



Trust and Verify

The Bulletin of the Verification Technology Information Centre

No. 42 November 1993

ISSN 0966-9221

In this issue:

- United Nations Arms Register
- Iraq and nuclear weapons
- Ukraine and nuclear weapons

United Nations Arms Register

The United Nations Secretary-General's report on the UN Register of Conventional Arms was issued on 11 October. For further details see the supplement to this issue.

Iraq and nuclear weapons

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has continued to analyse information provided by the Iraqi authorities on that state's nuclear weapon development programme.

In a report to the United Nations on 13 October, the IAEA stated:

The IAEA is confident that the essential elements of Iraq's nuclear weapons program are understood and have been dismantled. ... Iraq has now provided the IAEA with critical information regarding suppliers of

prohibited and other materials and sources of technical advice. The information appears to be complete and verifiable.

Although these conclusions may, in the near future, allow the IAEA to certify that Iraq is in compliance with the terms of UN Security Council resolution 687 with regards to nuclear weapons, Iraq has still not complied with regard to chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles.

A British Government spokesman stated in October:

The UN inspection teams found incontrovertible evidence that Iraq was developing a crude nuclear weapon and there is concern that Iraq could reinstate its nuclear weapons programme if current UN sanctions were to be lifted.

Iraq has still to satisfy the Security Council that it has provided 'full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its programme to develop weapons of mass destruction' as required by UN resolutions.

Ukraine and nuclear weapons

The situation regarding the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil remains confused.

Editorial Comment

On 3 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 687 which established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to investigate and render harmless Iraq's programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

The UNSCOM investigations have involved numerous demands for information from the Iraqi authorities, persistent questioning of officials when answers have been inadequate, on-site inspections of facilities and detailed scrutiny of documents.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged by resolution 687 to deal specifically with Iraq's nuclear programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA have been successful in piecing together a picture of each of the Iraqi programmes.

The nuclear programme was assisted by Iraq's acquisition of sophisticated dual-use equipment and technologies from around the world. Many of the states and companies involved were not aware of the real use of their exports.

Part of the IAEA/UNSCOM task was to discover what had been imported by Iraq, and in order to ensure that no equipment remained hidden, to liaise with the companies and states that had provided it.

To this end, the IAEA and UNSCOM produced a list of companies that had supplied relevant items to Iraq. Although some observers wanted the inspectors to publish information as they compiled it; many, including

VERTIC, had accepted that there was a strong case that such data should remain unpublished while the investigations were continuing.

Much to the disappointment of observers, the IAEA appears to have signed an agreement with Iraq to keep all the data on procurement confidential — to be used for verification purposes only.

Whatever was signed on 8 October, its terms are unclear. Does this agreement mean that national Governments will have access to the IAEA's data? If they do not, how can they improve their export control procedures?

Even if Governments have the data, are they allowed to pass it outside Government? If prosecutions are brought against companies that knowingly supplied Iraq will Governments be able to present the IAEA information in court? In Britain, will the Scott Inquiry be allowed to see the data?

In Iraq, the IAEA has performed a task for which it had no prior experience and performed it well. Although mistakes were made, they were few and far between and nothing greater than any organization might make carrying out a task of this magnitude.

However, after a commendable effort, the IAEA appears to have fallen at the last hurdle. It may be that the IAEA believes there is good reason to keep this data secret. If it does it should say why; if it doesn't, it faces losing credibility.

Richard Guthrie

In late October the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, visited Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union. During this visit, the Safe and Secure Dismantling Agreement (SSDA), relating to US aid for storage and dismantling of nuclear weapons was signed.

Before signing the SSDA, the Ukrainian authorities had been asking for a total of \$2.8 billion in economic and technical aid. They did not receive this and it is unclear how much the total US aid will amount to.

Before the Christopher visit, President Kravchuk had told reporters that Ukraine might retain 46 missiles, although these might be taken off alert and pointed away from the United States.

Missile safety

In early November Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Foreign Minister, warned that the state of the Ukrainian weapons was deteriorating and suggested that the missiles were being kept in less than ideal environmental conditions.

Ukraine has dismissed the claims as 'propaganda' and has said that 20 of the 130 SS-19 missiles have already been earmarked for priority destruction, claiming that these 'are now reaching the end of their operational life'.

Although the Russian allegations are primarily concerned with the state of the missiles on Ukrainian soil, the issue has been tied up with that of safety of the nuclear warheads.

