VERTIC Changes its Name and Moves!

On 1 November VERTIC changed its name from the Verification Technology Information Centre to the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. The new name is intended to better reflect VERTIC’s role and activities. The familiar acronym, VERTIC, remains the same.

VERTIC is also moving from Carrara House to new premises before 31 December. We will be closed from 25 December to 25 January during the move. For our new address, telephone and fax numbers as well as updates on the move see VERTIC’s new website at www.fhit.org/vertic.

In the meantime we apologise for any disruption to VERTIC’s services, including our publications. Due to the move Trust and Verify will not appear again until March 1999—with a bumper issue.

The staff of VERTIC would like to take this early opportunity to wish all of you a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!

Landmine Monitor
Pioneering 'Track Two' Verification

The 1997 Landmine Ban Treaty, which bans the manufacture, transfer and use of antipersonnel landmines, continues to shatter precedents. Already unique in the annals of disarmament because of the speed with which it was negotiated and the extent of non-governmental involvement in its negotiation (so-called 'track two' diplomacy), it has entered into force faster than any previous multilateral disarmament agreement in modern times. Entry-into-force was ensured by the fortieth ratification by a signatory state, that of Burkina Faso, on 16 September, in time for the first anniversary of the treaty being agreed in Oslo, Norway, last year.

Yet another unprecedented feature of the treaty, also know as the Ottawa Convention, is currently being put into place, namely the establishment of a civil society-based reporting network for monitoring state compliance. The Landmine Monitor, as the network is called, has been established by non-governmental organisations involved in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) which, along with Jody Williams, received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize for its promotion of a landmine ban. At a conference held in Dublin, Ireland, from 14 to 18 September, the Landmine Monitor, drawing on the experience of an expanded group of non-governmental organisations, established an ambitious work plan for the preparation of its first Annual Report. The report will cover all aspects of implementation of the Landmine Ban Treaty, including reports on compliance by all countries (whether signatories, parties or neither) and thematic reports on global landmine use, production and export, stockpiles, demining, mine awareness programmes and landmine survivor assistance. The report is due for completion by May 1999 in time for presentation to the first conference of states parties, to be held in Maputo, Mozambique in May/June.

The establishment of a civil society-based monitoring network for an international agreement is unprecedented. While non-governmental organisations and research institutes have for years monitored compliance with treaties individually and informally, this is the first attempt to create a systematic, global, non-governmental monitoring network. While the Landmine Monitor will have no official status under the treaty, it is likely to be taken seriously by states since the treaty provides for no official verification organisation to be established. Unlike other recently concluded treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Ottawa Convention contains no verification mechanism.
This is due partly to the fact that it is a hybrid agreement combining aspects of disarmament agreements (which today usually mandate stringent verification) and humanitarian law (which traditionally does not mandate verification). The absence of verification in the Ottawa Convention is also attributable to the lack of agreement among the negotiating states on what verification was required or feasible.

The treaty does however contain compliance provisions requiring annual reports by states parties on their compliance and outlining the means by which compliance questions may be resolved. The United Nations Secretary-General is charged with collecting and collating the annual reports of states parties and publishing them. In addition, the treaty provides for annual meetings of states parties during the first five years of the treaty's life to assess its effectiveness.

The Landmine Monitor, in seeking to supplement the treaty's provisions with a comprehensive review of annual compliance, has taken on an enormous task. It will be reliant on scores of non-governmental organisations in the field, especially in mine-affected countries, which, although they may have expert local knowledge and contacts, are usually untrained in gathering data systematically and professionally, and will be unlikely to give priority to such work over their principal missions. The global data from such outposts must be centrally collected, electronically stored and analysed. The annual report must then be drafted on the basis of the data, and edited and published by May 1999. While funding for the project has been pledged by Canada, Ireland and Norway, the amounts available to support organisations in the field world-wide is minuscule. Ultimately, it is neither in the Monitor's interests nor in those of states parties for it to be indefinitely and exclusively funded by governments.

VERTIC will be participating in preparing the first report. It has been awarded a grant of $US 5,000 by Landmine Monitor to monitor the progress of national ratification and implementation legislation world-wide.

