VERTIC Briefs

Verification of a nuclear weapon-free world
Trevor Findlay
VERTIC Brief no 1, May 2003
In this first VERTIC Brief, Trevor Findlay considers the requirements for verifying complete nuclear disarmament. He describes the verification tasks that will need to be accomplished while ‘getting to zero’, including those related to nuclear weapons, nuclear research and development and manufacturing capabilities, nuclear-capable delivery systems and fissionable material. The Brief also considers the institutional components of the verification and compliance regime that are likely to be required, ranging from a substantial technical secretariat to a strengthened United Nations Security Council. Special attention is paid to the ‘breakout’ problem—the sudden re-emergence of a nuclear weapon state in a denuclearised world—and the possible responses. Finally, the paper considers what it terms the ‘necessary precursors’ for building an effective verification system for a nuclear weapon-free world, all of which exist in embryonic form at present but which must be greatly developed and enhanced if ‘getting to zero’ is to succeed.

93+10: strengthened nuclear safeguards a decade on
Kenneth Boutin
VERTIC Brief no. 2, April 2004
The Brief considers the progress made in strengthening International Atomic Energy (IAEA) safeguards ten years after the so-called 93+2 programme was launched in 1993 following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. It analyses steps taken by the IAEA itself under its existing legal authority and the status of attempts to have all states adopt Additional Protocols to give the Agency wider powers of information-gathering and inspection. The paper also assesses the challenges facing the Agency in rationalising the old and new safeguards regimes through what it calls 'integrated safeguards'. The Brief concludes with some recommendations on how nuclear safeguards might be further strengthened.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: virtually verifiable now
Ben Mines
VERTIC Brief no. 3, April 2004
Ben Mines provides a progress report on the establishment of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments. The paper reveals the steady development of a system which promises significantly greater verifiability than that envisaged by its designers. Dr Mines argues that full implementation of all aspects of the verification system should be pursued, even without entry into force of the treaty, in order to help refute claims that the treaty is unverifiable and to signal to treaty hold-outs that its supporters are intent on seeing its promise realised.

Biological weapons: minding the verification gap
Trevor Findlay
VERTIC Brief no. 4, Febuary 2004
The BWC is the cornerstone of international efforts to control the development and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons. VERTIC Brief no. 4 explores the strengths and weaknesses of the BWC, focussing on attempts to improve its ineffective verification and compliance system. The paper considers the political context of the failure to negotiate a verification protocol establishing an International Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW). It also examines progress on the minimalist work programme agreed by the resumed session of the Fifth BWC Review Conference in 2002.

Kyoto Protocol national systems and registries: countdown to 2008
Larry MacFaul
VERTIC Brief no. 5, December 2004
Larry MacFaul examines the compliance and eligibility requirements facing parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change in the run-up to its first commitment period (2008-2012). These requirements relate to the estimation and reporting of emissions. The development of national systems for emissions estimation and registries for accounting parties' emissions tading units provide the basis for meeting these requirements. To establish their systems and registries states need significant capacity and resources. So far, parties have made consider progress in developing them. However, to meet the eligibility requirements and be deemed in compliance there is much to do and only a short while to do it before the Kyoto Protocol deadlines take effect.

Adoption of procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol: a guide
Larry MacFaul
VERTIC Brief no. 6, November 2005
This Brief examines the implications, both practical and legal, of the options for adoption of the procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The options are by COP/MOP decision, amendment to the protocol or by some other approach. It is possible that the options can be combined.

Larry MacFaul argues that the most judicious way forward is for the procedures and mechanisms to be adopted by COP/MOP decision at COP/MOP 1. A process for adoption by amendment may also be initiated but the potential consequences of this course of action, as outlined in this paper, will need to be carefully evaluated. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of including this issue in the negotiations on the post-2012 regime. Adoption could be included in a legal instrument or amendment which establishes commitments for the post-2012 regime. Again this should be additional to adoption by COP/MOP decision at COP/MOP1.

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