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VERTIC Transcaucasus Conference

On 23-24 January 1997, VERTIC held a conference entitled 'Prospects for the Transcaucasus' at Dartmouth House, Mayfair, London.

Valerie Mitchell, Director-General of the English Speaking Union, welcomed the participants; Sir Nicholas Bonsor MP, Minister of State, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, opened the conference and HE Zurab Zhvania, Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, gave the keynote address.

Other speakers and discussants included: Revaz Adamia, Chairman of the Commission on Defence and Security, Parliament of Georgia; Jonathan Cohen, Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations; Tamaz Gamkheidze, Chairman of Sub-Committee on Co-operation with International Organizations, Parliament of Georgia; Archil Gegeshidze, Chief Adviser on National Security Issues to the President of Georgia; Edmund Herzig, Royal Institute for International Affairs; Raffi K. Hovannisian, Director, Armenian Centre for National and International Studies; Gerald Libaridian, Senior Presidential

Adviser, Armenia; Neil Macfarlane, St Annes College, Oxford; M. Mamed-Kuliyev, Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan; Anna Mateeva, International Alert; Dennis Sammut, VERTIC; Richard Samuel, former Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova; and David Turr, Directorate General IA, European Commission.

In addition to its formal sessions, the conference provided an opportunity for officials from states with disputes in the region to conduct informal discussions.

One issue raised was the view that the term 'Transcaucasus' was a relic of the Cold War-era and that a more suitable name for the region would be 'South Caucasus'.

The Conference was organized with the generous support of the TACIS Democracy Programme of the European Union and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

A set of papers and transcripts from the conference will shortly be available from the VERTIC office, priced £20.

The Climate Convention Negotiations

From 9 to 18 December 1996, the *ad hoc* negotiating groups and the Subsidiary Bodies of the Climate Change Convention met in Geneva.

The first, and in many ways, the main meeting was of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM), the body responsible for negotiating a protocol (or an amendment) to the Convention in time for the third Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the Convention which will be held in Kyoto in December 1997.

Following the second CoP in July 1996, which resulted in the so-called Geneva Declaration in favour of a protocol containing legally binding commitments to quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives (QUELROs), there was a general expectation that the AGBM would, after more than a year, begin to discuss specific targets and timescales for achieving emission reductions in developed (Annex 1) countries. However, although a debate on these topics began, it rapidly became clear that there was no consensus at all on what these might be, and the sole proposal for a protocol containing specific commitments remained that tabled by the Alliance of Small Island States in January 1995, which was again raised but was not discussed.

It was anticipated that the European Union might take a lead on the target and timescales debate and, although this was clearly what

some EU states intended, a Council of Ministers meeting held on the first day of the AGBM failed to agree on exactly which commitments to adopt. Denmark, Austria and Germany held out for significant emission reduction objectives (10 to 20%) in the short term (by 2005 and 2010) with the British and Dutch advocating less ambitious objectives. The southern Europeans, notably Spain, opposed this as they wish to increase their emissions under any EU burden sharing arrangement (bubble) and were fearful that an ambitious target might mean significant action to limit emissions on their part.

To compound the already rather confused EU position, France reverted to its old position of advocating reductions based on *per capita* emissions, rather than percentage reductions from a baseline national total of emissions advocated by the rest of the EU. (France has very low *per capita* emissions, owing to its heavy reliance on nuclear power.) Japan later appeared to advocate this option, although the Japanese position was not well defined on this, and many other issues, owing to a split between the powerful trade and industry ministry part of its delegation and the less powerful Environmental Agency. (Japan has no environment ministry.)

The United States, having appeared to 'green' considerably at the second CoP, came up with a new position, previously revealed in a 'non-

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paper' issued in Washington the week before the AGBM. The new position is unclear on many matters but seems to advocate that it would not be practical to set significant legally binding emission reduction targets in the short term (before about 2010), but that hard targets thereafter would be desirable. In the meantime, the US is to support voluntary measures and a 'flexible' approach — including consideration of a variety of means of achieving emission reductions, such as emissions trading and the complex concept of borrowing against future emissions, which the US acknowledges may have teething troubles.

With the US proposing binding targets after 2010, and the EU and AOSIS focusing on the years before 2010, the situation was further complicated as the US was clearly undecided as to whether it would prefer a protocol or an amendment to the Convention, whereas the EU and AOSIS clearly favoured a protocol. There were no other proposals regarding targets.

There were debates on the nature of commitments which centred on the question of whether all states should have the same commitments (undifferentiated commitments) or whether

they could vary between states (differentiated commitments). Most developed states were in favour of undifferentiated commitments but a significant minority, led by Australia, Norway and Japan, considered that differentiation would be fairer to them — although Norway acknowledged that the time needed to work out how to differentiate obligations would probably be far longer than the one year left to the negotiators.

The question of which states should actively participate in any new agreement bedevilled many of the week's discussions. The developing state position remained, as it has been for years, that until the developed states made some progress in limiting emissions they would undertake no new commitments in addition to those already in the Convention (essentially a commitment to report on emissions). Most developed countries, however, were determined to build in provisions for developing countries to join any protocol at a later date. This led to a number of heated exchanges. The EU, for example, tabled specific proposals on this topic that were vigorously opposed by many developing states. The EU later claimed that its proposals had been

misunderstood, but even after several attempts to explain them, there remained a significant view that 'the EU are not dealing from a full deck'.