Trust & Verify understands that if the teams currently responsible for maintaining the missiles do not have the required expertise to perform sufficient routine maintenance to keep them safe, they would also almost certainly lack the expertise to remove warheads from missiles. A safety problem with the missiles would thus affect the warheads.

Biological weapons verification

As reported in the last *Trust & Verify*, the *Ad Hoc* Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint had completed their investigations into possible verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in September. The series of meetings of the *ad hoc* group were known as 'Verex'.

The report of the group will be circulated to all States Parties to the BWC. If a majority of States Parties so desire, a conference will be convened to examine the report. This conference would then decide on any further action.

It has been suggested that the simplest means of collecting the views of States Parties would be for a resolution to be introduced at the UN General Assembly, calling for a conference.

If this procedure were to be followed, a resolution could be passed before the end of 1993, a preparatory committee (required by the Verex mandate) could meet in January 1994 with the conference itself taking place in September 1994.

If the conference were to suggest that a verification protocol be added to the BWC, there would be time for working groups to meet to draw it up in time for the Convention's Fourth Review Conference, scheduled for 1996.

Verex conclusions

The concluding document of the fourth Verex meeting, BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8, contains the following passages:

31. The *Ad Hoc* Group of Governmental Experts concluded that potential verification measures as identified and evaluated could be useful to varying

degrees in enhancing confidence, through increased transparency, that States Parties were fulfilling their obligations under the BWC. While it was agreed that reliance could not be placed on any single measure to differentiate conclusively between prohibited and permitted activity and to resolve ambiguities about compliance, it was also agreed that the measures could provide information of varying utility in strengthening the BWC. It was recognized that there remain a number of further technical questions to be addressed such as identity of agent, types and quantities, in the context of any future work. Some measure [sic] in combination could provide enhanced capabilities by increasing, for example, the focus and improving the quality of information, thereby improving the possibility of differentiating between prohibited and permitted activities and of resolving ambiguities about compliance.

32. Based on the examination and evaluation of the measures described above against the criteria given in the mandate, the Group considered, from the scientific and technical standpoint, that some of the potential verification measures would contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention, also recognizing that appropriate and effective verification could reinforce the Convention.

Open Skies

The agreement on Open Skies, signed in March 1992, has been formally ratified by four states, although other states are close to depositing their instruments of ratification.

US preparations

On 3 November, President Clinton signed the United States' instrument of ratification which is expected to be deposited soon. On 6 August the US Senate had unanimously given its advice and consent to ratification.

The United States has continued its preparations for the entry into force of the Open Skies agreement.

In April, the US carried out a training flight with Canada to test procedures and operational activities. The two countries have signed an agreement to carry out joint overflights of the Ukraine in future.

In addition, the US has partially converted a former weather reconnaissance aircraft, a WC-135B, to carry Open Skies sensors. Under current plans, the converted aircraft, to be designated OC-135B, will be based with the 55th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron at Offutt AFB, Nebraska, and will operate under the command of the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA).

At least one more OC-135B conversion is on order and a third is being considered. The OSIA expects the first aircraft to be finished in the near future and for all aircraft to be fully operational by 1997.

Benelux agreement

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have concluded their agreement for co-operation.

The joint observation flights will be operated from the Belgian Air Force base at Melsbroek. The first phase of operations will use an adapted Belgian C-130 Hercules, with later operations using a similar Dutch C-130. Arrangements further into the future have not yet been made, but it is worth noting in this context that Luxembourg has no aircraft of its own.

Ratifications

The following states have deposited their instruments of ratification of the Open Skies agreement: Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Slovakia. VERTIC under-

stands that France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States [see above] have completed their domestic requirements for ratification but have not yet deposited their instruments of ratification.

Scott Inquiry

The British Attorney General, Sir Nicholas Lyell, has stated:

if any conduct in any circumstances arising out of that [Scott] inquiry or from anywhere else gives rise to a sufficiency of evidence for a realistic prospect of criminal conviction, such a matter will be brought before the courts without fear, favour, affection or ill will.

Although similar statements have been made in the recent past, this latest statement is clearer than the earlier ones. In British legal practice there are two principal criteria for deciding whether a prosecution should take place: the first is sufficiency of evidence; the second is whether the prosecution would be in the public interest.

The words of the Attorney-General are a statement that any cases for prosecution that might arise from the Scott Inquiry would be in the public interest.

UK TASM decision

On 18 October, Malcolm Rifkind, British Secretary of State for Defence, indicated changes to the plans for replacing the WE177 free-fall nuclear bomb currently in RAF service.

