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## Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee

The first Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting in the run up to the 2000 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was held in New York on 7–18 April.

This follows the decision on strengthening the treaty review process at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to hold a PrepCom in each of the three years running up to the Review Conference itself.

The PrepCom was attended by representatives of 149 states parties and 4 observer states (Brazil, Cuba, Israel and Pakistan). The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not represented, having expressed an intention to attend as an observer. Observer status is only used for states not party to the NPT, but wish to attend the meeting. As the DPRK is a party to the NPT, it could not attend as an observer.

As in earlier international conferences, the issue of Yugoslavia's participation caused some dispute. As has happened before, the issue was left unresolved with a Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nameplate on a desk, but without any representative behind it.

The PrepCom was chaired by Ambassador Pasi Patokallio of Finland. The second, in 1998, will be chaired by Ambassador Tadeusz Strulak of Poland with the chair of the third (and possibly the Review Conference itself) coming from the Group of Non-Aligned and other states. There has been some discussion that a fourth PrepCom session may be required to complete the workload before the Review Conference, although no decision was taken on this.

A future schedule of meetings has been agreed provisionally, although there has been some opposition to holding a PrepCom session in Geneva, particularly from the non-aligned, as the cost for many states to attend meetings in Geneva is higher than in New York. The details are as follows:

- second PrepCom (Geneva), 27 April–8 May 1998;
- third PrepCom (New York), 12–23 April 1999; and
- the Review Conference, (New York) 24 April–19 May 2000.

### NGO participation

As in previous NPT meetings, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were allowed to attend meetings of the PrepCom that were not designated as closed from the public gallery, receive prepCom documents, and to make written materials available to the delegates.

In a departure from previous practice, NGOs were allowed to address an informal session of the PrepCom (on the morning of the second Wednesday).

A similar form of arrangement for NGO participation had been made at the Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention held in December 1996.

As 113 NGOs had registered to attend the PrepCom, it was clear that there would be insufficient time for them all to address the meeting. It was decided amongst the NGOs in attendance that there would be sufficient time for nine presentations, and that these should each be given on a different theme.

## CWC — Conference of States Parties

The First Session of the Conference of States Parties of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was held in the Hague from 6 to 24 May 1997.

It was attended by 80 of the then-87 states parties, 36 signatory states and one observer state. The states parties that did not attend

were: Albania, Equatorial Guinea, Maldives, Moldova, St Lucia, Seychelles and Tajikistan.

### Executive Council

The 41 members of the Executive Council were elected by consensus. As half of the seats on the Council are up for re-election in each

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year, some states have been appointed for a term of only one year. There is also one seat on the Council that rotates between groups. The composition of the Executive Council is given in Box 1.

### Staff Appointments

The following appointments were made to the OPCW Technical Secretariat:

- Director-General — José Mauricio Bustani (Brazil)
- Deputy Director-General — John Gee (Australia)
- Director (Verification) — Jean-Louis Rolland (France)
- Director (Inspectorate) — Ichiro Akiyama (Japan)
- Director (External Relations) — Huang Yu (China)
- Director (Administration) — David Clements (USA)
- Director (International Cooperation and Assistance) — John Makhubalo (Zimbabwe)
- Director (Legal) — Rodrigo Yepes Enriquez (Ecuador)
- Director (Internal Oversight) — Mohamed Louati (Tunisia)
- Secretary to Policy-Making Organs — Sylwin Gizowski (Poland)

## IAEA — New Model Additional Protocol Approved

At a meeting on 15–16 May, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approved further measures to strengthen the Agency's system of safeguards.

The measures are contained in a new model additional protocol that is designed to supplement existing safeguards arrangements. Owing to the legal basis of safeguards, each state will require an individual agreement to implement the new measures.

Elements of the new model additional protocol include:

- an 'expanded declaration' to provide information on activities that do not involve nuclear material but which are related to nuclear fuel cycle activities;
- access to any place on the site of a nuclear facility, to any decommissioned facility, and to any other location where nuclear material is present; to locations referred to in the expanded declaration; and to other locations identified by the Agency; and
- environmental sampling.

The new model additional protocol is the result of the Agency's '93+2' programme which was initiated following experiences with Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the implementation of safeguards. It has also made use of lessons learned by the Agency from South Africa's nuclear-weapons programme.