Trevor Findlay

### Compliance Provisions of the Landmine Ban Treaty: a Summary

#### Article 7, Transparency

Each state party is required, within 180 days after entry into force of the treaty, and annually thereafter, to report to the UN Secretary-General on a wide range of antipersonnel landmine-related matters including:

- national implementation measures
- number and types of stockpiled mines
- number and types of mines kept or transferred for training purposes
- number and types of mines destroyed
- location, number and types of emplaced mines
- status of programs to convert or decommission mine production facilities
- measures taken to protect the population from mined areas
- technical characteristics of mines previously produced and currently owned by a state party in order to facilitate mine clearance.

#### Article 8, Facilitation and Clarification of Compliance

This provides for a multi-stage system to investigate possible violations. First, one or more state parties submits through the UN Secretary-General a Request for Clarification to another state party. If there is no response within 28 days or an unsatisfactory one, the matter is taken up at the next regular annual Meeting of States Parties. Alternatively a request can be made to hold a Special Meeting of States Parties. If unable to resolve the issue, either type of meeting may authorise by majority vote a fact-finding mission, carried out by experts nominated from a list maintained by the UN Secretary-General. The mission must give at least 72 hours' notice before it arrives, and may stay up to 14 days. It reports its findings to the Meeting of States Parties. The meeting may then ask the state party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period and may suggest ways and means to resolve the matter, 'including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law', by a two-thirds vote if consensus cannot be reached. Such procedures may include referring the matter to the UN Security Council, which in turn may impose sanctions on the non-compliant party.
The Kosovo Verification Experiment

After threats of NATO bombing if Serbian oppression in Kosovo continued, US envoy Richard Holbrooke finally achieved an agreement with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milosevic on 12 October. The agreement calls for the removal of Serbian troops and police from Kosovo to their pre-March levels, monitored by an international verification operation. Elections are to follow at a date to be determined. The deal is backed by the use of force—NATO air strikes—if the terms of the agreement are breached.

The verification mission was allotted to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has previously been involved in many different types of missions, from monitoring elections to chairing meetings, but this is the first time it has been solely charged with organising a mission explicitly to verify compliance with a peace agreement.

The mission, comprising 2000 unarmed verifiers, is mandated to observe Serbian compliance with the Holbrooke agreement, encourage Albanians to return from the countryside to their homes and monitor the elections to be held in Kosovo. Its head is American Ambassador William Walker. Contributing countries so far include the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. The US government has hired a private mercenary firm, DynCorp, to provide the American contingent.

The OSCE verifiers will confront multiple challenges. Aside from the problems of different nationalities, languages and backgrounds within the mission, they face the difficult environment of Kosovo itself: mined land, pillaged houses, shortages of supplies and no guarantee of help from the outside if the mission goes wrong. They are being deployed in the midst of an ongoing low-level war, unarmed, with little training, no on-site protection and without precise rules for Serbian demilitarisation of Kosovar territory and re-entry of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forces to areas vacated by the Serb forces.

A NATO ‘extraction force’ of 1,200 to 1,800 troops commanded by France will be on standby in neighbouring Macedonia in case of difficulties, and NATO still has significant air power in the region and its stabilisation force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But this still may not be enough to protect the 2,000 verifiers on the ground.

Currently the verifiers are still in the process of being deployed to Kosovo. Negotiations are beginning with local officials and the Serbian authorities to secure access to military positions and border areas. Some Albanians have ventured back to their homes only to find them burnt, pillaged and booby-trapped, and their towns still under Serbian military rule. Skirmishing between the KLA and the Serbian

Other Observer Missions in the News

*the Mission of Military Observers Ecuador/Peru (MOMEP), deployed along the Ecuador/Peru border, has received new tasks with the 13 August agreement on withdrawal of the forces of both sides from the border; MOMEP will monitor the zone of separation with six patrols each month, using UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters

*Pakistan has asked the UN to increase the number of military observers monitoring the 1,000-long Line of Control (LOC) between India and Pakistan, where troops have exchanged fire in recent months; the UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan has been in existence since January 1949

*the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) has warned that the country’s stability is in jeopardy because of human rights violations, public lynchings and extra-judicial executions; established in 1995, MINUGUA’s mandate is to verify compliance with the human rights aspects of the peace agreements between the Guatemalan government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) signed between 1994 and 1996.