Rifkind said:

The United Kingdom's sub-strategic capability is currently provided by the WE177 bomb carried on Tornado dual-capable aircraft. In the mid to late 1980s, we saw the need to enter into the early development of a sophisticated stand-off weapon which would be able to penetrate the increasingly effective Warsaw pact defences, and which would replace the current bomb. The type of system we began to examine is known as a tactical air-to-surface missile, or TASM.

The security circumstances have changed fundamentally since then. As a consequence, we have concluded that our previous requirement for a new stand-off nuclear weapon capability is not a sufficiently high priority to justify the procurement of a new nuclear system in the current circumstances. Instead, we will plan, after the WE177 leaves service in the long term, on exploiting the flexibility and capability of the Trident system to provide the vehicle for the delivery of our sub-strategic deterrent.

Rifkind went on to say:

The present [nuclear] capability of the Royal Air Force can continue, under present plans, into the next century. I am not announcing a proposal that is about to be implemented. The WE177 carried by the Tornado aircraft is due, under current plans, to continue in operation, with the Royal Air Force responsible for its sub-strategic capability, into the first few years of the next century. I am referring to what is likely to be the sensible and desirable way of dealing with our long-term requirements over a much longer period.

Inhumane Weapons Convention

It is now clear that the French Government have approached the United Nations Secretary-General to hold a review conference of the Inhumane Weapons Convention (see last *Trust & Verify*).

It is also clear that discussions about the proposed review conference have taken place within NATO.

The states that have ratified or acceded to the convention are: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Japan, Latvia, Laos, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.

The states that have signed, but not ratified, the convention are: Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sudan, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Viet Nam.

UK to ratify Additional Protocols

The United Kingdom has stated that it is to ratify the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions that it signed in 1977. These protocols are linked with the Inhumane Weapons Convention. Once these have been ratified, it will open the way to ratification of the weapons convention, which was signed by the UK in 1981.

CWC text errors

Typographical errors have been discovered in the certified copies of the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

For example, in the Schedule 1 list of chemicals the qualifier '≤' has been replaced by ' ' in the English, French and Spanish versions and in the Arabic by '<'.

Most of the errors are either inconsequential or are obviously wrong. However, in cases of dispute, it has been suggested that the final text adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the Conference on Disarmament (contained in document CD/1170) should be taken as the true copy of the Convention.

UK publishes CWC text

On 8 October, the British Government published and presented to Parliament its copy of the text of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Cm 2331).

The British version faithfully reproduces the errors in the certified English text. The Convention has been presented to Parliament in preparation for its ratification. Whether a new text will be presented is unclear at present; if one isn't, then the UK would technically be ratifying the errors!

Curiously, the British text refers to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, while that body, in line with continental spellings, regards itself as an Organisation.

Whaling

On 11 October, the British Commissioner to the International Whaling Commission (IWC) hosted an informal meeting of some of his counterparts to look at proposals for a southern ocean sanctuary.

Commissioners participating included those from Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United States.

A paper on the history of verification and enforcement by the IWC, by Gregory Rose and Edward Rowland, is included in the latest in VERTIC's series of yearbooks, *Verification 1993*.

Russia and CFE

Russia has continued to indicate that it would like to amend the Treaty on Conventional Armed Force in Europe (CFE), signed in 1990. CFE restricts the deployment of forces within Russia itself as Russia is covered by more than one of the CFE regions.

Russian authorities have stated that the requests are justified and have highlighted the changes that have been occurring within its own borders in recent months.

The matter is currently being dealt with in the Joint Consultative Group established by the Treaty.

In the news

Kazakhstan and NPT

In a joint press conference in Alma-Ata with Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, in late October, President Nazerbayev of Kazakhstan gave assurances that his country would sign the NPT before the end of 1993.

An announcement was also made that the US would provide Kazakhstan with \$80 million in aid to assist with the nuclear weapon system dismantling programme and \$140 million in economic aid.

North Korea and nuclear weapons

Further discussions have taken place between officials from North Korea and the United States on the subject of inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities.

The two states do not have formal diplomatic relations and it has been reported that the US has offered to recognize North Korea as part of its efforts to negotiate access for international inspectors.

The talks, held in private in New York, have not yet reached a conclusion and further discussions are expected to continue to the end of the year.

On 1 November the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution urging North Korea to co-operate

with the IAEA. The only vote cast in opposition to this resolution was that of North Korea itself.

EC export controls

The definitional problems that have dogged the negotiations on a unified set of EC export controls on certain dual-use goods and technologies have so far prevented agreement (e.g., see *Trust & Verify* No. 36, March/April 1993).

