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BRIEF

Information-sharing in nuclear security
Current initiatives, challenges, and the proposal for a Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report

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VERTIC

> "To date, reporting and information sharing have played a relatively limited role in international efforts to improve nuclear security standards worldwide."

Executive Summary

This brief argues that, while reporting and information sharing on nuclear security have only played a limited role in the nuclear security field so far, these activities could significantly contribute to further reinforcing nuclear security worldwide.

The first half of the paper provides an overview of the utility and potential uses of international reporting; some of the key challenges to wider use of reporting in service of the nuclear security regime; and, of the current extent of international reporting under it. It argues that depending on the specific approach taken, international reporting can support the global nuclear security regime in different ways: these can range from introducing a formal verification system akin to that used in IAEA Safeguards (an ambitious proposal that is unlikely to become reality in the foreseeable future), to less intrusive but nonetheless valuable approaches that support confidence-building and experience-sharing. The key obstacles to increased information-sharing in nuclear security are identified as state-level national security concerns, and, importantly, the fragmented nature of the international nuclear security regime itself, that involves a plurality of policy initiatives, international bodies, and legal instruments both binding and voluntary in nature.

The second half of the paper analyses some of the current proposals to expand reporting in nuclear security and focuses on a particular initiative, the Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report (CNNSR), offered as a gift basket by the Netherlands and a coalition of like-minded countries at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Here, the brief argues that one key advantage of the CNNSR is that, by consolidating reporting under different instruments in one single reporting form,

it can mitigate the difficulties engendered by the fragmentation of the international nuclear security regime.

The brief concludes by analysing the current state of the CNNSR initiative and identifying areas where it can be further developed, as well as proposals for future action.

Project methodology

This brief is the product of a pilot project run by VERTIC and kindly funded by the Government of the Netherlands and the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The project aimed at supporting and encouraging expanded reporting on nuclear security, as well as exploring states' attitudes and practices on the subject. In particular, a priority was to identify the key challenges and obstacles that states—and especially developing countries—may face when approaching nuclear security reporting.

To this end, VERTIC ran two workshops involving countries with different nuclear profiles and institutional frameworks, to discuss information collection on nuclear security, international reporting, and the CNNSR initiative. In preparation for these workshops, VERTIC analysed the legal and regulatory framework for nuclear security of the partner countries, and prepared preliminary drafts of a CNNSR based on the information found. These draft reports were extensively reviewed and discussed during the workshops. This provided both VERTIC and state officials with a better sense of the CNNSR's scope and contents, and allowed productive and informed discussion on how states may approach preparing such a report, and what challenges they saw in sharing it with other countries. These workshops were held in confidence.

In addition, VERTIC ran a public side event during the 2016 IAEA International Nuclear Security Conference, entitled 'Supporting Sustainability in Nuclear Security Reporting and Information Sharing'. The event provided a forum for a more public and multilateral discussion of the matter, and saw the contributions of diplomats, academics and functionaries of international organisations.

The views expressed during the workshops and the side event, as well as VERTIC's own analysis, inform the contents of this brief.

Utility of international reporting

To date, reporting and information sharing have played a relatively limited role in international efforts to improve nuclear security standards worldwide. This marks a difference from other international regimes both within and beyond the nuclear sector, where reporting often plays a major role. This is the case, for example, in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, whose main mechanism is the IAEA Safeguards system, and in the chemical non-proliferation regime which is upheld and verified by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Both these systems rely on a combination of reporting and inspections to verify state's compliance with international commitments. Even for treaties that lack a formal verification element, such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), information sharing and transparency measures adopted by state parties play an important confidence-building role.

This section will provide an overview of the most common approaches to reporting and information sharing, and how they can support international regimes.

Reporting as a component of verification

At its strongest, reporting constitutes the backbone of international verification regimes, such as the ones established and maintained by the IAEA on nuclear non-proliferation[1], and by the OPCW on chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation.[2] Under such an arrangement, states provide information to an internationally-mandated third party organisation that is tasked with independently verifying its correctness (and often its completeness), in order for the states parties to the relevant treaty to formally determine whether the state is compliant with the international commitment it has undertaken. Regimes of this kind are established pursuant to founding legal instruments, which create institutions with strong mandates and refer to a clear and well-defined set of commitments. Such a regime cannot be readily applied to the current international legal framework for nuclear security given its disparate constituent elements (as explained above). They are also resource-intensive since they involve professional assessment of countries' reports and on-site visits by teams of trained inspectors, being international civil servants employed by an international organisation.

