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IRAQ
WEAPONS INSPECTIONS DATABASE
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From
the first inspection on 27 November 2002 until the last on 17 March 2003,
VERTIC monitored and chronicled the progress of weapons inspections conducted
in Iraq by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
This searchable database provides a detailed record of each inspection,
as both a historical record of the inspections regime and to allow for
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the inspections.
VERTIC's
analysis
VERTIC's analysis of the data appears in 'UNMOVIC
in Iraq: opportunity lost' by Trevor Findlay and Ben Mines in Verification
Yearbook 2003. Noting that the pattern of inspections shows two distinct
phases, they look at the extent of Iraqi cooperation and the chief difficulties
the weapons inspectors encountered. The most important results of the
inspectionsboth what was found and what was notare discussed.
This analysis is set
against the background of the debate by the UN Security Council about
the appropriate course of action, and its timing, once Iraq was found
to be in 'material breach' of its obligations under Resolution 1441. The
viewpoints of the key players in the debate as it progressed are noted.
Findlay and Mines
also enumerate the ways in which UNMOVIC was better equipped for its mission
than its predecessor, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM),
including training, preparation time, and advances in technology for inspections
and monitoring. Although it is unlikely that UNMOVIC will be allowed to
return to Iraq to complete its mandate, the authors consider whether there
are other ways in which its expertise and experience might be retained
for future use. The chapter concludes with a look at this possibility
and an evaluation of what the lessons learned from the inspectors' work
in Iraq might mean for future multilateral verification efforts.
Background
Following
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the UN Security Council required Iraq to disarm
itself of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and associated capabilities
and delivery systems. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM),
created by Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991, was mandated to verify the
disarmament of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and missiles with
a range of more than 150 km and to operate a system of Ongoing Monitoring
and Verification (OMV) to verify Iraq's compliance with its obligations
not to reacquire WMD. The IAEA was mandated to verify Iraq’s disarmament
of its nuclear weapons programmes.
In December
1998, despite substantive disarmament, Iraq’s intransigence and persistent
failure to cooperate resulted in military action by the US and UK against
Iraq. The UNSCOM inspectors, withdrawn for their safety, were never to
return to Iraq. On 17 December 1999
Security Council Resolution 1284 disbanded UNSCOM and replaced it with
UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC inherited the mandate and responsibilities of UNSCOM as
well as being tasked to establish a system of Reinforced Ongoing Monitoring
and Verification (R-OMV). The IAEA resumed its mandate
with regard to nuclear weapons.
UNMOVIC spent
the next three years carefully preparing for a return to Iraq. In September
2002, under the threat of military action by the US, Iraq finally declared
its intention to allow inspections to resume. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1441 on 8 November 2002, which declared that Iraq was still in
material breach of its obligations under previous resolutions but offered a
final opportunity for Iraq to comply. It was also required to provide an
accurate, full and complete declaration of all its weapon and missile
programmes, which it submitted on 7 December.
Inspections
resumed on 27 November 2002. UNMOVIC received greater cooperation from Iraq
than had UNSCOM and made some progress, notably in destroying 72 Al Samoud 2
missiles that exceeded the permitted 150 km range. However, the inspections
were short-lived. By 17 March 2003 differences in the Security Council over
continuing Iraqi non-compliance reached a head. With no consensus on a
second resolution to authorise the use of force to compel Iraq to fulfil its
obligations, the US declared its intention to act unilaterally. On 17 March
the US advised the UN that inspectors should leave Iraq. They were withdrawn
the next day, signalling the end of the inspections.
The database
Project
methodology
VERTIC compiled
a daily record of inspections from UNMOVIC/IAEA press releases, supplemented
by statements released by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and
other open sources. From the UN press releases we recorded, where possible,
the following variables:
|
Variable
|
Description
|
|
Date
|
Date that
the inspection took place |
|
Name of site
|
Common name
of the inspected site |
|
Company name
|
Name of the
company that owns/runs the site |
|
AKA
|
Alternative
name for the site |
|
Type of
facility |
Nature or
role of the site, e.g. weapons factory or university |
|
Location
|
Location of
the site |
|
Region
|
Name of the
governorate of Iraq in which the site was located |
|
Team
|
Type of
inspection team: UNMOVIC (general), IAEA (nuclear), biological,
chemical, missile or multidisciplinary |
|
Number of
inspectors |
Number of
inspectors in the team |
|
Declared
status |
Declared:
the site was formally declared to the UN prior to inspection
Undeclared:
the site was not formally declared to the UN
New: a
declared site visited for the first time |
|
Purpose of
inspection |
Purpose of
the inspection, such as verifying the activities and operations at a
site, verifying the declaration, taking samples, tagging equipment,
radiation surveys, or supervising weapon destruction. |
|
Proprietor
|
Government
ministry that oversees the site |
|
Public/Private |
Whether the
site is state- or privately-owned |
Acronyms
|
IAEA |
International Atomic Energy Agency |
|
MFA |
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Iraq) |
|
MIC |
Military
Industrialization Corporation (Iraq) |
|
OMV |
Ongoing
Monitoring and Verification |
|
R-OMV |
Reinforced
Ongoing Monitoring and Verification |
|
UNMOVIC
|
United
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission |
|
UNSCOM |
United
Nations Special Commission |
This database
has been independently compiled by VERTIC and is not an official UNMOVIC or
IAEA record. While every effort has been made to ensure its accuracy and
completeness, the database may differ from official records of the
inspections.
Resources
VERTIC
publications
Trevor
Findlay and Ben Mines, 'UNMOVIC
in Iraq: opportunity lost', Verification Yearbook 2003,
VERTIC, 2003
Ben Mines, ‘Iraq
Survey Group takes up baton in hunt for WMD’,
Trust &
Verify, no.
109, July-August
2003
Trevor Findlay
and Ben Mines, ‘Iraq’s weapons: the US fails to best UNMOVIC’,
Trust & Verify,
no. 108, May-June
2003
Ben Mines,
‘UNMOVIC: progress, but to what end?’,
Trust &
Verify,
no. 107, March-April
2003
Alex Wood,
‘UNMOVIC: quality time in Iraq’,
Trust &
Verify,
no. 106, January-February
2003
Trevor Findlay,
‘UNMOVIC’s balancing act’,
Trust &
Verify,
no. 105, November-December
2002
Stephen Black,
‘Verification under duress: the case of UNSCOM’, Verification
Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, 2000
Links
United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq
IAEA Iraq Nuclear Verification Office (INVO)
United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM)
Conflict in Iraq
(a BASIC, ISIS and Saferworld initiative)
Database
compiled by Alex Wood and Ben Mines with the assistance of Jane Awford.
Database designed by Olle Bodelius (W3Logic).
Contact us
Please
contact
Jane Awford if you have any queries or comments.
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