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Completed arms control
& disarmament projects
Project
on strengthened nuclear safeguards
VERTIC promotes the strengthening
of the nuclear safeguards regime operated by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is based in Vienna, Austria. Nuclear
safeguards are designed to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material
from peaceful purposes to weapons purposes and are the principal means
for verifying compliance with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Improvements to safeguards include the adoption and implementation
of Additional Protocols to the existing comprehensive safeguards agreements
that states have signed with the IAEA.
VERTIC's research
focuses on the progress of implementing the Additional Protocol, as well
as the attempt by the IAEA to achieve integrated safeguards to improve
effectiveness and efficiency. VERTIC also monitors the progress of other
safeguards-related issues, including the Trilateral Initiative involving
Russia, the US and the IAEA, and attempts to initiate negotiations on
a fissile material 'cut-off' treaty at the Conference on Disarmament (CD)
in Geneva.
In its work VERTIC
cooperates with the international safeguards community, including the
IAEA, the European
Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the International
Safeguards Division (ISD) of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management
(INMM), along with national safeguards offices, including including
the Australian
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO).
• Project
highlights
• Publications
and online resources
Prospects
for a standing United Nations verification mechanism for weapons of mass
destruction
Since the end of United Nations
inspections in Iraq in March 2003, which took place just prior to the
coalition invasion, there has been increasing debate about the future
of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC). The organization, which was established specifically to carry
forward the unfinished work of monitoring, verifying and dismantling the
remains of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, has
not been permitted to re-enter the country since the end of the war. The
Security Council is divided over its fate, with some members, notably
France and the United Kingdom, suggesting that it be transformed into
a permanent, standing UN WMD verification body. VERTIC's project is examining
the feasibility of this idea, beginning with the broader issue of whether
there is a need for a permanent body.
Interim
report on standing WMD verification mechanism for the UN
On
10 May 2005, Trevor Findlay, Director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty
Compliance, presented an interim report on 'A
Standing United Nations WMD Verification Body: Necessary And Feasible'
to NGO representatives and delegates at the NPT Review Conference in New
York. The study examines the options for establishing a standing United
Nations monitoring, verification and inspection body to deal with weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) issues.
The
report, begun while Trevor was Executive Director of VERTIC, is one of
four reports originally commissioned from VERTIC by the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission in Sweden. Following Trevor's appointment to the
Canadian centre (based at the Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa), the study became a cooperative
project between the two centres.The final report was published in December
2005.
Publications
and online resources
'Interim
report: A standing United Nations WMD Verification Body: Necessary and
Feasible'. Presentation by former VERTIC Executive Director Trevor
Findlay to NGO representatives at the NPT Review Conference, New York,
May 2005.
Verification
Yearbook 2004
The
lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC
Trevor Findlay
Verification Yearbook 2003
'UNMOVIC
in Iraq: opportunity lost
Trevor
Findlay and Ben Mines
• 'A
Standing United Nations WMD Verification Mechanism?' Presentation
by Trevor Findlay, Executive Director of VERTIC, to a Regional
Meeting, sponsored by the Japanese Government, with United
Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Kyoto,
Japan, 6 July 2004
•
'Preserving UNMOVIC:
the Institutional Possibilities' by Trevor Findlay in Disarmament Diplomacy,
Issue
No. 76, March/April 2004
VERTIC's online Iraq
Weapons Inspections Database provides access to a searchable database
that details each of the inspections conducted by the UNMOVIC and IAEA
inspectors between 27 November 2002 and 17 March 2003, when the inspectors
were withdrawn from Iraq.
Implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Landmine
Convention
Researchers: Angela Woodward
Past funders: Landmine Monitor, Government
of Belgium, The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund,
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Ministry of Defence
VERTIC has been
involved in promoting and supporting effective implementation of the 1997
Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines since the treaty’s
entry into force in 1999. Research on the project has concentrated on
the verification and compliance mechanisms; including the implementation
of Article 7, which obliges states to report on their compliance; Article
8 relating to the treaty’s compliance provisions; and the requirement
under Article 9 to adopt national implementation legislation. VERTIC works
closely with states parties, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL) and Landmine Monitor. VERTIC contributed to the annual Landmine
Monitor report for several years.