For further reading on the development of IAEA safeguards see Suzanna van Moyland, 'The International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol', *Verification Matters Briefing Paper* 97/2, July 1997.

**Box 1 — The Membership of the OPCW Executive Council**

Group	1 year	2 years
Africa (9 seats)	Algeria Kenya Morocco South Africa	Cameroon Côte d'Ivoire Ethiopia Tunisia Zimbabwe
Asia (9 seats plus 1 seat rotated with Latin America and the Caribbean Group)	Bangladesh Oman Philippines Sri Lanka	China India Japan Republic of Korea Saudi Arabia
Eastern Europe (5 seats)	Belarus Bulgaria Romania	Hungary Poland
Latin America and the Caribbean (7 seats plus 1 seat rotated with Asia Group)	Ecuador Peru Suriname Uruguay	Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico
Western European and other states [WEOG] (10 seats)	Australia Malta Netherlands Norway Spain	France Germany Italy United Kingdom United States of America



## **The United States — an attempt to gut the CWC?**

When the United States deposited its instrument of ratification to the CWC with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 25 April it also deposited the following declaration:

Subject to the condition which relates to the Annex on Implementation and Verification, that no sample collected in the United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred to any laboratory outside the territory of the United States.

At first sight this may seem a reasonable attempt to protect US commercial interests that had been vocal in their concerns that the CWC would lead to loss of proprietary information.

However, its effects may be to lead other states to make such 'declarations', greatly weakening the

Convention. (Note: the US statement is a 'declaration' rather than a 'reservation' as the latter could be held to be against Article XXII of the Convention.)

What would be the US reaction if, say, Iran, on depositing its instrument of ratification, were to make a similar declaration?

International instruments such as the CWC can only operate successfully if independent verification can be seen to be carried out in a fair and proper manner and if all states are treated equally.

If this declaration is left to stand without comment from the international community, then the guts of the Convention may have been removed.

## **New British Government**

On 1 May a new Government was elected in Britain. It has made a number of statements on changes in foreign policy.

The statements below have been compiled from a variety of official sources.

### **On the Strategic Defence Review:**

As promised in our Manifesto and announced in the Queen's Speech, the Government has now started work on the Strategic Defence Review. One of its main aims is to build as wide a consensus as possible on British defence policy to provide an agreed basis for defence policy and planning into the next century.

The Review will be foreign policy led. The first stage will be to identify our interests and commitments within the clear commitments on which we were elected: collective defence through NATO, active cooperation with our Allies, strong conventional forces, and maintenance of our national nuclear deterrent. Within this framework the Review will look afresh at all aspects of our policy and programmes to decide how the Armed Forces should be structured, equipped and deployed to meet those objectives.

### **On nuclear weapons:**

The Government will press for multilateral negotiations towards

mutual, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons. When satisfied with verified progress towards our goal of the global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure that British nuclear weapons are included in multilateral negotiations. We are considering how best to implement this policy.

### **On anti-personnel land-mines:**

We shall implement our manifesto commitment to ban the import, export, transfer and manufacture of all forms of anti-personnel land mines.

We will accelerate the phasing out of our stocks of anti-personnel land mines, and complete it by 2005 or when an effective international agreement to ban their use enters into force, whichever comes first. In the meantime, we have introduced a complete moratorium on their operational use, while we participate constructively in the Ottawa Process and push in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a wider ban.

That moratorium will be suspended only if we judge that for a specific operation the security of our Armed Forces would be jeopardised without the possibility of the use of anti-personnel land mines. In such an exceptional case we would report to Parliament the decision, and the circumstances which led to it.

We shall also examine how we can make more progress in removing mines already laid across the world.

### **On export controls:**

We have made a firm commitment not to permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression. To give effect to that commitment, we have initiated an urgent review of the detailed criteria used in considering licence applications for the export of conventional arms. We support a strong UK defence industry but must ensure that exports are properly regulated. We are aware of concerns that some defence equipment exported from the UK in the past has been used for internal repression. The review will ensure that the risk of such misuse is fully taken into account, alongside all other relevant factors, in the assessment of all licence applications for the export of conventional arms. The new criteria will be made available to the House when the Review is complete. In the meantime, I have instructed my officials to consult Ministers whenever there are export licence applications which may raise concerns about human rights or international stability.



## Anti-Personnel Mines — the 'Ottawa Process' continues

### Brussels meeting

The latest meeting in the 'Ottawa Process' to agree a treaty banning anti-personnel mines (APMs) took place in Brussels on 24–27 June 1997.