Assurance and confidence-building

In the absence of a formal verification mechanism, countries can also use reporting and information-sharing for assurance, transparency, and as a confidence-building measure. In this context, these are often considered to be 'softer' measures than verification, certainly aimed at reassuring other state parties that a country is upholding its obligations under an agreement, especially when they do not undergo review or a formal assessment by a third

"Reporting challenges are largely due to the fragmented nature of the international legal framework and the sensitivity of security arrangements as well as 'reporting fatigue.'"

party. Where such information is also made available publicly, it can also usefully serve to reassure more broader audiences, including other stakeholders in these regimes. Such assurance and transparency measures can help in raising the global standards of implementation by providing positive examples and reinforcing norms. Furthermore, they can play a crucial role in building trust and confidence in regimes that have struggled to agree a formal verification system: for example, in the case of the BTWC community, where states have resorted to information-sharing and enhancing transparency concerning implementation.[3] The absence of reports, or sufficiently comprehensive reports, creates an opportunity to engage in discussions with the respective states about the reasons for this and finding solutions cooperatively to address them: be it enhancing capacity for implementation and reporting through to resolving any non-compliance concerns.

Arrangements of this kind can vary widely in how extensive and intrusive they are, ranging from voluntary initiatives to periodic, mandated reporting to a central institution, but which are still less intrusive in nature than a full-fledged verification regime.

Experience-sharing and mutual assistance

Finally, reporting and information sharing can be used as an instrument of mutual assistance. By sharing experiences of the challenges encountered in implementing an international agreement, and on the solutions found to overcome them, countries can provide successful examples and foster the diffusion of best practices, helping to raise the standard of implementation among all states parties. This is akin to many initiatives that already exist in the nuclear security field, both at the interna-

tional level, with initiatives such as the IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), and at the bilateral and regional level, such as 'peer review' initiatives or experience-sharing fora. In addition, such reporting is particularly useful in highlighting what types of targeted assistance states may require to more effectively fulfil their obligations, which can inform the development of resource and capacity-building packages by assistance providers.

Operational notifications

Several treaties, also feature provisions on the timely notification of incidents or events of transnational relevance, for example in the case of environmental disasters, public health emergencies, transnational crime (smuggling, terrorist activities), or other events that require speedy international co-ordination. These are usually limited to state-to-state communication, and are often confidential. Many examples of these are in the nuclear sector, both in the field of nuclear safety, with instruments such as the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident or *the* Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and in nuclear security, with provisions to this effect contained, among others, in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

Key challenges to reporting in nuclear security

Reporting challenges are largely due to two key factors, namely, the fragmented nature of the international legal framework for nuclear security, and the high level of

sensitivity surrounding information on security arrangements at many nuclear facilities. In addition, some developing countries experience 'reporting fatigue' often having to bear the burden of reporting to many international agreements while balancing competing priorities against a lack of capacity.

The international nuclear security regime is notable in its piece-meal, decentralised structure, which has evolved over the years to encompass a range of instruments with different purposes and scope. Several key instruments are non-binding in nature. These include the corpus of guidance published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found in its INFCIRC/225 Rev.5,[4] in the Nuclear Security Series, the Joint Statement on 'Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation' which was initially presented at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and then published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/869[5] as well as a number of other documents covering the security of nuclear material and, in some cases, radioactive sources.[6] Furthermore, the legally-binding instruments that constitute what can be regarded as the core of the international legal framework all differ in terms of focus, depositary entities and membership:

- The CPPNM has the IAEA as its depositary and mandates the implementation of legal measures and key security arrangements to cover nuclear material in international transport, and, with its 2005 amendment (CPPNMa), nuclear material and facilities in domestic use;
- The ICSANT focuses on the criminalisation of certain acts in order to deter and counter transnational terrorism, and is deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General; and
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) is supported by a

Group of Experts and overseen by an ad-hoc subsidiary committee of the Security Council, which reports to the Security Council, and obliges all UN Member States to support implementation of 'appropriate effective' methods to control, account for and secure nuclear (as well as chemical and biological) material in an effort to prevent non-state actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.

