Arms Control and Disarmament: completed projects 

Working towards Additional Protocol universalization (2011-12)

 

Funder

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (SPF 142)
 

Project updates

  • 15/07/2011: Project start date (six month pilot).
  • 22/07/2011: Pilot phase parameters decided (two regions: Africa and South Asia).
  • 29/07/2011: Country research commenced.
  • 22/08/2011: Country outreached commenced.
  • 19/09/2011: Consultations with governments and other assistance providers during the IAEA General Conference.
  • 19/10/2011: Summary report and individual country reports completed.
  • 02/02/2011: Report back to funder. Awaiting continuation grant.
  • 14/05/2012: Project archived.

Background

The aim of this project is to build support for new ratifications of the IAEA's Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The project builds on and complements the work of the VERTIC National Implementation Measures programme, which provides assistance to states in developing national legislation in conformity with international law and other arms control agreements.
 
This project, should it move beyond its pilot phase, also aims to develop a publicly-available ratification and implementation package, in several languages and consistent with IAEA guidance and methodology, for states wishing to accede to and then implement the Additional Protocol.

 

Irreversibility (2010-11)

 

Funder

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland)

Project updates

  •  08/11/2010: Project started.
  • 15/12/2010: VERTIC commissioned one external author to contribute to project.
  • 22/12/2010: First draft to be transmitted to funder by 21/01/11. First review meeting scheduled for 17/02/11.
  • 21/01/2011: Draft submitted to funder.
  • 18/02/2011: Review meeting concluded.
  • 11/03/2011: Final delivery to funder.
  • 01/09/2011: Report now in layout.
  • 14/10/2011: Final report published.
  • 14/10/2011: Project archived.

Background

In the past few years, nuclear disarmament has benefitted from increasing amounts of political attention. This, coupled with continued real cuts of nuclear arsenals, has led to a sense that disarmament no longer is a remote and unachievable goal. Clearly, however, more can be done with regard to the implementation of disarmament obligations.

In 2000, the NPT Review Conference outlined ‘13 practical steps’ toward nuclear disarmament. One of those is the principle of irreversibility. By highlighting this principle, the conference made explicit a widespread concern about the long term durability of disarmament measures. While knowledge needed to rebuild nuclear weapons will never be forgotten, steps taken away from nuclear weapons should not be reversed. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference contains a commitment by the NPT’s 189 States Parties "to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations".

Over the last decade, ‘irreversibility’ has become a frequently used criteria to evaluate disarmament measures (recently, for instance, many analysts noted with concern the absence of irreversibility provisions in the New START treaty). But the term as such remains undefined. If one could define the term, is it possible to give complete assurances of irreversibility? Can one confidently verify an irreversibility pledge? Our project will aim to explore these issues in greater detail. 

Milestones

  • First draft completed: January 2011
  • Review meeting: February 2011
  • Revised draft and approval of product: March 2011
  • Layout, print and release: April 2011
  • Final report published: October 2011 - project completed

Resources and publications

Verified nuclear disarmament (2009-11)

 

Funder

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Project updates
 

  • 30/06/2010: New presentation posted
  • 16/08/2010: VB12: First draft complete; Under review
  • 20/09/2010: Drafting of brief on 'IAEA General Conference' underway
  • 05/10/2010: Cancelled brief on nuclear disarmament verification
  • 14/12/2010: VB12 and VB13 now online
  • 15/12/2010: Project completed.
  • 01/06/2010: Page scheduled for archive
  • 12/04/2011: Project archived.
     

Background

New projects inspired by the UK-Norway process are presently under consideration by several countries.

Progress on nuclear disarmament—and its verification—would benefit from a wider circle of practical projects in more States, both NWS and NNWS. Several States have expressed interest in joining the UK-Norway process. While these States cannot join the UK-Norway process as such—this would be unworkable—their financial, technical and human resource potential should not go untapped.

The international climate is fertile for seeding new initiatives. There is increased political interest in the concept of multilateral disarmament. For instance, in December 2008, the Global Zero initiative was launched in Paris and on 19 January 2009, three retired senior military officers called for the UK to disarm unilaterally in a letter to the Times. The P-3 (France, the UK and the US) have already pledged to participate in the technical laboratory conference organized by the UK Ministry of Defence in the autumn of 2009, and China and Russia are expected to join.