All in all the AGBM was not a great success, although it did make progress. After more than a year it has begun to discuss the main substance of a new agreement: commitments concerning emissions.

Space constraints limit detailed discussion of the other meetings. Some limited progress was made in the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SUBSTA) which took up most of the time previously allocated to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). However, it became bogged down in the old and thorny issue of joint implementation and on an important technical report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. In its own subtle way, the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 (concerning implementation-related questions) also made some headway.

The next meetings of the AGBM, AG13 and the Subsidiary Bodies are to start in Bonn on 25 February.

Non-Parties to Certain Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties (as of 31 December 1996)

The following is a list of states that are not parties to one or more of the global treaties controlling weapons of mass destruction — the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC); the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); the 1925 Geneva Protocol (1925); and the 1968 [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The table is designed to illustrate the efforts required to achieve universal membership of key global treaties — an achievement which would enhance the efficacy and acceptability of verification arrangements.

For brevity, CWC-ratified states are cited as parties, the CWC will enter into force on 29 April 1997.

	BTWC	CWC	GP	NPT
Afghanistan	P	S	P	P
Algeria	—	P	P	P
Andorra	—	—	—	P
Angola	—	—	P	P
Antigua and Barbuda	—	—	P	P
Armenia	P	P	—	P
Azerbaijan	—	S	—	P
Bahamas	P	S	—	P
Bahrain	P	S	P	P
Bangladesh	P	S	P	P
Barbados	P	—	P	P
Belarus	P	P	—	P
Belgium	P	S	P	P
Belize	P	—	—	P
Benin	P	S	P	P
Bhutan	P	—	P	P
Bolivia	P	S	P	P
Bosnia and Herzegovina	P	—	—	P
Botswana	P	—	—	P
Brazil	P	P	P	—

	BTWC	CWC	GP	NPT
Brunei Darussalam	P	S	—	P
Burkina Faso	P	S	P	P
Burundi	S	S	—	P
Cambodia	P	S	P	P
Cameroon	—	P	P	P
Cape Verde	P	S	P	P
Central African Republic	S	S	P	P
Chad	—	S	—	P
China	P	S	P	P
Colombia	P	S	—	P
Comoros	—	S	—	P
Congo	P	S	—	P
Cook Islands†	—	P	—	—
Costa Rica	P	P	—	P
Côte d'Ivoire	S	P	P	P
Croatia	P	P	—	P
Cuba	P	S	P	—
Cyprus	P	S	P	P
Dem. People's Rep. of Korea	P	—	P	P
Djibouti	—	S	—	P

	BTWC	CWC	GP	NPT
Dominica	P	S	—	P
Dominican Republic	P	S	P	P
Egypt	S	—	P	P
El Salvador	P	P	S	P
Equatorial Guinea	P	S	P	P
Eritrea	—	—	—	P
Estonia	P	S	P	P
Gabon	S	S	—	P
Gambia	P	S	P	P
Georgia	P	P	—	P
Ghana	P	S	P	P
Grenada	P	—	P	P
Guatemala	P	S	P	P
Guinea	P	S	—	P
Guinea-Bissau	P	S	P	P
Guyana	S	S	—	P
Haiti	S	S	—	P
Holy See†	—	S	P	P
Honduras	P	S	—	P
Iceland	P	S	P	P
India	P	P	P	—
Indonesia	P	S	P	P
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	P	S	P	P
Iraq	P	—	P	P
Israel	—	S	P	—
Jamaica	P	—	P	P
Jordan	P	—	P	P
Kazakhstan	—	S	—	P
Kenya	P	S	P	P
Kiribati†	—	—	—	P
Kuwait	P	S	P	P
Kyrgyzstan	—	S	—	P
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	P	S	P	P
Latvia	—	P	P	P
Lebanon	P	—	P	P
Liberia	S	S	P	P
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	P	—	P	P
Liechtenstein	P	S	P	P
Lithuania	—	S	P	P
Luxembourg	P	S	P	P
Madagascar	S	S	P	P
Malawi	S	S	P	P
Malaysia	P	S	P	P
Mali	S	S	—	P
Malta	P	S	P	P
Marshall Islands	—	S	—	P
Mauritania	—	S	—	P
Micronesia (Fed. States of)	—	S	—	P
Monaco	—	P	P	P
Morocco	S	P	P	P
Mozambique	—	—	—	P
Myanmar	S	S	—	P
Namibia	—	P	—	P
Nauru†	—	S	—	P
Nepal	S	S	P	P
Nicaragua	P	S	P	P
Niger	P	S	P	P
Nigeria	P	S	P	P
Niue†	—	—	—	—
Oman	P	P	—	—