Guide to reporting
under Article 7
In 2001 VERTIC published a Guide
to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention. Based on
consultations with states parties, international and non-governmental
organisations, and with the assistance of Landmine
Action (UK), the guide was designed to assist states parties in meeting
their legal obligation to report annually to the UN Secretary-General
on their activities under the treaty. The guide also suggested areas where
voluntary reporting might be useful. It illustrated best practice for
completing Article 7 report forms, including recommendations on the type,
format and amount of information that should be provided. The publication
was intended to be useful to officials completing the forms and to those
tasked with assembling the necessary information. The guide also included
a CD-ROM containing the blank report forms.
Funding for the production and publication of the guide was provided by
the Government of Belgium. The guide was presented to the Second Meeting
of States Parties held in Managua, Nicaragua in November 2001.
Copies of the guide may be obtained in hard copy from VERTIC or downloaded from this website. It is also available in other UN languages from the UN Department
for Disarmament Affairs.
Guide to fact-finding
missions
Article 8 of the Ottawa Convention details procedures that may be used
to help resolve a concern about compliance with the treaty. The procedures
include issuing a request for clarification, using the good offices of
the UN Secretary-General and dispatching a fact-finding mission to collect
relevant information for assessment at a meeting of states parties. As
none of these procedures has yet been used, despite credible cases of
suspected non-compliance being raised in meetings of states parties, there
remains some uncertainty as to how they will be implemented.
VERTIC has contributed to discussions among states parties and interested
organisations on the issue by producing a Guide
to Fact-Finding Missions under the Ottawa Convention. Published
in 2003, the guide is intended to assist states parties in their advance
planning and preparations for receiving a fact-finding mission, as well
as suggesting activities they may wish to carry out immediately prior
to, during and after receiving an actual mission. It also provides information
on how fact-finding missions relate to the rest of the Ottawa Convention
and when and how such missions may be initiated and organised.
VERTIC launched the guide at the states parties’ consultation on
the facilitation and clarification of compliance held in Geneva, Switzerland
in January 2003. It is available in hard-copy from VERTIC or from the
VERTIC website.
Publications
Angela Woodward, Guide
to fact-finding missions under the Ottawa Convention, VERTIC,
December 2002.
VERTIC, Guide
to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention, VERTIC,
London, 2001.
Angela Woodward, ‘Verifying
the Ottawa Convention’, Verification Yearbook 2001, VERTIC,
London, 2001.
Laurence Baxter and Angela Woodward, with Trevor Findlay, ‘The Mine
Ban Treaty and National Implementation Legislation’, Landmine
Monitor 2001, International
Campaign to Ban Landmines, Washington, 2001.
Angela Woodward, 'The United Nations' Role in Implementing the Compliance
Aspects of the Ottawa Convention', Landmine Monitor 2000, International
Campaign to Ban Landmines, Washington, 2000.
Trevor Findlay, ‘Verification of the Ottawa Convention: workable
hybrid or fatal compromise?’, Disarmament Forum, September
1999.
VERTIC, ‘Landmines in International Law: Ratification and National
Implementation’, Landmine Monitor 1999, International
Campaign to Ban Landmines, Washington, 1999.
Joe McGrath and David Robertson, ‘Monitoring the Landmine Convention:
Ratification and National Implementation Legislation’, VERTIC
Research Report No. 5,
VERTIC, London, 1999.
Links
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD)
International Action Network on Small
Arms (IANSA)
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
(ICBL)
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC)
Human Rights Watch (Arms Division)
Landmine Action
Landmine Monitor
Mines
Action Canada
United Nations Department
for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) (Ottawa Convention website)
United Nations Mine Action Service
(UNMAS)
Peace Agreements
VERTIC’s peace agreements programme focused on the monitoring and verification of peace accords. Verification and monitoring may be applied to the whole range of elements that constitute a peace implementation process, ranging from the military aspects, through electoral monitoring and human rights monitoring, to the monitoring of local police using international civilian police. The monitoring and verification of the military aspects of peace agreements has the longest lineage historically: ceasefire agreements have often called for monitoring by impartial international observers.
Since the end of the Cold War the deployment of multi-function peace operations as part of comprehensive peace settlements has vastly expanded the possibilities for monitoring and verification. Such activities have also become increasingly significant because the results are much better publicised by the global media, because modern peace agreements tend to be more explicit and elaborate and because experience in monitoring and verification in other fields, such as arms control and disarmament, is gradually being extended to the implementation of peace accords.
'Peace Missions Monitor' is a regular feature of Trust & Verify, which also includes periodic articles on particular peace operations.
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