117 states were full participants in the meeting, while 33 others attended as observers (including the Russian Federation and the United States). The Palestinian Authority also attended as an observer.

Earlier meetings, in Vienna and Bonn, had resulted in what was effectively a 'rolling text' for the treaty which, having been amended following consultations, is now known as the 'Austrian draft'. Although this has not been formally adopted, there is a widespread feeling that this will form the basis of the final treaty.

The June meeting produced a statement, known as the Brussels Declaration, which reaffirmed the desire to conclude and sign 'an agreement banning anti-personnel landmines before the end of 1997 in Ottawa'. The Brussels Declaration was signed by 97 participants at the meeting and has been left open for other participants to sign if they wish.

The next meeting is to be held on 1–19 September in Oslo.

### Outstanding issues

#### Definitions

Definitions are an important issue in all treaties, as without clear definitions, confidence in a treaty may be much reduced if there is a grey area of overlap between compliance and non-compliance.

The 13 May version of the Austrian draft defines an APM as:

a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.

However, the definition excludes:

mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices ...

Critics of this definition point out that it would be possible to manufacture anti-vehicle mines that would have anti-handling devices so sensitive as to make them indistinguishable in effect from anti-personnel mines.

#### Retained stocks

The 13 May version of the Austrian draft includes the provision that parties would be allowed to:

retain or transfer a number of anti-personnel mines necessary for the development and teaching of mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques.

Retained stocks of any item regulated by any treaty cause problems with verification and with confidence building.

It is far easier to maintain confidence in a regime that has a total prohibition on an item.

While there may be some justification for the retention of a small number of APMs (although this is hotly disputed), there has been no attempt to codify an upper limit on numbers retained under this provision.

Italy, for example, has indicated that, under this provision, it may wish to retain as many as 200,000 APMs.

#### Other APM news

##### CD urged by US to ban APMs

Speaking in a plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on 15 May, the head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, John Holum, urged that forum to make progress on starting

negotiations that could lead to a ban on APMs.

On 26 June, Ambassador John Campbell (Australia) was appointed as Special Coordinator in the CD on the topic of APMs.

##### Bosnia mine clearance

Mine clearance operations in Bosnia have been hampered by lack of funds.

A target of US\$38 million had been set for contributions to the clear-up costs for 1997 — but, by the end of the first quarter of the year, only \$6.5 million had been received.

During 1996, APMs were believed to have caused 324 casualties in Bosnia, including 59 deaths, according to figures compiled by the Red Cross.

##### UK loses track of APMs in Iraq

It has become known that 12 C3A1 anti-personnel mines were used in Iraq by British forces during the Gulf conflict and were not subsequently recovered. C3A1 mines are commonly known as 'Elsies'.

The British Government has stated that 'details of their precise locations were not recorded in view of the nature of the operations', and that this was 'consistent with the provisions of international law'.

The case has highlighted the problems of recording details of deployments of APMs.

##### US clears mines in Cuba

The United States is clearing APMs around the US Navy's Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba.

The US Department of Defense has stated that this has been prompted by the decision of President Clinton to support a worldwide ban on APMs.

However, US minefields in the border area on the Korean Peninsula are to remain in place.

## Open Skies

On 17 and 18 June, Hungary (as a lead nation) and Romania performed two joint 'Open Skies' trial flights over Bosnia and Hercegovina. This was one of the voluntary confidence-building measures foreseen under Article 2 of the Dayton Agreement.

The exercise involved representatives of the State of Bosnia and Hercegovina and from the three ethnic 'entities' as well as international observers. Aerial photographs taken from military sites of the three entities were shared among them.

The flights were carried out in a cooperative atmosphere.

It was the first time since NATO took over control of the airspace over Bosnia that aerial photographs of their mutual territories became available to the parties.



It is expected that further Open Skies trial flights over Bosnia will follow during this year, carried out by Romania and potentially also the United States and Germany as lead nations. This might pave the way for a more permanent Open Skies regime for the region.

A bilateral Open Skies Agreement between Hungary and Romania has been successfully in force since 1992, although this has not been well known.