	BTWC	CWC	GP	NPT
Pakistan	P	S	P	—
Palau	—	—	—	P
Panama	P	S	P	P
Qatar	P	S	P	P
Republic of Korea	P	S	P	P
Republic of Moldova	—	P	—	P
Russian Federation	P	S	P	P
Rwanda	P	S	P	P
Saint Kitts and Nevis	P	S	P	P
Saint Lucia	P	S	P	P
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	—	S	—	P
Samoa	—	S	—	P
San Marino	P	S	—	P
Sao Tome and Principe	P	—	—	P
Senegal	P	S	P	P
Seychelles	P	P	—	P
Sierra Leone	P	S	P	P
Singapore	P	S	—	P
Slovenia	P	S	—	P
Solomon Islands	P	—	P	P
Somalia	S	—	—	P
Sudan	—	—	P	P
Suriname	P	—	—	P
Syrian Arab Republic	S	—	P	P
Taiwan†	P	—	P	P
Tajikistan	—	P	—	P
Thailand	P	S	P	P
The former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia	P	—	—	P
Togo	P	S	P	P
Tonga†	P	—	P	P
Trinidad and Tobago	—	—	P	P
Tunisia	P	S	P	P
Turkey	P	S	P	P
Turkmenistan	P	P	—	P
Tuvalu†	—	—	—	P
Uganda	P	S	P	P
Ukraine	P	S	—	P
United Arab Emirates	S	S	—	P
United Republic of Tanzania	S	S	P	P
United States of America	P	S	P	P
Uzbekistan	P	P	—	P
Vanuatu	P	—	—	P
Venezuela	P	S	P	P
Viet Nam	P	S	P	P
Yemen	P	S	P	P
Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]	P	—	P	P
Zaire	P	S	—	P
Zambia	—	S	—	P
Zimbabwe	P	S	—	P

P = party, S = signatory, — = no action taken

† = not a member of the United Nations.

This list is produced in the same alphabetical order as that of the list of members of the United Nations.

Note: not all states in this list are recognized by all others; notable examples are Taiwan and Israel. Care should be taken when trying to give the number of parties to a treaty. The criterion used to define a 'state' is that a depositary for a major arms control or environmental treaty has accepted an instrument of ratification or accession, etc., from it.

Verification 1997, the latest in VERTIC's yearbook series published in conjunction with the Westview Press, has now gone to press.

Copies will be available in the second quarter of 1997. For further details contact the VERTIC office.

Chapters

- Introduction
- The Year in Context
- Could a New Security Assurance Enhance WMD Norms?, *Richard Guthrie*
- Ending Nuclear Weapon Testing: Getting and Keeping the CTBT, *Rebecca Johnson*
- Programme "93+2": Evolution in IAEA Safeguards, *Suzanna van Moyland*
- New Approaches to a Comprehensive Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Land Mines, *Ann Peters*
- Preparing for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Progress during 1996, *Robert J. Mathews*
- Development of a Verification Protocol for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Progress in 1996, *Annabelle Duncan and Robert J. Mathews*
- The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Report of a Joint UK-Brazil Practice Non-Challenge Visit, *John Walker, Lorna Miller, Roque Monteleone-Neto and Ricardo Ayrosa*
- Environmental and Security Regimes for Toxic Chemicals and Pathogens: A Useful Synergy, *Graham S. Pearson*
- Whither the Climate Convention?, *John Lanchbery*
- The Georgia-South Ossetia Conflict, *Dennis Sammut and Nikola Cvetkovski*

Documentation

- *Cooperation With Other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones* [OPANAL Council Resolution C/E/RES.27, adopted 27 March 1996]
- *The Cairo Declaration* [Adopted on the Occasion of the Signature of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), 11 April 1996]
- *US Statement on the Occasion of the Signature of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty* [11 April 1996]

- *UK Declaration on the Occasion of the Signature of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty* [11 April 1996]
- *Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit* [19-20 April 1996]
- *Amended Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as Amended on 3 May 1996*. [Amended Protocol II to the Inhumane Weapons Convention]
- *Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990* [Agreed at Vienna on 31 May 1996]
- *Resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacturing, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction* [OAU CM/Res 1661 (LXIV), adopted 5 July 1996]
- *Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict* (Request for Advisory Opinion by the General Assembly of the United Nations) [International Court of Justice, 8 July 1996]
- *Initiation of Challenge Inspections* [Working Paper submitted by Australia to the BWC Ad Hoc Group — BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.68]
- *Challenge Inspection: Key Principles* [Working Paper submitted by Canada to the BWC Ad Hoc Group — BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.70]
- *Key Verbs in Official Records of Commission Decision-Making* [OPCW Preparatory Commission, 22 July 1996]
- *Programme of Action for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons* [Proposed to the CD by 28 of the G-21 states, 7 August 1996 — CD/1419]
- *The Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons* [Extracts] [14 August 1996]
- *The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty* [UNGA resolution, text of the treaty, declarations on signature, and signatures as of 31 December 1996]
- *Verification Resource Requirements: Variations on a Theme* [OPCW PTS Discussion Paper for the Expert Group on Programme of Work and Budget]
- *Declaration of the Ottawa Conference on Anti-Personnel Mines* [3-5 October 1996]
- *Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention* [25 November-6 December 1996]

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VERTIC is the Verification Technology Information Centre, an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements.

VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press.

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Other publications

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