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The Kosovo verification mission is unique in a number of respects. One is its title: the use of the term 'verification' implies a harder-nosed attitude than mere monitoring. It is also the first time a verification mission has been provided with a dedicated external military force to protect and/or extract it. However, as with all experiments, many elements are still unclear and a number of questions remain unanswered. How much protection is the OSCE mission likely to receive when NATO clearly wishes to avoid involvement in another Balkan war? Could verification teams be used as hostages by Serbian President Milosevic (as occurred in Bosnia) to deter NATO action? Can the OSCE monitor a withdrawal of Serbian troops when their total number is unknown? How effective can the unarmed OSCE mission be in monitoring or deterring outbreaks of fighting between the Serbs and the KLA? Can the OSCE offer safety to the Albanians as they return to their homes? And one of the most important questions: if the OSCE mission proves a failure, and the Kosovo crisis continues, Albanian citizens do not return to their homes and elections are not held or are not free and fair, will the international community hold the verification mission responsible, thereby discrediting the whole concept?

International verification is the most logical and appropriate way for the international community to reassure itself of the safe return of Albanian civilians to their homes in Kosovo, while at the same time overseeing the removal of the Serbian forces. It is yet to be seen whether this experiment is successful and renewed armed conflict avoided.

Kathryn Klebacha, VERTIC Intern

Northern Ireland Decommissioning Verification: The Missing Element

The decommissioning of paramilitary weapons was directly addressed in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which aims to bring peace to Northern Ireland. It called for the process to be completed by 22 May, 2000. Yet these are significant differences between the parties on the timing of decommissioning. Unionist leader and Northern Ireland’s First Minister David Trimble is adamant that decommissioning begin before Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams and chief negotiator Martin McGuinness are allowed to take their seats in the newly-elected Northern Ireland Assembly. Adams, sensitive to historic republican views that the relinquishing of weapons is an act of surrender, argues that nowhere in the Good Friday agreement does it require decommissioning to start prior to Sinn Fein’s joining the executive. Sinn Fein has suggested merely drawing up a timetable for decommissioning, but Trimble has refused this option as inadequate, urging tangible action from the IRA instead. As a result of these differences no decommissioning has yet taken place. One of the loyalist factions, the Ulster Volunteer Force, has even declared that regardless of IRA disarmament, they will keep their weapons.

Meanwhile the issue of verification has been almost entirely overlooked. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning was established in 1997 to oversee the decommissioning of weapons, with Canadian General John de Chastelain as its chair. The Good Friday Agreement clearly states that ‘The Independent Commission will monitor, review, and verify progress on decommissioning of illegal arms’. However, the importance of verification has been overlooked due to constant disagreements between the parties over principle. Luckily, de Chastelain is trusted by both the republicans as well as Unionists. Sinn Fein has declared that the parties must continue to work constructively and in good faith with the Commission. McGuinness, who was appointed by Adams to liaise with de Chastelain, has said somewhat disingenuously that the decommissioning issue was ‘always a matter for General de Chastelain and his International Body, and I think that the path to decommissioning should be left to him’. Leaving it to the commission is, of course, pointless unless the paramilitaries co-operate.

So far the Loyalist Volunteer Force is the only paramilitary group to announce that it will decommission and that this can be verified by the International Commission. The weapons, monitored by the commission, would, they suggest, be fed into a metal shredder in Belfast, in front of television cameras, demonstrating to the public that ‘their war’ is over. While this may have a useful demonstration effect, the real solution lies with a decision by the IRA, by far the largest and best armed paramilitary force in Northern Ireland, to begin decommissioning and for this to be fully verified by the Decommissioning Commission.

Genevieve Forde, VERTIC Intern

Trust & Verify

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North Korean Nuclear Puzzle

The United States is continuing to press North Korea for an on-site inspection of a suspected underground nuclear facility, alleged to be a nuclear reactor to make weapons-grade plutonium. Such a facility would be a violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which North Korea is a party. It would also violate the 1994 Agreed Framework with the US, by which North Korea has foresworn the military nuclear option in exchange for a massive civil nuclear power assistance programme. The North Koreans, who deny the existence of the facility, are demanding monetary compensation for such a visit. The US has rejected the unprecedented idea that verification, essentially a confidence-building measure that should benefit all parties, should require compensation from one party.