In contrast, the multilateral Open Skies Treaty, which has 27 state parties, still waits for entry into force. The pending ratification procedures in the Ukrainian Rada and the Russian Duma are hoped to take place this fall. Many previous hopes in this direction failed. However, there are some positive indications.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has given the go-ahead — after a standstill of more than a year — for a new round of bilateral trial flights under the rules of the Treaty. On the Ukrainian side their Open Skies aircraft, a twin engine Antonov An-30 with a flight range of less than 1500km, was taken to the United States earlier this year. This flight required a spectacular 'island-hopping' with four stopovers. It covered US sites on the East Coast including Cape Canaveral.

Beyond the Northern Hemisphere the Open Skies idea is gaining ground in South America.

South American Defense Ministers have declared confidence-building measures to be amongst their priorities. It is said that at least four or five South American states are interested to consider bilateral or trilateral Open-Skies arrangements with their neighbours.

The United States has been promoting the idea in a discreet but persistent way. It has been agreed that the US Open Skies aircraft will be displayed at a major airshow in Santiago de Chile in March 1998, concurrent with a meeting of the Latin American Defense Ministers. The US will also offer to bring their Open-Skies aircraft to all capitals interested.

[This report was contributed by Hartwig Spitzer of the Center for Science and International Security, University of Hamburg. For background information see Peter L. Jones & Marton Krasznai, 'Open Skies: achievements and prospects', *Verification Report 1992*, pp. 47–56; Peter L. Jones, 'Open Skies: events in 1992', *Verification 1993*, pp. 145–61; and Peter L. Jones, 'Open Skies in other regional contexts', *Verification 1994*, pp. 145–58]

## NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations

On 27 May, the NATO states and Russia agreed the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization'.

The agreement was negotiated, in part, to allay fears within Russia of the consequences of the proposed expansion of NATO membership.

The agreement establishes the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council, which will have as its central objective 'to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area'.

The Permanent Joint Council 'will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern. The consultations will not extend to internal matters of either NATO, NATO member States or Russia'.

Areas which are identified in the agreement as being of mutual interest and possible foci for co-operation include:

- 'conflict prevention, including preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution taking into account the role and responsibility of the UN and the OSCE and the work of these organisations in these fields';
- 'joint operations, including peacekeeping operations, on a case-by-case basis, under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and if Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are used in such cases, participation in them at an early stage';
- 'exchange of information and consultation on strategy, defence policy, the military doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgets and infrastructure development programmes';
- 'arms control issues';
- 'nuclear safety issues, across their full spectrum';
- 'preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and their delivery means, combatting nuclear trafficking and strengthening cooperation in specific arms control areas, including political and defence aspects of proliferation';
- 'possible cooperation in Theatre Missile Defence';
- 'increasing transparency, predictability and mutual confidence regarding the size and roles of the conventional forces of member States of NATO and Russia';
- 'reciprocal exchanges, as appropriate, on nuclear weapons issues, including doctrines and strategy of NATO and Russia'; and
- 'coordinating a programme of expanded cooperation between respective military establishments'.

On nuclear weapons, the agreement states:

The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so.

On the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the accord states:



NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.

...

The member States of NATO and Russia proceed on the basis that adaptation of the CFE Treaty should help to ensure equal security for all States Parties irrespective of their membership of a politico-military alliance, both to preserve and strengthen stability and continue to prevent any destabilizing increase of forces in various regions of Europe and in

Europe as a whole. An adapted CFE Treaty should also further enhance military transparency by extended information exchange and verification, and permit the possible accession by new States Parties.

...

The member States of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to take and resulting national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE

Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished.

### **Detargeting of missiles**

During the signing ceremony for the Founding Act, President Yeltsin made a surprise announcement that he would order the warheads taken off Russian missiles targeted at NATO states.

This caused some confusion, not least amongst other members of the Russian delegation, as Russia already had agreements with Britain, France and the United States not to target each others' territories.

Following later clarification, it became clear that intention of the new policy was to extend detargeting to all states that had signed the Founding Act.

## **Russia — alleged arms transfers to Armenia**

Lev Rokhlin, Chair of the Defence Committee of the Russian State Duma has alleged that covert arms shipments from Russia to Armenia have taken place.

Rokhlin alleges that when the shipments began in 1992 they were carried out with the full knowledge and approval of the political leadership in the defence ministry. However, he has claimed that recent shipments have taken place without such knowledge or approval.

Some of the items that are alleged to have been transferred fall within the categories for reporting under the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. For example, it is alleged that 84 T-72 tanks and 50 BMP-2 armoured combat vehicles were included in the transfers.