VERTIC’s project would aim to inform interested third States and civil society organizations of the need for verified nuclear disarmament, the options for negotiating verifiable reductions and the technical aspects of nuclear disarmament verification. This would draw on VERTIC analysis of these issues over the past 23 years, but would also develop generic lessons from the UK-Norway process that could be applied to disarmament verification generally. The aim is to get more States to commit human and financial resources to the cause.
VERTIC’s activities will be fully transparent. Indeed, VERTIC will continue to liaise closely with, and seek advice from, its Norwegian and UK partners to reassure them that these activities complement—and are not competitive with—the UK-Norway process.

Deliverables

VERTIC intends to produce a series of short fact sheets on nuclear disarmament verification, which will include analysis of various issues such as personnel and budgetary requirements. These papers are intended to support the establishment of negotiations for verified nuclear weapons reductions or disarmament and to inform other States interested in developing a work programme similar to the UK-Norway process.

VERTIC also intends to hold a number of meetings and consultations with other nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States to find out more about national capacities and aspirations in this field. Particular attention will be given, initially, to ascertaining the incoming US administration’s commitment in this area.

VERTIC intends to organize a number of off-the-record consultations with interested States around the 2009 and 2010 NPT meetings. Our partners in the UK-Norway process will be kept fully informed about the outcome of these consultations.

Resources
 

The UK-Norway initiative (2007-10)

 

Funder

Carnegie Corporation of New York

Project updates

  • 17/06/2010: First draft complete
  • 18/06/2010: Preparations for the first review meeting underway
  • 09/07/2010: First draft sent for review (hold period)
  • 23/07/2010: First review seminar, London
  • 01/08/2010: Second review meeting cancelled
  • 11/08/2010: Second draft sent for review (hold period)
  • 20/08/2010: Draft approved by editor
  • 26/08/2010: Proofs received. Release dates scheduled
  • 01/09/2010: Web release
  • 17/09/2010: Print release
  • 28/10/2010: Report presented in the United States
  • 04/11/2010: Report presented to the IAEA Safeguards Symposium
  • 08/11/2010: Project closed
  • 01/02/2011: Scheduled for archiving
  • 12/04/2011: Project archived.

Background

The UK-Norway Initiative was founded in 2007, after a series of consultations between VERTIC and the U.K. and Norwegian Governments. It is a groundbreaking project involving a nuclear weapon State, a non-nuclear weapon State, and a non-governmental organization.

The project involves some eight participating institutes, and employs about 30 researchers from both countries. It addresses research questions agreed to by all participants, and is presently focusing on on-site methodology and so-called information barrier technology. The work of the initiative has attracted considerable international attention, both from nuclear weapon States and from a large number of non-nuclear weapon States.

VERTIC is observing the initiative, and is also responsible for the evaluation of all its activities. In addition, the Centre provides non-technical advice and support, and has contributed to the work on on-site inspection methodology. It draws funding from both governments, and has supplemented its budget by using programme funds provided by the Ford Foundation.

After the conclusion of the project, VERTIC will have produced a public report on the UK-Norway Initiative. This report will review all documentation produced under the UK-Norway Initiative’s first phase (2007-2009). The principal objective is to draw out and summarize lessons learned in respect to verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads. A secondary objective is to formulate recommendations for future work.

Milestones
 

  • Draft report, May 2010 (completed 17 June 2010)
  • Review meetings, June and July 2010 (completed 1 August 2010)
  • Final report, August 2010 (completed 20 August 2010)
  • Distribution, September 2010

Resources 

South Asia Strategic Stability Dialogue (2007-11)

 

Funder

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (partial funding)

Project updates
 

  • 13/07/2010: Drafting of final report started.
  • 26/08/2010: Final field trip (Sri Lanka) scheduled.
  • 17/09/2010: Field trip (Sri Lanka) completed.
  • 22/12/2010: Final report now scheduled for Trust & Verify 123, scheduled for 7 January 2011.
  • 23/12/2010: Final reporting completed. Project now scheduled for completion.
  • 07/01/2011: Project completed.
  • 01/04/2011: Page scheduled for archiving.
  • 12/04/2011: Project archived

Background

VERTIC has been in discussions with Indian and Pakistani officials since November 2007. Several of those have expressed concern over the unstable political climate in Pakistan, and are obviously concerned that nuclear material (or perhaps even nuclear weaponry) may fall into wrong hands. 

Several of these discussions have focused on the possibility of the establishment of a bilateral fissile material control regime in South Asia. Initial discussions focused on the experiences of the Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares (ABACC) regime, which oversees a bilateral nuclear safeguards regime for Argentina and Brazil (administered independently but in cooperation with IAEA safeguards) and whether this concept might be replicated for India and Pakistan.

