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Towards a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East
Sameh Aboul-Enein and Hassan ElBahtimy
VERTIC Brief no. 11, May 2010
This brief examines the practical application of the various elements of the CTBT verification regime, their interplay, and suggests a model for technical interaction among States Parties to facilitate verification.
Putting the CTBT into Practice
Malcolm Coxhead and David Jepsen
VERTIC Brief no. 10, December 2009
This brief examines the practical application of the various elements of the CTBT verification regime, their interplay, and suggests a model for technical interaction among States Parties to facilitate verification.
Report on VERTIC’s Technical Coordination Meeting: For legislative assistance facilitators and providers in the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons field
VERTIC
Brief no. 9, March 2009
This Brief contains some of the ideas, themes and conclusions that emerged during the Technical Coordination Meeting for legislative and technical assistance facilitators and providers, hosted by VERTIC on 29 January 2008. The meeting aimed to discuss approaches to developing the capacity of states, to hear experiences of providing assistance, to discover lessons learned, and finally, to consider ways in which facilitators and providers could liaise or collaborate with each other in the future to achieve the overall objective of a safer, more secure world.
News from Open Skies:
A co-operative treaty maintaining military transparency
Hartwig Spitzer
VERTIC
Brief no. 8, March 2009
This paper outlines the main provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies and discusses the interest of the original and new states parties in the agreement.
It focuses primarily, though, on events since 2005: the first Review Conference, preparations for use of additional sensor categories, the flight allocation for 2008, and the outcome of treaty implementation—that is, support for monitoring of arms control treaties and military transparency in a co-operative setting.
On-site inspections for the CTBT: long-running discussions achieve progress
Malcolm Coxhead
VERTIC
Brief no. 7, July 2008
This
Brief examines explores the elaboration of inspection procedures for the on-site inspections (OSI) mechanism of CTBT. In particular the author gives an overview of the elaboration process of the Operational Manual and the difficulties encountered for reaching consensus on key issues. The paper also highlights the forthcoming major inspection exercise which is due to take place from in Vienna, Austria and in Kazakhstan, from the 25 August to 30 September 2008.
Adoption
of procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol:
a guide
Larry MacFaul
VERTIC
Brief no. 6, November 2005
This
Brief examines the implications, both practical and legal, of the options
for adoption of the procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The options are by COP/MOP decision, amendment
to the protocol or by some other approach. It is possible that the options
can be combined.
Larry MacFaul
argues that the most judicious way forward is for the procedures and mechanisms
to be adopted by COP/MOP decision at COP/MOP 1. A process for adoption
by amendment may also be initiated but the potential consequences of this
course of action, as outlined in this paper, will need to be carefully
evaluated. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of including
this issue in the negotiations on the post-2012 regime. Adoption could
be included in a legal instrument or amendment which establishes commitments
for the post-2012 regime. Again this should be additional to adoption
by COP/MOP decision at COP/MOP1.
Kyoto
Protocol national systems and registries: countdown to 2008
Larry
MacFaul
VERTIC
Brief no. 5, December 2004
Larry MacFaul examines the compliance
and eligibility requirements facing parties to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
on climate change in the run-up to its first commitment period (2008-2012).
These requirements relate to the estimation and reporting of emissions.
The development of national systems for emissions estimation and registries
for accounting parties' emissions tading units provide the basis for meeting
these requirements. To establish their systems and registries states need
significant capacity and resources. So far, parties have made consider
progress in developing them. However, to meet the eligibility requirements
and be deemed in compliance there is much to do and only a short while
to do it before the Kyoto Protocol deadlines take effect.
Biological
weapons: minding the verification gap
Trevor Findlay
VERTIC
Brief no. 4, Febuary 2004
The
BWC is the cornerstone of international efforts to control the development
and proliferation of biological and toxin weapons. VERTIC Brief no. 4
explores the strengths and weaknesses of the BWC, focussing on attempts
to improve its ineffective verification and compliance system. The paper
considers the political context of the failure to negotiate a verification
protocol establishing an International Organization for the Prohibition
of Biological Weapons (OPBW). It also examines progress on the minimalist
work programme agreed by the resumed session of the Fifth BWC Review Conference
in 2002
The Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: virtually verifiable now
Ben
Mines
VERTIC
Brief no. 3, April 2004
Ben
Mines provides a progress report on the establishment of the verification
regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning nuclear tests
in all environments. The paper reveals the steady development of a system
which promises significantly greater verifiability than that envisaged
by its designers. Dr Mines argues that full implementation of all aspects
of the verification system should be pursued, even without entry into
force of the treaty, in order to help refute claims that the treaty is
unverifiable and to signal to treaty hold-outs that its supporters are
intent on seeing its promise realised.
93+10: strengthened
nuclear safeguards a decade on
Kenneth Boutin
VERTIC Brief no. 2,
April 2004
The Brief considers the progress made in strengthening International Atomic
Energy (IAEA) safeguards ten years after the so-called 93+2 programme
was launched in 1993 following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine attempts
to acquire nuclear weapons. It analyses steps taken by the IAEA itself
under its existing legal authority and the status of attempts to have
all states adopt Additional Protocols to give the Agency wider powers
of information-gathering and inspection. The paper also assesses the challenges
facing the Agency in rationalising the old and new safeguards regimes
through what it calls 'integrated safeguards'. The Brief concludes with
some recommendations on how nuclear safeguards might be further strengthened.
Verification of
a nuclear weapon-free world
Trevor Findlay
VERTIC Brief no 1,
May 2003
In this first VERTIC Brief, Trevor Findlay considers the requirements
for verifying complete nuclear disarmament. He describes the verification
tasks that will need to be accomplished while ‘getting to zero’,
including those related to nuclear weapons, nuclear research and development
and manufacturing capabilities, nuclear-capable delivery systems and fissionable
material. The Brief also considers the institutional components of the
verification and compliance regime that are likely to be required, ranging
from a substantial technical secretariat to a strengthened United Nations
Security Council. Special attention is paid to the ‘breakout’
problem—the sudden re-emergence of a nuclear weapon state in a denuclearised
world—and the possible responses. Finally, the paper considers what
it terms the ‘necessary precursors’ for building an effective
verification system for a nuclear weapon-free world, all of which exist
in embryonic form at present but which must be greatly developed and enhanced
if ‘getting to zero’ is to succeed.
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