Meanwhile, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on 3 November, by a vote of 113 to 1 (North Korea) with 8 abstentions, expressing deep concern over North Korea's repeated violation of its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and urging it to abide by its obligations.

Iraq Crisis Redux

In yet another replay of previous crises, Iraq again halted all cooperation with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in early November, violating previous agreements with the UN Security Council, including that which ended the Gulf War and an agreement concluded with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in February (see Trust & Verify, no. 79, March 1998). UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) promptly withdrew their staff, while the United States and the United Kingdom threatened military action if cooperation was not restored. Unlike previous crises, military action was authorised. Iraq was only 30 minutes from being attacked by cruise missiles launched by B52 bombers when a message from Baghdad expressing Iraq's willingness to comply with its previous undertakings was received by Kofi Annan. While suspending the bombing, the US pressed for an unconditional Iraqi undertaking rather than that received by Annan, to which had been appended a list of Iraqi demands. Iraq ultimately agreed.

UNSCOM inspectors returned to Iraq within 48 hours but were confronted with the prospects of re-establishing themselves, systematically checking monitoring equipment that had been left unattended (and possibly tampered with) and pressing a new round of inspection requests on a resentful Iraqi government. Almost immediately Iraq refused an UNSCOM request for 12 categories of documents, including a handwritten logbook snatched away from an UNSCOM inspector at Iraq's air force headquarters in July. The logbook is believed to show that Iraq used only half as many chemical weapons during its 1980-88 war with Iran that it has disclosed. UNSCOM was also pursuing the issue of Iraqi production of VX nerve gas. UN tests on missile fragments evacuated in the desert showed traces of the gas. Iraq continued to deny producing VX in quantity.

Despite the close escape that Iraq had had from a devastating bombing campaign, it appeared that there would be no new era in Iraq-UNSCOM relations and no early end to the UN’s verification effort in that country.

Climate Change Talks in Buenos Aires

A conference of states parties to the Climate Change Convention, convened in Buenos Aires in November, was frustratingly unproductive. It did however agree a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to encourage companies to build wind, solar or other 'clean energy' projects or plant forests which act as carbon 'sinks'. Such efforts would allow reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases in developing countries which do not have formal limits under the Climate Change Convention's Kyoto Protocol. Starting in 2000, companies will receive certificates showing the amount of carbon dioxide they have prevented from entering the atmosphere. These could eventually be sold to power companies in industrialised countries which want to emit more pollution than they could under their governments’ agreed emission targets. Such a mechanism, along with much else in the Climate Change area, has verification and monitoring implications. For instance, how is it to be determined that a particular project really has prevented carbon dioxide emissions? The US demand for 'key' unnamed developing countries to accept formal limits on their emissions, which
would also need to be monitored and verified, was left unresolved at Buenos Aires. Only Argentina and Kazakhstan agreed.

**OSIA Absorbed**

The US On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), which has managed US involvement in verifying compliance with a number of arms control agreements, including the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, was absorbed on 1 October into the Defence Threat Reduction Agency; the new agency, which will deal comprehensively with threats of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction, absorbed, along with OSIA, the former Defence Special Weapons Agency and the Defence Technology Security Administration; it is to be hoped that the OSIA’s disappearance will not result in diminished attention and resources being devoted to US involvement in on-site inspections.

**Japan’s New ‘National Technical Means’**

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party’s project team on the euphemistically named ‘information satellite’ project, led by former Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, proposed on 29 October that a government ministry or agency be nominated to launch the project and that funds be allocated in this or next fiscal year. While the precise capabilities of the satellite remain unclear, it appears likely to boost Japan’s so-called ‘national technical’ means of verification. According to the Nakayama report: ‘To prevent threats and crises, to promote positive peaceful diplomacy, and to contribute to a defence-oriented security policy...it is necessary to self-develop and produce within four or five years an information satellite that is capable of identifying even small things that are less than 1m’. North Korea and China have expressed concern about the implications for Japanese ‘spy’ activities.

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**Position Available**

**RESEARCHER—ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION**

Applications are invited for a researcher to conduct policy-relevant research into the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. You should have a higher degree in political science or international law or other relevant qualification or experience. Expertise in one or more fields, including nuclear, chemical, biological and conventional arms control and disarmament, would be an advantage. Proficiency in English and ability to write for a generalist audience are essential.

