

VERTIC's Safeguards Database

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VERTIC

- Work areas: nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, nuclear test ban issues, nuclear security, CWC, BWC, UNSC1540, trade controls on conventional arms and cyber security issues.
- Activities:
 - Analysis, research and development;
 - Facilitation, outreach and engagement;
 - Collaboration with a wider range of stakeholders.

VERTIC's Safeguards Project

- VERTIC has been running a project on IAEA Safeguards since 2012, with specific focus on the Additional Protocol;
- We work with countries to raise awareness and build capacity in safeguards implementation;
 - Main partners: Countries who are working on establishing or updating their laws and practices for safeguards implementation;
- We focus on knowledge- and experience-sharing:
 - Countries can learn from each other to find the most suitable implementation approach;
- We provide assistance only on request of our partner countries, and free of charge.

Assistance activities

- Legislation review:
 - Main goal: understanding how each country approaches the implementation of IAEA Safeguards;
 - Review of country legislative framework;
 - Receives comments and feedback from national regulator.
- Technical assistance visits:
 - Awareness-raising and provision of information on Safeguards implementation;
 - Aimed at a range of national stakeholders;
 - Can also support internal outreach;
- Other activities and services.

VERTIC Safeguards Database

Relational database used to archive and research information on countries' implementation of Safeguards;

- Key goal: facilitate experience-sharing by providing a single, comprehensive repository of knowledge.
- Current status: final prototype;
 - Core functions have been implemented;
 - Graphic User Interface – first basic draft;
 - Populated with information on a sample of countries;
- We aim to have a discussion and understand what countries need: please think about questions and about how this tool could help you.

DB: Country Profile

‘Homepage’ of Database user interface.

- Contains key information on the country’s:
 - Safeguards status for CSA, AP and SQP;
 - Legal tradition;
 - Geopolitical Region(s) of reference;
 - Affiliation to treaties, NWFZs, regional organisations or other groups;
 - Nuclear fuel cycle profile.
- This information is used to provide context to our analysis of Safeguards implementation, and to find countries with similar profiles for comparison.



Country Profile

Norway

IAEA Membership 10/01/1957

[Full Legal Framework Survey >>](#)

[Go To Country Summaries >>](#)

SQP Status No SQP

Date

CSA Status In Force

Date 01/03/1972

INFCIRC 177

Additional Protocol Status In Force

Date 16/05/2000

Profile Overview

Legal System

Existing Nuclear Activities

Statements

Tags Master

Edit tags

Category: Region

Central Asia

East Asia

Eastern Europe

Europe ✓

Middle East

North Africa

North America

South Asia

South East Asia

Southern America

DB: Information on National Regulator

Profile of country's national regulator.

- Collects information on:
 - Origin of mandate and authority;
 - Source of funding;
 - Type of organisational structure;
 - Areas of authority;
 - Powers to provide authorisations and enforce decisions.
- Also provides an organogram of the regulator's organisational structure.



National Authority

Senegal

Name L'Autorite de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire

Website <http://www.arsn.sn>

In Charge of Safeguards Reporting ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Partially
In Charge of Nuclear Safety ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Partially
In Charge of Nuclear Security ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Partially

In Charge of Licensing ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Partially
Has Enforcement Powers ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Partially

Integrated SSS Authority


Yes

Mandate origin Directly from Law

Source of Funding Government Budget

Institutional Structure Stand-alone Body

Organogram



DB: Legislative Framework Survey

The legislative framework survey is the core of our analysis on Safeguards implementation.

- Analysis of how specific provisions have been adopted in the national legislation;
 - Provisions drawn from CSA, AP, IAEA guidance, and recognised best practices.
- Provisions are tagged with different ‘subject areas’, which help to identify and group them together for research:
 - Import/Export;
 - Inspections;
 - SSAC;
 - Reporting;
 - National Authority;
 - Operator Duties.

DB: Legislative Framework Survey Provision Examples

- The state will implement a system to account for and control nuclear materials.
- Nuclear activities or activities involving nuclear materials require authorisation and/or licenses.
- Operators [of nuclear facilities within the state] are required to accept inspections by the competent authority and co-operate with inspectors.
- The state must provide the IAEA accounting and special reports on nuclear materials, based on accounting and operating records.
- IAEA inspectors are allowed to discharge their duties within the state.