These controls were due to be ready before the beginning of this year, with successive rounds of negotiations hoping to conclude an agreement 'within a few months'.

The current situation is that these negotiations are continuing. While officials are confident that no breach of controls have occurred, no one can be absolutely sure.

German missile exports to Iraq and Libya

Three former employees of a bankrupt German company, H&H Metallform, based in Drensteinfurt, near Münster, have gone on trial accused of exporting components for use in ballistic missiles and tools that may be used to make them.

UK and IAEA special inspections

The IAEA and Euratom have powers to conduct special inspections at undeclared sites in the UK under section 73 of the UK/IAEA/Euratom trilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/263).

The Ministry of Defence stated in October that, as the UK is a nuclear-weapon state, 'the question of special inspections at undeclared sites does not arise.'

If this is so, why were such provisions placed in the agreement in the first place?

Fissile materials cut-off

Following the speech by President Clinton to the United Nations General Assembly in which he proposed a fissile materials cut-off (see last *Trust & Verify*), the British Government has acknowledged that UK officials have met their US counterparts in what has been described as a 'preliminary meeting'.

Trust & Verify is edited and produced by Richard Guthrie with additional reporting by Philip McNab.

© VERTIC 1993

Trust & Verify

Trust & Verify is produced by VERTIC 10 times a year. Anyone wishing to contribute information for inclusion in *Trust & Verify*, or to comment on its contents, should contact the VERTIC office.

Subscriptions

Annual subscription rates are £15 (individual) or £25 (organization) per year. Payments may be made by cheque or credit card.

Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London WC2N 6NN
Telephone 071 925 0867
Facsimile 071 925 0861

What is VERTIC?

VERTIC is an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements. VERTIC co-ordinates six working groups comprising 21 UK consultants and 11 overseas advisors. VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press. VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

VERTIC
Verification Technology Information Centre



Trust and Verify

The Bulletin of the Verification Technology Information Centre

Supplement

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was published as a report by the UN Secretary-General on 11 October as UN document A/48/344. The register was established under UNGA resolution 47/52L.

A/48/344 contains the standard form returns provided by States and an index of background information provided by States, which is deposited in the UN.

States were requested, not obliged, to declare imports and exports in seven categories: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; and missiles and missile launchers. The definition of each of the categories is given in the original resolution and the report.

Reporting difficulties

Any exercise of this size and complexity will contain some discrepancies, especially in its first year of operation.

Much confusion has arisen simply because there is no guidance as to when a transfer should be listed. Should it be at the time the order is placed; when it is physically delivered to the importing state; or when the items have been accepted by the importing state and ownership has legally changed?

Discrepancies

The most notable discrepancies discovered so far are given below, listed in alphabetical order of the 'importing' state.

Colombia

The Colombian entry states that there have been no exports in any of the categories and gives the following figures for imports for 1992:

Armoured combat vehicles (total)	257
Large-calibre artillery systems (total)	300
Combat aircraft (total)	68
Attack helicopters (total)	74
Warships (total)	38

It appears that these figures relate to Colombia's total holdings of equipment in these categories.

Greece

In the declaration by Greece on imports, the following totals are given for each of the categories:

Battle tanks (total)	447
Armoured combat vehicles (total)	151
Large-calibre artillery systems (total)	249
Combat aircraft (total)	16
Warships (total)	11
Missiles and missile launchers (total)	21

The following are the totals for items exported to Greece with the exporting states in brackets:

Battle tanks (NL, US; +145)	592
Armoured combat vehicles (FRG, NL, US; +55)	206
Large-calibre artillery systems (NL, US; -6)	243
Combat aircraft (Fr, FRG, US; +12)	28
Warships (FRG, US; -2)	9
Missiles and missile launchers (Fr, US; +101)	21

Nepal/India & the United Kingdom

The Indian entry makes no mention of exports to Nepal, while Nepal's entry states that 52 120mm mortars were imported from India.

Similarly, the UK's entry makes no mention of exports to Nepal, while Nepal's entry states that 8 105mm guns were imported from the UK.

Peru/South Africa

The South African entry states:

Despite South Africa's clear and continuing commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation, South Africa is currently unable to contribute to the newly established United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, due to the continued United Nations arms embargo being applied against it in terms of Security Council resolution 418 (1977).

Once the above mentioned embargo has been lifted, South Africa will be in a position to consider submitting a return in accordance with the request contained in resolution 47/52 L.