This project examines the feasibility of a range of confidence building measures that could be applied bilaterally by India and Pakistan in relation to their nuclear weapons programmes. Research and advocacy activities under this project will also seek to build support for the adoption and implementation of such measures in the future.

Deliverables

The project aims will be achieved by holding a series of bilateral meetings and convening a workshop.

VERTIC will publish and disseminate an official project report at the end of the project. VERTIC will lead the project, which will also involve regional organizations as collaborative partners. 

VERTIC has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) to further the goals of this project.

VERTIC is also funding a meeting of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs on this, and other, topics.

Resources and meetings
 

  • SASSI-VERTIC Meeting on South Asia, Islamabad, Pakistan (June 2008).
  • USI-India-VERTIC Meeting on South Asia, New Delhi, India  (December 2009).
  • 12th Asian Security Conference, IDSA, New Delhi, India (February 2010).
  • Wilton Park Conference on Verified Dismantlement of Strategic Missiles, Wilton Park, UK (April 2010).
  • International Pugwash Meeting on South Asia, Islamabad, Pakistan (June 2010).
  • Meeting on the verified dismantlement of short range ballistic missiles, Colombo, Sri Lanka (September 2010).
  • Building confidence in India and Pakistan, Trust & Verify No. 131, 7 January 2011.

Project on strengthened nuclear safeguards 

VERTIC promotes the strengthening of the nuclear safeguards regime operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is based in Vienna, Austria. Nuclear safeguards are designed to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to weapons purposes and are the principal means for verifying compliance with the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Improvements to safeguards include the adoption and implementation of Additional Protocols to the existing comprehensive safeguards agreements that states have signed with the IAEA.

VERTIC's research focuses on the progress of implementing the Additional Protocol, as well as the attempt by the IAEA to achieve integrated safeguards to improve effectiveness and efficiency. VERTIC also monitors the progress of other safeguards-related issues, including the Trilateral Initiative involving Russia, the US and the IAEA, and attempts to initiate negotiations on a fissile material 'cut-off' treaty at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

In its work VERTIC cooperates with the international safeguards community, including the IAEA, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), along with national safeguards offices, including including the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO).

Prospects for a standing United Nations verification mechanism for weapons of mass destruction

Since the end of United Nations inspections in Iraq in March 2003, which took place just prior to the coalition invasion, there has been increasing debate about the future of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The organization, which was established specifically to carry forward the unfinished work of monitoring, verifying and dismantling the remains of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, has not been permitted to re-enter the country since the end of the war. The Security Council is divided over its fate, with some members, notably France and the United Kingdom, suggesting that it be transformed into a permanent, standing UN WMD verification body. VERTIC's project is examining the feasibility of this idea, beginning with the broader issue of whether there is a need for a permanent body.

Interim report on standing WMD verification mechanism for the UN

On 10 May 2005, Trevor Findlay, Director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance, presented an interim report on 'A Standing United Nations WMD Verification Body: Necessary And Feasible' to NGO representatives and delegates at the NPT Review Conference in New York. The study examines the options for establishing a standing United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection body to deal with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issues.

The report, begun while Trevor was Executive Director of VERTIC, is one of four reports originally commissioned from VERTIC by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission in Sweden. Following Trevor's appointment to the Canadian centre (based at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa), the study became a cooperative project between the two centres.The final report was published in December 2005.

Publications and online resources

'Interim report: A standing United Nations WMD Verification Body: Necessary and Feasible'. Presentation by former VERTIC Executive Director Trevor Findlay to NGO representatives at the NPT Review Conference, New York, May 2005.

Verification Yearbook 2004

The lessons of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC
Trevor Findlay

Verification Yearbook 2003

UNMOVIC in Iraq: opportunity lost
Trevor Findlay and Ben Mines

• 'A Standing United Nations WMD Verification Mechanism?' Presentation by Trevor Findlay, Executive Director of VERTIC, to a Regional Meeting, sponsored by the Japanese Government, with United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Kyoto, Japan, 6 July 2004
• 'Preserving UNMOVIC: the Institutional Possibilities' by Trevor Findlay in Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 76, March/April 2004

VERTIC's online Iraq Weapons Inspections Database provides access to a searchable database that details each of the inspections conducted by the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors between 27 November 2002 and 17 March 2003, when the inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq.

Implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Landmine Convention

Researchers: Angela Woodward
Past funders: Landmine Monitor, Government of Belgium, The Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK Ministry of Defence

VERTIC has been involved in promoting and supporting effective implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel landmines since the treaty’s entry into force in 1999. Research on the project has concentrated on the verification and compliance mechanisms; including the implementation of Article 7, which obliges states to report on their compliance; Article 8 relating to the treaty’s compliance provisions; and the requirement under Article 9 to adopt national implementation legislation. VERTIC works closely with states parties, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and Landmine Monitor. VERTIC contributed to the annual Landmine Monitor report for several years.

Guide to reporting under Article 7

In 2001 VERTIC published a Guide to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention. Based on consultations with states parties, international and non-governmental organisations, and with the assistance of Landmine Action (UK), the guide was designed to assist states parties in meeting their legal obligation to report annually to the UN Secretary-General on their activities under the treaty. The guide also suggested areas where voluntary reporting might be useful. It illustrated best practice for completing Article 7 report forms, including recommendations on the type, format and amount of information that should be provided. The publication was intended to be useful to officials completing the forms and to those tasked with assembling the necessary information. The guide also included a CD-ROM containing the blank report forms.

Funding for the production and publication of the guide was provided by the Government of Belgium. The guide was presented to the Second Meeting of States Parties held in Managua, Nicaragua in November 2001.

Copies of the guide may be obtained in hard copy from VERTIC or downloaded from this website. It is also available in other UN languages from the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.

Guide to fact-finding missions

Article 8 of the Ottawa Convention details procedures that may be used to help resolve a concern about compliance with the treaty. The procedures include issuing a request for clarification, using the good offices of the UN Secretary-General and dispatching a fact-finding mission to collect relevant information for assessment at a meeting of states parties. As none of these procedures has yet been used, despite credible cases of suspected non-compliance being raised in meetings of states parties, there remains some uncertainty as to how they will be implemented.

VERTIC has contributed to discussions among states parties and interested organisations on the issue by producing a Guide to Fact-Finding Missions under the Ottawa Convention. Published in 2003, the guide is intended to assist states parties in their advance planning and preparations for receiving a fact-finding mission, as well as suggesting activities they may wish to carry out immediately prior to, during and after receiving an actual mission. It also provides information on how fact-finding missions relate to the rest of the Ottawa Convention and when and how such missions may be initiated and organised.

VERTIC launched the guide at the states parties’ consultation on the facilitation and clarification of compliance held in Geneva, Switzerland in January 2003. It is available in hard-copy from VERTIC or from the VERTIC website.

Publications

Angela Woodward, Guide to fact-finding missions under the Ottawa Convention, VERTIC, December 2002.
VERTIC, Guide to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention, VERTIC, London, 2001.
Angela Woodward, ‘Verifying the Ottawa Convention’, Verification Yearbook 2001, VERTIC, London, 2001.
Laurence Baxter and Angela Woodward, with Trevor Findlay, ‘The Mine Ban Treaty and National Implementation Legislation’, Landmine Monitor 2001, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Washington, 2001.
Angela Woodward, 'The United Nations' Role in Implementing the Compliance Aspects of the Ottawa Convention', Landmine Monitor 2000, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Washington, 2000.
Trevor Findlay, ‘Verification of the Ottawa Convention: workable hybrid or fatal compromise?’, Disarmament Forum, September 1999.
VERTIC, ‘Landmines in International Law: Ratification and National Implementation’, Landmine Monitor 1999, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Washington, 1999.
Joe McGrath and David Robertson, ‘Monitoring the Landmine Convention: Ratification and National Implementation Legislation’, VERTIC Research Report No. 5, VERTIC, London, 1999.

Links

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Human Rights Watch (Arms Division)
Landmine Action
Landmine Monitor
Mines Action Canada
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) (Ottawa Convention website)
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Peace Agreements

VERTIC’s Peace Agreements Programme (now inactive) focused on the monitoring and verification of peace accords. Verification and monitoring may be applied to the whole range of elements that constitute a peace implementation process, ranging from the military aspects, through electoral monitoring and human rights monitoring, to the monitoring of local police using international civilian police. The monitoring and verification of the military aspects of peace agreements has the longest lineage historically: ceasefire agreements have often called for monitoring by impartial international observers.

Since the end of the Cold War the deployment of multi-function peace operations as part of comprehensive peace settlements has vastly expanded the possibilities for monitoring and verification. Such activities have also become increasingly significant because the results are much better publicised by the global media, because modern peace agreements tend to be more explicit and elaborate and because experience in monitoring and verification in other fields, such as arms control and disarmament, is gradually being extended to the implementation of peace accords.