DB: Legislative Framework Survey Provision Analysis

- Has the provision been implemented in national legislation?
- What order of instrument has been used to implement this provision at the national level? (e.g. law, regulation, guides)
- What is the focus of the legal instrument used for implementation? (e.g. safeguards-specific, radiation protection, etc.)
- Does the national legislation follow IAEA model text or use IAEA terminology?
- Comment: A short analysis of the implementation approach, with space to quote relevant laws and to explain things in more detail.



Provisions for countries

[Report](#)[Import Survey](#)

United Kingdom ▼

Provision ID

44 ▼

The State must provide information to the IAEA regarding all uranium mines, and uranium and thorium concentration plants, and their status.

Note: this refers to both initial information, once an AP is signed, and regular yearly updates on changes.

Reporting
Mines
AP

General Information

Comment

Has the Provision
Been Implemented?

Partial Match ▼

Does the implementing
provision follow IAEA
Model?

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Partially

Order Of Instrument

First Order ▼

Does the implementing
provision follow IAEA
Terminology?

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Partially

Type Of Instrument

Safeguards-Specific ▼

Year Introduced

2000

Record Created 02/09/2015 15:30:39

Last Modified 10/11/2015 06:08:51

[Add Next Provision >>](#)

United Kingdom ▼

Provision ID

44 ▼

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Reporting
Mines
AP

General Information

Comment

General Comment on Implementation of the Provision

Article 2 of the Nuclear Safeguards Act (2000) covers the provision of information and records for purposes of the Additional Protocol. The nature of the Article, what it involves and what types of information and records it relates to is left unclear, undefined and largely vague so that it captures all aspects of information and record keeping falls under the Additional Protocol agreement. According to the Article 2, as amended by the Energy Act (2013):

(1) No obligation as to secrecy or other restriction on disclosure (whether imposed by statute or otherwise) prevents a person voluntarily giving information to the S Office for Nuclear Regulations if that person has reasonable cause to believe that it is Additional Protocol information.

(2) The Office for Nuclear Regulations may serve a notice on any person requiring him to give the Office for Nuclear Regulations information, or information of a description, specified in the notice – (a) within a period or at times specified in the notice; and (b) if the notice so provides, in such form as the notice may require.

(3) The information required by a notice – (a) must be information which Office for Nuclear Regulations has reasonable cause to believe is Additional Protocol information; and (b) may relate to a state of affairs subsisting before the coming into force of this Act or of the Additional Protocol.

(4) A notice shall not require a person to give information which is required only for the purposes of sub-paragraph (ii) of Article 2.a. unless the notice sets out the terms, agreed by the United Kingdom, in which the [IAEA] has identified information for the purpose of that sub-paragraph. (...)

(7) A person on whom a notice is served shall keep and retain such records of information in his possession (and retain any existing records) as may be necessary to enable him to comply with the notice; and a failure to do so shall be taken into account in proceedings for an offence under subsection (5) in determining whether a reasonable excuse exists for a refusal to comply with the notice".

Record Created

02/09/2015 15:30:39

Last Modified

10/11/2015 06:08:51

[Add Next Provision >>](#)

DB: Analytical summaries

- 300-words limit: short analysis focused on key issues.
- ‘General’ summaries + subject-specific ones.
- Can be used to capture and record information that is not contained in the legal framework survey:
 - Practices;
 - Insights from regulator on the national approach;
 - Evolution of framework.
- Different access levels, depending on source and content:
 - Public;
 - Partners only;
 - Internal use only.

New Zealand

▼

Summary Text

The New Zealand Parliament is currently considering the Radiation Safety Bill 2014 which, once adopted, will repeal and replace the Radiation Protection Act 1965 and its Regulations (Radiation Protection Act Commencement Order 1973, the Radiation Protection (Appeals) Regulations 1974, and the Radiation Protection Regulations 1982).

The new Act is intended to provide an enhanced legislative framework for radiation safety that responds effectively to the range of technological, scientific, and organisational changes that have occurred over the last five decades while the current Act has been in force. As well addressing both existing and emerging risks relating to radiation safety and security, it will enable New Zealand to ratify the CPPNM (amended) and ISCANT.

The Bill is also specifically intended to consolidate New Zealand's legislative framework to implement its IAEA safeguards agreements (through its provisions on international (IAEA) inspections). The new Act will also amend the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, with respect to the definition of radioactive material, the import/export of nuclear material and in regard to demands, intimidation and use of force to obtain radioactive material. Nothing in the Bill affects or derogates from the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987 and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Act 1999. The provisions of the Bill will apply in conjunction with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 1945.