The differences between these instruments are largely due to international concerns surrounding nuclear material at the time they were developed; as such, nowadays they may appear inconsequential or bureaucratic. In addition, this patchwork approach has led to disparities between states' obligations to ensure effective nuclear security. These disparities become all the more evident in the case of observance of the non-binding instruments, in particular, as each country decides whether and how it will respond to recommended guidance. It is also important to note that ultimate responsibility for nuclear security rests with individual states, although states parties to each instrument collectively have a responsibility to take supportive action. This is especially important as there is no one entity or institutional framework that is responsible for overseeing, at the international level, the domestic implementation of nuclear security measures, as, for example, the IAEA does for global non-proliferation norms. Because of this, reporting and information sharing in nuclear security is currently constrained to a series of distinct practices and schemes, each with a different scope and function, and each going to different recipients with a variety of intended end-uses.

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Another reason why nuclear security reporting has taken a back seat to endeavours focused on improving safety practices is that information on nuclear security arrangements is often regarded as sensitive, as it touches upon national security issues, but also relates to the protection of commercial and industrial proprietary information. (It is important to remember that in most countries, nuclear installations are partially or wholly privately-owned.) Comprehensive reports addressing nuclear security implementation across a range of instruments could only be shared under a scheme providing strong assurances of neutrality and information protection; options for how this might be achieved in the nuclear security realm have not yet been identified. These legitimate concerns, it could be argued, have been compounded by a culture of secrecy and information sharing only on a 'need to know' basis that has traditionally surrounded the nuclear energy sector, which for a long time meant that almost no information on nuclear security, not even information that could be usefully revealed, would be shared at all. While the nuclear industry and regulatory bodies of many countries are slowly moving away from this model and towards increased transparency and co-operation at least at the domestic level, concerns about national security and sovereignty still pose obstacles to similar exchanges happening at the international level. Furthermore, states may consider that public opinion is a concern when dealing with the nuclear industry, as even relatively benign and harmless information, if widely shared, may be misinterpreted by the public and provoke backlash and undue alarm.

How strongly a reporting measure touches upon state sensitivities depends on the scope and level of detail of the information provided. At the broadest level, reports can focus on state-level policy, legislation and regulations. The main existing arrangements in the nuclear security field currently do this. The focus on legislation is very suitable for nuclear security, as it can be a good way to demonstrate that a state is taking action on the matter and is establishing the required procedures and frameworks at the national level, without disclosing sensitive operational arrangements used within facilities. Additional and more detailed reporting can cover administrative and regulatory issues, such as procedures and requirements established by the national regulator, and may even extend to selected aspects of the security arrangements employed at relevant facilities.

It is also important to consider the final recipient of information and the appropriate forum in which it is shared. Based on information gleaned from actors in this sector, it is possible to say that when sharing is limited to a defined group of trusted parties, states may feel sufficiently reassured to report more detailed information, including on challenges and issues they have encountered. Conversely, reporting in the public domain can be very good for fostering transparency and trust with a wider group of stakeholders, but will likely remain limited to the most uncontroversial information. Discussions with states and the low levels of reporting in the nuclear security field indicate that even this level of sharing may be questionable to some countries without further awareness-raising of its purpose and scope.

Furthermore, states are often concerned with how resource-intensive reporting requirements are, so whether reporting is voluntary or required, and whether it is a recurring obligation, are also pertinent

issues. This is especially relevant in the case of developing countries, which often have limited resources to implement, let alone report on, a broad range of international agreements with an increasing number of reporting requirements, while also facing competing priorities in the domestic spheres such as poverty alleviation, health, and education.

Current extent of international reporting

All the key binding legal instruments—CPPNM and the amended CPPNM, ICSANT and UNSCR 1540—contain provisions on notification and reporting, but most of them are narrow in scope and have different recipients, or focus on operational issues such as state-to-state notification of events that have transnational significance. These include:

- International transfers of nuclear material[7];
- Theft or attempted theft of nuclear material[8];
- Possession of nuclear material or of nuclear devices by unauthorised parties[9];
- Sabotage or attempted sabotage of a nuclear facility[10];
- Criminal proceedings for offences involving nuclear material, especially related to transnational crime[11], and
- Disposition of nuclear material or facilities in certain situations[12].

