



# Multilateral Verification of Nuclear Disarmament

## *The Role of the IAEA*



# 1. The IAEA: Mandate



## Statute Article III.A.5:



The Agency is authorized ‘to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to **any bilateral or multilateral arrangement**, or at the request of a State, to **any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy**’

# 1. The IAEA: Experience



Iraq



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South Africa




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# 1. The IAEA: Experience

Libya



The Trilateral Initiative/  
PMDA



# 1. The IAEA: Strategy



Disarmament verification has been included in all IAEA Medium Term Strategies (MTS).

## MTS 2001-2005:

‘The Statute provides that the Agency shall act in accordance with United Nations policies furthering the establishment of safeguarded nuclear disarmament. **For the Agency this implies promoting nuclear disarmament** and furthering the universal application of safeguards’

# 1. The IAEA: Strategy



However, the strategic focus has evolved:

2001-2005

Developing the  
Trilateral Initiative  
Advising on the  
FM(C)T

2006-2011

Implementing the  
Trilateral Initiative  
General 'advice and  
assistance'

2012-2017

Must remain 'ready  
to assist' with  
verification tasks  
under nuclear  
disarmament

# 1. The IAEA: Strategy



IAEA Sub-programme 4.2 – ‘Other Verification Activities’:

## Project 4.2.001: Verification activities in DPRK

- State evaluation report for DPRK
- Plans to implement safeguards or other monitoring/verification measures under different scenarios

## Project 4.2.002: Verification activities related to the PMDA


- Verification approaches
- Inspection procedures
- Activity reports
- Equipment requirements, etc.

# 1. The IAEA: Programmes



## IAEA Sub-programme 4.1 – ‘Other Verification Activities’:

**Figure 3.1** Budget Allocations for ‘other verification activities’



# 1. The IAEA: Questions




The IAEA will start considering the next medium term strategy in 2016. This raises questions:




- What should the IAEA do in the long term?
- Should it look beyond the DPRK and the PMDA?
- If so, how should it prepare to verify disarmament beyond these current projects?

## 2. Member State Views



A detailed picture of what IAEA member states think about the Agency's role in verifying disarmament

## 2. Member State Views: Survey



## 2. Member State Views: Survey



### Methodology concerns:

- Ask the right questions
- Ask the right questions the right way
- Distribute these questions fairly and equally
- Offer anonymity
- Process results statistically

## 2. Member State Views:

### Survey



Theme: The scope of the IAEA's role in verifying nuclear disarmament

#### Questions:

- Do you think the IAEA should verify nuclear disarmament?
- Which of these disarmament activities should the IAEA verify?
- What expertise should the IAEA maintain to verify disarmament?
- Should personnel from non-nuclear-weapon states verify nuclear weapon dismantlement?

## 2. Member State Views:

### Survey

Theme: The scope of the IAEA's role



**Chart 1** Which of the following disarmament steps do you consider that the IAEA should be involved in verifying?

**QUESTION**

■ Portion of respondents □ Extrapolation to NNWS members

2a. Application of safeguards to all non-sensitive forms of nuclear material in former nuclear-armed states?



2b. Decommissioning of enrichment and reprocessing facilities used in weapons production, or their conversion to non-military purposes



2c. Decommissioning of warhead delivery systems, or their conversion to non-nuclear roles



2d. Dismantlement of nuclear warheads and other nuclear explosive devices, and disposition (destruction/storage/recycling for other uses) of weapons-grade nuclear material in sensitive forms



2e. Disposition of weapons-grade nuclear material in non-sensitive form



2f. Cessation of nuclear weaponisation research and development and associated capabilities, including decommissioning, conversion or removal of facilities and non-nuclear items specifically involved in production of nuclear weapons



0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

PERCENTAGE

## 2. Member State Views: Survey



Theme: Interest in the issues

Questions:

- Would your country like to participate in research and capacity building in these issues?
- What activities should the IAEA Secretariat and policy-making organs take to explore these issues?
- Would your country give political or other support to the IAEA's capability to verify nuclear disarmament?

## 2. Member State Views: Survey




Theme: Interest in the issues

**Chart 3** Would your country like to see one or more of the following steps addressing the potential role of the IAEA in disarmament verification?

### QUESTION

■ Portion of respondents □ Extrapolation to NNWS members



## 2. Member State Views: Survey



Theme: Additional disarmament verification options

Questions:


- Should nuclear disarmament be verified by intergovernmental organisations?
- If so, should a new international body dedicated to verifying disarmament be established?

## 2. Member State Views: Survey



Theme: Additional disarmament verification options

**Chart 5** Does your country consider that a new international body dedicated to verifying nuclear disarmament should be established, outside the IAEA?



## 2. Member State Views: Survey




### Conclusions:

1. There is strong support among member states for a broad role for the IAEA in verifying future cases of nuclear disarmament.
2. Nearly all member states would feel it important to explore and engage with the IAEA's role in verifying disarmament.
3. Opinion is split among members as to how to explore and engage on these issues.


**→ There is a demand for a more active and informed debate on the IAEA and nuclear disarmament.**

### 3. Priming a Debate



‘This primer seeks to facilitate an informed debate [...] on the challenges and opportunities of multilateral verification of disarmament through the IAEA’

### 3. Priming a Debate: Features



- ✗ Comprehensive technical discussion
- ✓ Outline of activities and issues
- ✓ Case studies
- ✓ Charts
- ✓ Graphs
- ✓ Further reading
- ✓ Glossary

### 3. Priming a Debate: Structure



#### Section 2: Defining Disarmament



Warhead  
dismantlement



Fissile material  
disposition



Stopping  
'weaponisation'



Decommissioning  
facilities



Verifying the ongoing peaceful nuclear  
activities of a disarmed state

### 3. Priming a Debate: Structure



Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8: Discussing verification



1. What does this disarmament activity involve?
2. How might this be verified?
3. What case studies are there?
4. What issues are there for the IAEA?
5. Further reading

### 3. Priming a Debate: Structure



Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8: Discussing verification



Decommissioning  
facilities

1. How are fissile material production facilities decommissioned?
2. How might this be verified?
3. What case studies are there?
4. What issues are there for the IAEA?
5. Further reading

### 3. Priming a Debate: Structure



#### Section 3: Issues common to all disarmament activities

1. Legal issues: NPT commitments, forming agreements
2. Political issues: Securing IAEA involvement
3. Financial issues: Regular or extrabudgetary?
4. Personnel issues: What expertise is required?
5. Equipment issues: What new equipment might be needed?

### 3. Priming a Debate: Structure



Sections 10 & 11: Opportunities to explore these issues

#### Outside the IAEA:

- VERTIC project
- US-NTI International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification
- The UK-Norway Initiative

#### Inside the IAEA:

- Medium Term Strategy 2018-2023
- IAEA Programme and Budget
- The Board of Governors
- The General Conference