Access

- ☒ Public
☐ Partner Only
☐ Internal Use Only

Selected Tags

Edit the Tags

View tags

Evolution of Framework - Summaries only

Country Tags

Asia-Pacific
 Australia and Oceania
 Common Law
 CSA Signatory
 CSA In Force
 AP Signatory

DB: Search and report functions

A Database is an ideal tool because it can store a large amount of information, which can then be searched and sorted in different ways.

- Every single data point can be used as a search parameter.
- Special reporting function for summaries and legislative framework survey:
 - Countries can be selected using country profile tags;
 - Can find all summaries/survey provisions, or focus on specific subject areas.



Specify options for the Provisions for Countries Report

Countries ☐ All
☒ Specify country...
☐ Select tag(s)...

Specify a specific country

United Kingdom

Finland

New Zealand

Norway

Senegal

South Africa

United Kingdom

Zambia

Provision Tags ☐ All
☒ Select tag(s)...

Specify (a) tag(s)

<input type="checkbox"/> Administrative and legal arrangements	<input type="checkbox"/> Sites and design information
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AP	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Source material
<input type="checkbox"/> CSA	<input type="checkbox"/> SQP
<input type="checkbox"/> Decommissioning	<input type="checkbox"/> SSAC
<input type="checkbox"/> Definitions	<input type="checkbox"/> State duties
<input type="checkbox"/> Enforcement	
<input type="checkbox"/> Exemption and termination	
<input type="checkbox"/> IAEA cooperation, rights and duties	
<input type="checkbox"/> Import/export	
<input type="checkbox"/> Inspections	
<input type="checkbox"/> Liabilities and finances	
<input type="checkbox"/> Licensing	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mines	
<input type="checkbox"/> National authority	
<input type="checkbox"/> Notifications	
<input type="checkbox"/> Nuclear fuel cycle development	
<input type="checkbox"/> Nuclear waste	
<input type="checkbox"/> Operator duties	
<input type="checkbox"/> Record keeping	
<input type="checkbox"/> Reporting	

Cancel

Print



Specify options for the Provisions for Countries Report

Countries ☐ All
☐ Specify country...
☒ Select tag(s)...

Specify (a) tag(s)

<input type="checkbox"/> ACP Group	<input type="checkbox"/> Convention on Nuclear Safety	<input type="checkbox"/> Monist	<input type="checkbox"/> West Africa
<input type="checkbox"/> Advanced Nuclear Technology	<input type="checkbox"/> CPPNM	<input type="checkbox"/> New Agenda Coalition	<input type="checkbox"/> Western Europe
<input type="checkbox"/> Africa	<input type="checkbox"/> CSA In Force	<input type="checkbox"/> No Fuel Cycle Activities	<input type="checkbox"/> Zangger Committee
<input type="checkbox"/> Africa NWFZ	<input type="checkbox"/> CSA Signatory	<input type="checkbox"/> Non-Aligned Movement	
<input type="checkbox"/> African Union	<input type="checkbox"/> CTBT	<input type="checkbox"/> North Africa	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AP In Force	<input type="checkbox"/> Dualist	<input type="checkbox"/> North America	
<input type="checkbox"/> AP Signatory	<input type="checkbox"/> East Asia	<input type="checkbox"/> NPT	
<input type="checkbox"/> ASEAN	<input type="checkbox"/> Eastern Europe	<input type="checkbox"/> Nuclear Suppliers Group	
<input type="checkbox"/> Asia	<input type="checkbox"/> EU	<input type="checkbox"/> OECD	
<input type="checkbox"/> Asia-Pacific	<input type="checkbox"/> EURATOM	<input type="checkbox"/> Original SQP	
<input type="checkbox"/> Australia and Oceania	<input type="checkbox"/> Europe	<input type="checkbox"/> P5	
<input type="checkbox"/> Caribbean	<input type="checkbox"/> Exporter of Nuclear Technologies	<input type="checkbox"/> Planned Nuclear Activities	
<input type="checkbox"/> CARICOM	<input type="checkbox"/> G7	<input type="checkbox"/> SE Asia NWFZ	
<input type="checkbox"/> Central America	<input type="checkbox"/> ICSANT	<input type="checkbox"/> Small Fuel Cycle	
<input type="checkbox"/> Central Asia	<input type="checkbox"/> Large Fuel Cycle	<input type="checkbox"/> South Asia	
<input type="checkbox"/> Central Asia NWFZ	<input type="checkbox"/> Latin America NWFZ	<input type="checkbox"/> South East Asia	
<input type="checkbox"/> Civil Law	<input type="checkbox"/> Middle East	<input type="checkbox"/> South Pacific NWFZ	
<input type="checkbox"/> Closed Fuel Cycle	<input type="checkbox"/> Mixed Monist-Dualist	<input type="checkbox"/> Southern America	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Common Law	<input type="checkbox"/> Mixed System (Civil-Common or Other)	<input type="checkbox"/> Uranium Mining	
<input type="checkbox"/> Convention on Civil Liability	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ModSQP	<input type="checkbox"/> Uranium Prospecting	