Neither the Register returns for Armenia nor for the Russian Federation are consistent with the types and quantities of equipment that are alleged to have been transferred, even in the years for

which political authority is said to have been given.

However, the allegations are far from proven. While, there has been a history of similar allegations of covert assistance, many of these have been fanciful — for example, that Russia has supplied chemical weapons to Armenia.

The distinguishing feature of these allegations is the seniority of the individual making them.

## **New UNSCOM Chair**

From 1 July 1997, Ambassador Richard Butler (Australia) took over as leader of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from Amb. Rolf Ekeus (Sweden), who is now to be his country's ambassador to the United States.

Amb. Ekeus had been Chair of UNSCOM since its formation in 1991 following the discovery of the efforts by the Iraqi authorities to acquire weapons of mass destruction prior to the Gulf War.

UNSCOM has not yet been satisfied that it has seen a 'full, final and complete declaration' (FFCD) from Iraq of its past activities in pursuit of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

UNSCOM's work also includes an 'ongoing monitoring and verification programme' that will continue after UNSCOM has been satisfied that all historical activities have been declared.

The last six-monthly report on UNSCOM activities to the UN

Security Council under Amb. Ekeus, delivered on 11 April, noted the continuing policy of Iraq 'of systematic concealment, denial and masking of the most important aspects of its proscribed weapons and related activities'.

However, progress is being made such as: 'an agreement was recently reached that both sides should work together in order to arrive at a well-structured declaration which could be a workable basis for the accomplishment of its verification'.



## In the News

### Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is now ten years old.

The MTCR was formed at a meeting held on 16 April 1987 to co-ordinate export control guidelines on the export or transfer of ballistic missile technologies between states.

The current adherents to the MTCR are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

### Recent Treaty Actions

- Antigua and Barbuda — CTBT signature 16 April
- Bahrain — CWC ratification 28 April
- Bangladesh — CWC ratification 25 April
- Belgium — CWC ratification 27 January
- Belize — VCPOL accession 6 June
- Bhutan — CWC signature 23 April
- Burundi — FCCC ratification and VCPOL accession 6 January; CBD ratification 15 April

- Bosnia and Herzegovina — CWC ratification 25 February
- Brunei Darussalam — CTBT signature 22 January
- Cambodia — CCW accession (inc. P.IV) 25 March
- China — CWC ratification 25 April
- Congo — CTBT signature 11 February
- Cuba — CWC ratification 29 April
- Denmark — CCW P.IV 30 April
- Equatorial Guinea — CWC ratification 25 April
- Gabon — CBD ratification 14 March
- Grenada — CWC signature 23 April
- Guinea — CWC ratification 9 June
- Guinea-Bissau — CTBT signature 11 April
- Iceland — CWC ratification 28 April
- Ireland — CCW P.IV 27 March
- Jamaica — CWC signature 23 April
- Kenya — CWC ratification 25 April
- Kuwait — CWC ratification 28 May
- Laos — CWC ratification 25 February
- Latvia — BWC accession 6 Feb
- Luxembourg — CWC ratification 15 April
- Mali — CTBT signature 18 February; CWC ratification 28 April
- Malta — CWC ratification 28 April
- Namibia — CBD ratification 16 May
- Niger — CWC ratification 9 April
- Panama — CCW accession (inc. P.IV) 26 March
- Qatar — CTBT ratification 3 March
- Republic of Korea — CWC ratification 28 April
- Saint Lucia — CWC ratification 9 April

- Singapore — CWC ratification 21 May; FCCC ratification 29 May
- Slovenia — CWC ratification 11 June
- Suriname — CTBT signature 14 January; CWC signature and ratification 28 April
- Sweden — CCW P.IV 15 January
- The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia — CWC ratification 20 June
- Togo — CWC ratification 23 April
- Trinidad and Tobago — CWC ratification 24 June
- Tunisia — CWC ratification 15 April
- Turkey — CBD ratification 14 February; CWC ratification 12 May
- Ukraine — FCCC ratification 13 May
- United States of America — CWC ratification 25 April
- Uzbekistan — CTBT ratification 29 May
- Zimbabwe — CWC ratification 25 April

BWC=Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; CBD=Convention on Biological Diversity; CCW=Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons/Inhumane Weapons Convention, P.IV=Protocol IV [blinding laser weapons]; CTBT=Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; CWC=Chemical Weapons Convention; FCCC=Framework Convention on Climate Change; VCPOL=Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer

## VERTIC News

### VERTIC Director to move to UNIDIR

Dr Patricia Lewis, Director of VERTIC for eight years, has been appointed Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), based in Geneva.