Both the CPPNM and ICSANT contain provisions on protecting the confidentiality of information exchanged in this way. From this point of view, this is a form of reporting not aimed at transparency or assurance, but best understood as 'real-time' international co-operation and co-ordination against transnational threats.

The CPPNM and UNSCR 1540 also include provisions related to confidence-building and demonstrating compliance through the sharing of information on implementation. CPPNM Article 14.1 mandates that 'Each State Party shall inform the depositary of its laws and regulations which give effect to this Convention', while UNSCR 1540 operative paragraph 4 calls upon states to report 'on steps they have taken or intend to take to implement this Resolution'. The main difference between the two forms of reporting is that while UNSCR 1540 reports are published publicly (after approval by the 1540 Committee, and with some exceptions for countries facing specific security challenges), CPPNM reports are submitted to the IAEA and distributed only to other states parties, which are bound to observe the same standard of confidentiality used for all other information exchanged under the Convention. Moreover, the CPPNM does not specify the format and extent of information submitted, and has not produced a reporting form for states parties to utilise, while the 1540 Committee has provided all UN member states with a standardised form, the 1540 Matrix.[13] However, there is a significant similarity, in that reporting under both instruments chiefly focuses on national legislation.

In addition to the existing reporting arrangements, some countries, such as Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US, have voluntarily shared information about their policies and achievements in nuclear security through various international fora and by publishing dedicated reports. This is important for countries that wish to be seen as leaders in the field, as it provides a way to showcase their progress, to promote effective good practices, and also to lead by example, demonstrating their own

"Some countries have voluntarily shared information about their policies and achievements in nuclear security through various international fora."

efforts and commitment. Countries have also participated in experience-sharing initiatives at various levels; most relevant are the review activities carried out by the IAEA, such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) or the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS). Many states have great trust in the IAEA both for its expertise on nuclear security, and for its experience in handling sensitive information collected through its safeguards activities, and are thus willing to disclose information on their nuclear security practices, and take advice from it.

Proposals for new reporting measures

Over the years, especially during the period of heightened attention on nuclear security marked by the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, several proposals for new reporting measures have been discussed, ranging from the intrusive to more generalised and softer arrangements.

At the boldest end of the spectrum, some have called for a new, legally-binding instrument on nuclear security, that consolidates the requirements currently found across various binding instruments and guidance documents and includes mandatory reporting or even verification. Others have proposed a mandatory compliance review to be carried out by the IAEA and based on IAEA guidance. The future of nuclear security may include consolidation under a single instrument that provides a more coherent approach than the present fragmentation. It could also include stronger verification measures, but the prerequisite of any such scheme would be very difficult to meet at present. In addition, both approaches would likely be relatively resource-intensive (both for individual states and the international community in general) and, by their nature, intrusive.

This is the trade-off presented against the rigour and higher levels of assurance that formalised verification systems or compliance reviews can offer.

Proposals for a new reporting measure based on existing instruments have almost exclusively focused on the CPPNM. As depositary of the convention, some have argued that the IAEA could start collecting information on its implementation. Furthermore, as the 2005 amendment to the convention finally entered into force in 2016, many states have started discussing the possibility of a regular review cycle for the convention. Some have proposed that the reporting requirement under Art. 14.1 of the convention (see 'Current extent of international reporting' above) should be interpreted expansively, with a requirement for regular updates tied in to the review conference cycle and to the annual intersessional meetings that would most likely take place within it. If such a review cycle could be agreed on, it would be worthwhile to assess carefully the strengths and weaknesses of similar measures in other treaties' architecture both in the nuclear sector and beyond. This would help to maximise the benefits of such meetings and conferences and avoid potential pitfalls.

Other proposals for new activities have focused on the IAEA too, but envisioning a less intrusive role. Some have proposed that the IAEA would provide the appropriate venue to host a comprehensive database of national nuclear legislation, showcasing global efforts to implement legislation on nuclear security at the national level, as well as a 'Register of Achievements', similar to the Nuclear Safety Dashboard already operated by the Agency. Another example of this approach in a related field is the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).