Provision Tags ☐ All
☒ Select tag(s)...

Specify (a) tag(s)

<input type="checkbox"/> Administrative and legal arrangements	<input type="checkbox"/> Sites and design information
<input type="checkbox"/> AP	<input type="checkbox"/> Source material
<input type="checkbox"/> CSA	<input type="checkbox"/> SQP
<input type="checkbox"/> Decommissioning	<input type="checkbox"/> SSAC
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<input type="checkbox"/> Nuclear waste	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Operator duties	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Record keeping	
<input type="checkbox"/> Reporting	

Cancel

Print

Provisions for Countries

New Zealand

- 11 Nuclear activities or activities involving nuclear materials requiring authorisation and/or licenses.

Note: there may be thresholds or conditions - such as type of material, or minimum amounts of material - that determine whether the activity requires licenses or authorisation. Please note if this is the case.

Tags Licensing • National authority • CSA

Has the provision been implemented? Enabling Provision

Order of instrument First Order

Type of instrument Nuclear or radioactive-specific

Does implementing provision follow IAEA model?

Does implementing provision follow IAEA terminology?

Date introduced 2014

General comment on implementation of the provision

The most recent iteration of relevant provisions are specified in the 2014 Radiation Safety Bill (not in force). In particular:

Section 14 Activities that require authorization under this Act

Section 18 Source licence

Section 22 Use licence

Section 25 Grant of consent to import or export radioactive material

Section 66 Offence to do certain things without authorisation [This is a strict liability offence, with defences specified in Section 76]

Section 68 Duties of persons who hold authorisations

Summary: Section 14 specifies the activities requiring authorisation: the manufacture, possession, management and control of a radiation source (source licence); the use of a radiation source (use licence); and the import or export of radioactive material (consent). (There are certain exceptions to the requirement for source and use licences, in Sections 16 and 17). Authorisation requests are made to, and approved by, the Director for Radiation Safety. It is an offence under Section 66 to conduct an activity in Section 14 without authorisation, with penalties of up to NZ\$100,000 (individuals) and NZ\$500,000 (organisation). It is an offence under Section 68 for source and use licence holders and consent holders to breach their duties under Sections 21, 24 and 26 respectively, with penalties of up to NZ\$50,000 (individual) and NZ\$250,000 (organisation). Offences under Sections 66 and 68 are strict liability (no requirement to prove an intent to commit the offence): Section 76 specifies certain defences (the offence was due to an act/omission of another person; an accident; some other cause outside the defendant's control; or the defendant took all reasonable steps to avoid the commission of the offence (s)).

Current Status of Database

- Final prototype;
- We are constantly working on expanding our library of case studies.
- Currently available through VERTIC:
 - Provide information to our partner countries on request;
 - Use it during our workshops;
- Plans for a new phase of the project:
 - New Graphic User Interface;
 - Considering the possibility of having parts of the database publicly accessible through an internet platform;
 - Expanding functions and use in our assistance activities.

Your Perspective

We are interested in the opinions of Safeguards practitioners:

- Expansion to 3S (Safety, Security, Safeguards);
- Issues and areas which can most benefit from knowledge- and experience-sharing:
 - ex.1: independence and legal mandate of regulator;
 - ex.2: inter-agency cooperation.
- Increasing focus on practice: which procedures and systems used for implementing Safeguards should be highlighted?
 - e.g. we will provide additional information on licensing in different countries.
- What else?