study course held by the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD). The course was on Legal Aspects of the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Maintaining Accountability in a Flexible Regime. She gave a presentation on 'Monitoring and Verification in the Kyoto Protocol'. Last, on 12 July Clare attended the Royal Institution Tyndall Forum Meeting on 'Slowing Climate Change Through Carbon Sinks—Do We Know Enough To Act?'



VERTIC is the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, an independent, non-profit making, non-governmental organisation. Its mission is to promote effective and efficient verification as a means of ensuring confidence in the implementation of treaties or other agreements that have international or national security implications. VERTIC aims to achieve its mission through research, training, dissemination of information and interaction with the relevant political, diplomatic, technical, scientific and non-governmental communities. A Board of Directors is responsible for general oversight of VERTIC's operations and an International Verification Consultants Network provides expert advice. VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts, currently the Ford Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Ploughshares Fund, the Rockefeller Family Philanthropic Offices, the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

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