More generally, several states have also called for further voluntary reporting and the sharing of additional information on the implementation of various existing reporting arrangements. This is unlikely to elicit much more, if any, new information from those states already struggling with mandatory reporting requirements due to resource and capacity constraints.

The Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report

One tool proposed to improve reporting on nuclear security at the international level is the Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report (CNNSR),[14] presented at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit through the Joint Statement on Sustainability in Reporting and Information Sharing.[15] The CNNSR aims to make reporting on nuclear security more efficient, accessible and sustainable by consolidating reporting requirements arising from various instruments into a single form. This approach can be seen as particularly valuable, given that the fragmentation of the nuclear security regime is one of the key obstacles to strengthened reporting.

In terms of content, the CNNSR focuses on the transparency requirements under Art. 14.1 of the CPPNMa and operative paragraph 4 of UNSCR 1540. Conversely, it does not cover the kind of operational and confidential information on criminal cases and transnational events that states exchange under the CPPNM and ICSANT (as described above). In addition, the CNNSR concept provides an avenue for voluntary reporting on the implementation of instruments that do not require reporting, and voluntary reporting that goes beyond what is mandated in instruments that require limited reporting. As

such, the CNNSR includes reporting questions on provisions taken from the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, on the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, and on various provisions of ICSANT that the convention itself does not require to be reported.

The Joint Statement introducing the CNNSR was supported by a broad range of countries from several regions, and the tool constitutes an important first step towards increasing reporting rates, and towards additional reporting at the international level.

Future steps for the CNNSR: broadening and embedding reporting practices

At present, the template CNNSR—together with the wider principle of streamlining and facilitating reporting—has attracted international attention and support. In addition, countries have expressed interest in contributing to the issue area and the tool's development.

In order to chart the way forward for the report, a state, or a small group of states (possibly among the proponents and signatories to the Joint Statement) should lead on the matter, championing the CNNSR and showing commitment to it. There are several ways to do this, for example by getting the Joint Statement on Sustainability in Reporting and Information Sharing, and the attached CNNSR, published as an INFCIRC by the IAEA, as was done for the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation. It could also be brought to the attention of the Nuclear Security Contact Group. The issue of reporting could also be discussed periodically at events during

"The CNNSR concept provides an avenue for voluntary reporting on the implementation of instruments that do not require reporting."

international and regional conferences so as to keep some degree of attention on it. Furthermore, these interested states should consider the opportunity to lead by example, adopting the CNNSR for themselves and using it for their national reporting.

It would also be useful for the state, or states, championing the CNNSR to define what the future of the CNNSR should look like, especially in terms of how countries could approach and use this tool. There are interesting areas that are yet to be fully defined and can be shaped further; the CNNSR has the potential to innovate current practices in nuclear security reporting.

One area open to further development concerns the submission and final recipient —or recipients—of the CNNSR. As mentioned above, the various international instruments covered by the report have different depositaries. A key step in promoting and supporting the CNNSR would be to define whether all these bodies would accept reports submitted in the form of the CNNSR. This might be most easily achieved for those instruments which already have a standardised reporting form, such as the 1540 Matrix. Alternately, finding a means to easily extract the relevant information from the CNNSR and use it to populate other reporting forms, possibly through automated tools, could usefully be explored. Furthermore, many states will wish to establish clear and shared guidelines for the handling—and if necessary, the protection—of the information submitted through the CNNSR. It would also be useful to assess what level of detail states are willing to share. As discussed above, should greater detail be required through reporting, states will likely only accept a more restricted number of permissible recipients, and vice versa.

Discussion on the scope of reporting under the CNNSR, and on its eventual recipients, will necessarily touch on the issue of the tool's primary purpose. As it is, the form can be answered with very 'broad-brush' information, or can provide a space for more in-depth description of policies, requirements and practices. Commenting on the CNNSR, one state noted that it could be an excellent vehicle to foster experience-sharing and mutual learning; however, the level of detail required to achieve this goal would necessitate that the form be kept confidential and only shared at the government level, and not made public. Other states may see it as more suitable as a transparency tool, akin to the 1540 Matrix, using it to provide the interested public with less detailed information. The intended use, and consequently the arrangement related to the storage and distribution of the national reports, would need to be agreed before states could submit their own CNNSR.