She will take up her new post in October.

### New VERTIC Director required

The Director is responsible for managing VERTIC and leading its development. A successful candidate will have a good understanding of arms control or international relations; a strong record in research and fund-raising; and successful managerial experience. A scientific or technical background would be an advantage.

Salary will be commensurate with experience, but is likely to be in the region of £28,000–35,000.

For further information on VERTIC and on how to apply please contact Tiffany Edwards, Administrator, at the VERTIC office. Applications should reach the VERTIC office by 18 August 1997.

VERTIC is an equal opportunities employer

### VERTIC in the Caucasus

For nearly three years, VERTIC has been active in work aimed at promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus. Our work has involved the development of civilian confidence-building measures, support for civil society, and support in the process of

state-building in the three Transcaucasian republics.

The VERTIC Caucasus office has operated in Tbilisi since February 1995 and our work has been effective and well received by political and community leaders on all sides of the polity. Indeed, an independent assessment of our work in the Caucasus has just been conducted by Mr Richard Samuel CMG, CVO, former UK Ambassador to Latvia and Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and Estonia, copies of which are available on request from the VERTIC London office.

Our work in the Caucasus, headed by Dennis Sammut, has grown to such a large extent that it is truly now an organization in its own right.



In addition, the VERTIC Caucasus project has a different flavour to the other parts of VERTIC's work and has now developed an identity and life of its own.

For these reasons, it has been decided that the Caucasus project will separate from VERTIC and form its own structures. From the end of June, two new organizations are being established, one in the Caucasus and one in the UK. The British organization is called the London information Network on Conflicts and State Building (LINKS) and the Caucasus end is named Caucasus Links.

The new structures have a separate legal identity from each other and from VERTIC. Caucasus Links will enable people from the region to participate more actively in the work

and decision-making processes. Advisory councils are being set up for both structures. The combination of LINKS and Caucasus Links will enable the new organizations to respond quickly and effectively to the challenges of the Caucasus region, whilst facilitating the links between the Caucasus, Western Europe and beyond.

VERTIC is fully supportive of the establishment of LINKS and Caucasus Links as the successor to the VERTIC Caucasus project and is excited that the project has done so well that it is now able to leave the VERTIC nest and fly independently. Dennis Sammut is leaving VERTIC to head LINKS and be one of the five Directors of Caucasus Links.

### **VERTIC safeguards meeting**

On 2 July, VERTIC hosted a seminar in London on the International Atomic Energy Agency's enhanced safeguards regime.

The seminar was addressed by Dr Richard Hooper, Director, Division of Concepts and Planning of the IAEA.

### **Verification 1997 out**

The latest in VERTIC's yearbook series, *Verification 1997* is now out. The series is published in association with Westview Press.

Copies are available through the VERTIC office at a price of £30 plus postage and packing (please contact the office for details).

The book is also available through Westview Press at a price of \$45.

## **Trust & Verify — production difficulties**

VERTIC apologises for the production difficulties that have led to combining issues of *Trust & Verify*. This has been due to unforeseeable circumstances which are well on their way to a cure.

On a personal note, the editor thanks all those who have sent messages of support during his recent illness and promises that normal service will be resuming soon!

### **Trust & Verify**

*Trust & Verify* is edited and produced by Richard Guthrie with additional reporting by VERTIC staff and consultants.

*Trust & Verify* is published by VERTIC 10 times a year. Anyone wishing to comment on its contents should contact the VERTIC office.

Unless otherwise stated, views expressed in *Trust & Verify* are the responsibility of the editor and do not necessarily reflect those of VERTIC nor any individual or organization associated with it.

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### **Subscriptions**

Subscription rates are £15 (individual) or £25 (organization) per year. Payments may be made by cheque (in Sterling) or by credit card.

### **What is VERTIC?**

VERTIC is the Verification Technology Information Centre, an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements.

VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press.

VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

### **Other publications**

In addition to *Trust & Verify*, VERTIC publishes the *Verification* (formerly *Verification Report*) series of yearbooks and a variety of research reports each year. Details of VERTIC publications are available on request.