However, the Peruvian entry states in the category 'armoured combat vehicles' that 4 'Mine-resistant armoured troop carrier, CADOPLA MKIII REPONTEC' were imported by the Peruvian Navy from South Africa. The entry goes on to describe this ACV type as a 'personnel carrier for use in jungle areas in anti-terrorist and anti-narcotraffic operations'.

Turkey

In the declaration by Turkey on imports, the following totals are given for each of the categories:

Battle tanks (total)	427
Armoured combat vehicles (total)	119
Large-calibre artillery systems (total)	69
Combat aircraft (total)	26
Attack helicopters (total)	6
Missiles and missile launchers (total)	24

The following are the totals for items exported to Turkey with the exporting states in brackets:

Battle tanks (FRG, US; +161)	588
Armoured combat vehicles (FRG, US; +206)	325
Large-calibre artillery systems (US; +6)	75
Combat aircraft (FRG, NL, US; +14)	40
Attack helicopters (US; -)	6
Missiles and missile launchers (US; +1140)	1164

Responses to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

State	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information
Argentina	nil	yes	—	no
Australia	yes	nil	—	yes
Austria	—	yes	—	yes
Belarus	nil	yes	—	no
Belgium	yes	nil	yes	yes
Bolivia	yes			no
Brazil	yes	yes	—	yes
Bulgaria	yes	yes	—	yes
Canada	yes	yes	—	yes
Chile	yes	nil	—	yes
China	yes	yes	—	no
Colombia	yes	nil	yes	no
Croatia	nil	nil	yes	no
Cuba	nil	nil	yes	no
Czech Republic	nil	yes	—	yes
Denmark	yes	nil	—	yes
Egypt	yes	yes	yes	no
Fiji	nil	nil	yes	no
Finland	yes	yes	—	yes
France	nil	yes	—	yes
Georgia	nil	nil	yes	no
Germany	yes	yes	—	yes
Greece	yes	yes	yes	yes
Grenada	nil	blank form	—	no
Hungary	nil	nil	—	yes
Iceland	nil	nil	yes	no
India	yes	yes	—	no
Ireland	nil	nil	—	no
Israel	yes	yes	—	yes
Italy	yes	yes	—	yes
Japan	yes	nil	—	yes
Kazakhstan	nil	nil	yes	no
Lesotho	nil	nil	yes	no
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	nil	nil	yes	no
Liechtenstein	nil	nil	yes	no
Lithuania	yes	—	—	no
Luxembourg	nil	nil	—	no
Malaysia	nil	nil	yes	no
Maldives	nil	nil	—	no
Malta	yes	nil	—	no
Mauritius	—	nil	yes	no
Mexico	—	—	yes	no

State	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information
Mongolia	nil	nil	yes	no
Namibia	nil	nil	—	no
Nepal	yes	—	—	no
Netherlands	yes	yes	yes	yes
New Zealand	yes	nil	—	yes
Nicaragua	—	—	yes	yes
Niger	see note verbale	nil	yes	no
Nigeria	—	—	yes	no
Norway	yes	nil	—	yes
Oman	—	—	yes	no
Pakistan	yes	nil	—	no
Panama	—	—	yes	yes
Papua New Guinea	nil	nil	—	no
Paraguay	—	—	yes	no
Peru	yes	blank form	—	no
Philippines	yes	nil	yes	no
Poland	yes	yes	—	yes
Portugal	yes	nil	—	yes
Qatar	—	—	—	yes
Republic of Korea	yes	nil	—	yes
Romania	yes	yes	—	no
Russian Federation	nil	yes	—	no
Senegal	nil	nil	yes	no
Seychelles	nil	nil	—	no
Singapore	yes	nil	—	no
Slovakia	nil	yes	yes	no
Slovenia	nil	nil	yes	no
Solomon Islands	nil	nil	yes	no
South Africa	—	—	yes	no
Spain	yes	nil	—	yes
Sweden	yes	yes	—	yes
Switzerland	nil	nil	—	yes
Tunisia	—	—	yes	no
Turkey	yes	nil	—	yes
United Kingdom	yes	yes	—	yes
United States of America	yes	yes	yes	yes
Vanuatu	nil	nil	yes	no
Yugoslavia	nil	nil	yes	yes

Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London WC2N 6NN
Telephone 071 925 0867
Facsimile 071 925 0861

This supplement was distributed with *Trust & Verify*, No. 42, November 1993.
Further copies are available on request. © VERTIC 1993

VERTIC
Verification Technology Information Centre