VERTIC has located a facility that is likely associated with China’s nuclear weapon programme, which was not previously precisely located in open sources. We identified this facility during a collaborative ‘OSINT IRL’ workshop hosted and funded by the Stanley Center in November 2024. This workshop convened open-source researchers on nuclear issues to collaborate in real time and share methods. As a case study, workshop participants aimed to evaluate the US intelligence community’s estimate of China’s planned nuclear arsenal expansion, including by collecting information about whether China’s nuclear facilities could enable such an expansion. The facility has been referred to several times in Open Sources as ‘Pingtong’, and has been associated with manufacturing of nuclear weapons components[1] or specifically pit production and warhead assembly.[2] During the workshop researchers from the Open Nuclear Network flagged a footnote in a 2010 report by the Project 2049 Institute, whom had been alerted to the report by another researcher at the meeting:[3]
“Also known as the Ninth Academy [九院], CAEP [the China Academy of Engineering Physics] is China’s primary entity responsible for design, development, and manufacturing of nuclear weapons… According to Reed and Stillman (pp. 358-359)[4], fabrication of nuclear warheads is carried out “near the city of Pingtung” about a two and a half hour drive north of Mianyang. Chinese sources indicate the existence of a CAEP 903 Factory [also known as the Sichuan Materials and Technology Institute; 材料与工艺研究所], located between Nanbazhen Township [南坝镇] and Pingtong Township [平通镇] within Pingwu [平武县] County, in the mountains about 100 kilometers northwest of Mianyang. Pingwu and neighboring Beichuan Counties were two of the hardest hit by the 2008 earthquake, with a number of villages, as well as the 903 Factory, isolated. Media reporting highlights that Second Artillery engineering units, including the primary installation engineering regiment based in Luoyang, were involved in disaster relief operations in this area.”
We conducted a broad area search within the region described in the footnote and identified a site of interest that is shown in Figure 1. The site of interest is approximately 75km north of Mianyang, rather than “about 100 kilometers northwest” of that town as described above. It is situated off a main road (the G247) which runs between Pingtong and Nanbazhen Townships (which were identified using Google Maps place labels and confirmed on OpenStreetMap).
Figure 1. Area north of Mianyang.
The primary characteristics that suggest this area is likely related to China’s nuclear weapon programme are its location within a remote valley, high security, and the clearly industrial nature of many of the buildings within the complex. The mountainous setting does not resemble sites such as those in the US (Rocky Flats, Los Alamos, and Savannah River Laboratory) and UK (Aldermaston), it matches the pattern established during China’s ‘Third Front’ project from 1964 to 1971. At the time, China situated many of its key nuclear facilities inland to protect from what was considered the most likely route of invasion, via the coast. The Heping and Emeishan uranium enrichment plants are also situated in Sichuan Province, to the southwest of Chengdu. Lanzhou enrichment plant is situated in Gansu, which borders Sichuan to the north. Furthermore, the mountains of Sichuan Province provide some cover from indirect strikes by bombs and missiles (functioning as a sort of natural berm), mountain streams provide a water supply, and valleys are more easily access-controlled than a flat site. The Tzu-t’ung high explosives test area is located nearby, approximately 50 km to the southwest.[5]
At the entrance to the valley, where the stream which feeds the complex joins the Fujiang River, is a housing development with sports pitches. There are several high-rise apartment blocks, as well as a football pitch, track, covered courts, and an outdoor swimming pool. All of these are noticeable among the surroundings and they may be amenities for employees of the complex further up the valley.
One road runs from this housing area to the complex, where it joins another road from Nanbazhen Township. At this junction is the first of two security checkpoints at the eastern end of the complex. There is another security checkpoint at the northwestern end, on the only road which leads into the complex from the other direction (see figure 2). In addition to road access control, many of the facilities within the complex are fenced.
Figure 2. Overview of site.
The description of CAEP 903 factory in the secondary sources quoted above, and the features described above, lead us to assess that the facility is likely associated with China’s nuclear weapons programme. The exact purpose of this site is undetermined, but if it is associated with the CAEP, it could be related to research, development or testing of nuclear warheads.[6]
A historical source indicates the existence of a CAEP Institute 905 outside of Mianyang, which is an ordnance engineering laboratory for the non-nuclear weapon components. That source locates the machining of both plutonium and highly-enriched uranium metal into cores as well as the final warhead assembly at the Nuclear Component Manufacturing Plant in Jiuquan.[7] However, this source is now over three decades old, and the distribution of activities among sites may have since changed. Further information is also needed to clarify whether the identified site is either CAEP Institute 903 or 905.
Although significant in of itself, the identification of this site enables comparative analysis with sites in other nuclear weapons states. Discovery of features common to sites dealing with various segments of warhead production may provide insight which could help to understand potential counterparts in the DPRK. Due to the history of the Third Front project many of China’s sites are situated in mountainous areas; similarly situated sites will be familiar to those who have studied the DPRK’s nuclear programme and a common geographic setting may be useful for comparison of certain features.
[1] R. Babiarz (2021). Expansion at China’s Pingtong Nuclear Facility 2002-2020, in: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s Nuclear Forces: Moving beyond a Minimal Deterrent, 2021.
[2] Christopher Yeaw, The Escalatory Attraction of Limited Nuclear Employment For Great Power Competitors of the United States, 2021.
[3] Mark A. Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049 Institute, p.15, 12 March 2010, < https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf, accessed 21 November 2024.>
[4] T. Reed and D. Stillman (2009). The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation, Motorbooks International. ISBN: 9780760339046
[5] As identified in a declassified CIA report. National Photographic Interpretation Center, “High-Explosives Fabrication and Test Complex: Tzu-tung, China.” Photo Interpretation Note, May 1971, < https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78T04741A000100010159-3.pdf, accessed 17 Feb 2025>. It is not clear whether the Tzu t’ung high explosives test complex is associated with the CAEP Institute or China’s nuclear weapon programme as a whole.
[6] R. Norris, A. Burrows and R. Fieldhouse (1994). British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V, pp. 348.
[7] Norris, Burrows & Fieldhouse, ibid.