If the goal is to simplify reporting and increase efficiency and sustainability, the CNNSR would be a helpful aid to developing countries wishing to honour their reporting commitments. However, if the aim is to more generally increase voluntary reporting by the whole international community, then ideally some of the countries with the most developed capabilities in the area could helpfully lead by example, such as by taking up the CNNSR concept. It would therefore be helpful to achieve some clarification on whether this tool is intended, primarily or solely, as a support for developing countries or whether it is intended to be a resource for the whole international community, which champions of strengthening nuclear security might endorse to increase transparency of proven

practice. In either case, it might be helpful to make the distinction between required and voluntary reporting even clearer in the CNNSR form.

Since few countries—developed or developing—carry out nuclear security reporting, in particular under the CPPNM, it would be useful to carry out an analysis of why this is the case. Experience in assisting governments with reporting indicates that the reasons for this differ between states, but also reveals a number of common themes. For example, some states with few or no nuclear activities may feel very removed from the problem and see little relevance to their situation, or may not be fully apprised of their reporting obligations. Some countries have a culture of sharing information while others do not—a characteristic likely to be heightened in the realm of nuclear security. Many are likely to have serious and legitimate resource constraints in carrying out this kind of work, with competing priorities of more immediate concern to their constituents. Others may have comparatively strong resources but have a high number of different agencies involved in collecting and processing information which can cause complications and inconsistent reporting results.

A more thorough investigation of the issues that prevent or discourage states from reporting and sharing information on nuclear security matters could be especially important in order to provide effective support to countries with little expertise and resources to invest on the matter. It could be useful, for example, to investigate the key challenges they face in tackling reporting duties, and how these can be overcome or ameliorated. It could be possible to learn from initiatives undertaken in different sectors, for example by study-

ing the tools developed by the IAEA to facilitate safeguards reporting.

In order to build support for the CNNSR and for reporting more generally, it is important that the answers to these questions are widely shared, so that any further developments are recognised as beneficial. To do so, it will be important for the states that champion the cause of the CNNSR to try and encourage a wider discussion on the topic, to listen to a variety of perspectives, and to ensure compatibility with any future evolution of the nuclear security regime.

Endnotes

1 See https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification; for additional comments, see J. Carlson, A. Persbo, "The IAEA Safeguards Function", *VERTIC Brief*, no. 21, August 2013, available at http://www.vertic.org/media/assets/Publications/VB21.pdf.

2 See https://www.opcw.org/news/article/the-verification-regime-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention-an-overview/

3 See https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/5E2E8E6499843CCBC1257E52003ADED4?OpenDocument;

4 Available at: http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf

5 Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/infcirc869.pdf

6 It is worth noting that instruments focusing specifically on radioactive sources, such as the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, are sometimes discussed alongside measures related to nuclear material, and sometimes discussed separately.

7 CPPNMa Art. 4.5.

8 CPPNMa Art. 5.2.

9 ICSANT Art. 7.b, with reference to Art 2.a.

10 CPPNMa Art. 5.3, ICSANT Art. 7.b, with reference to Art. 2.b.

11 CPPNMa Art. 14.2 and 14.3, ICSANT Art. 10.6 and Art. 19.

12 ICSANT Art. 18.6.

13 Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/1540-matrices/matrix-template.shtml

14 Available at: http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/6/joint-statement-on-consolidated-reporting-appendix

15 Available at: http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-consolidated-reporting

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About this paper

This brief provides an overview of the utility and potential uses of international reporting; some of the key challenges to wider use of reporting in service of the nuclear security regime; and, of the current extent of international reporting under it. The brief argues that, while reporting and information sharing on nuclear security have only played a limited role in the nuclear security field so far, they could significantly contribute to further reinforcing nuclear security worldwide. However, key obstacles to increased information-sharing identified include state-level national security concerns as well as the plurality of policy initiatives, international bodies, and legal instruments both binding and voluntary in nature. The paper analyses some of the current proposals to strengthen reporting in nuclear security and in particular, the Consolidated National Nuclear Security Report (CNNSR), first offered as a gift basket by the Netherlands and a coalition of like-minded countries at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit.

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Building trust through verification