A one-year contract will be offered initially, with the possibility of extension depending on performance and funding. The salary range is £15,000 to £21,000.

The closing date for applications is 1 March 1999. Applicants should send a letter addressing the selection criteria, nominating three referees and providing a curriculum vitae. For the job description and selection criteria see VERTIC’s website.

VERTIC is an equal opportunity employer and maintains a smoke-free work environment.

Please note that this is an additional position to that previously advertised for a researcher/senior researcher in verification science and technology.

**‘Getting to Zero’ Project**

The first and third reports from VERTIC’s project on the verification of nuclear disarmament (‘Getting to Zero’) have been completed and published. They are ‘Laying the Foundations for Getting to Zero: Verifying the Transition to Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons’ by Patricia Lewis and ‘Virtual Nuclear Capabilities and Deterrence in a World Without Nuclear Weapons’ by George Paloczi-Horvathi. VERTIC has commissioned Tom Milne of Pugwash and Henrietta Wilson of Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security (BITTS) to write the second report on ‘Verifying the Transition from Low Levels of Nuclear Weapons to Zero’. The fourth report by Suzanna
van Moyland, on ‘Sustaining a Verification Regime in a Nuclear Weapon-Free World’, is currently being finalised. The second and fourth reports will be published in the New Year. The ‘Getting to Zero’ project is currently funded by the Ploughshares Fund of San Francisco.

New VERTIC Research Report Series

The two Getting to Zero reports are the first and third numbers of VERTIC’s new Research Report Series which has just been launched. The series, which will comprise reports on VERTIC’s own research and other relevant research in the verification field, will supersede VERTIC’s former Verification matters series, which will be discontinued. VERTIC’s other remaining publication series will be VERTIC Briefing Papers which will comprise shorter pieces on topics of immediate public interest.

Verification Organisations Directory 1999

VERTIC’s Verification Organisations Directory will be published for the first time in December. It lists all organisations worldwide which are involved in verifying compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements or which are involved in verification research. A key feature is its listing of all national authorities established to deal with national compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is available from VERTIC for £15.

Departure of Administrator

Nic Elborn has left VERTIC after four years, two as Administrator and two as Administrative Assistant. During that period she handled with aplomb the administrative and financial challenges that face any non-governmental organisation, as well as overseeing the transition to a new Executive Director. She will be sorely missed. We wish her the best for the birth of her first child and future happiness.

New Administrator Appointed

A new Administrator, Ms Fiona Steele, has been appointed as VERTIC’s new Administrator. Fiona, formerly an Administrative Assistant at the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the University of Southampton, has a BA(Hons) in politics from the University of Exeter and is awaiting the results of her MA studies in Middle East Politics at the same university. Fiona will become VERTIC’s permanent Administrator on 25 January next year.

New Board Member

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VERTIC has a new Board member, Ms Sue Willett, formerly of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), whose specialisation is arms transfers and post-conflict peace building. VERTIC welcomes the experience and expertise she brings to the Board.

New Consultants Network Member

Dr Robert Matthews, principal research scientist with the Aeronautical and Maritime Research Laboratory (formerly the Materials Research Laboratory) in Melbourne, Australia, has agreed to join VERTIC’s International Consultants Network. He is a chemical and biological disarmament expert.

Staff News

Trevor Findlay in October visited New York, for talks with UNSCOM, and Chicago to meet officials of the MacArthur Foundation. He also participated in a one-day seminar on 9 October at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island on, on ‘How to Deal with Obstructionist Leaders in Complex Contingency Operations’. On 14 October he participated in the annual meeting between non-governmental organisations and officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FC) in London on the subject of weapons of mass destruction. Tony Lloyd, MP, Minister of State, addressed the meeting. On 24 October he addressed a meeting of UN Reform on the control of ‘The Use of Force in Self-Defence by Peace keepers’. On 28 October Trevor attended another meeting with Mr Lloyd and the Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman, who gave a presentation on the progress being made in establishing the CTBT verification system. On 7 November he attended a Pugwash meeting on Achieving a Nuclear-Free World at the Royal Society in honour of Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat. In addition he has been involved in searching for new premises for VERTIC and recruiting new staff. He completed writing a paper for Brassey’s Defence Yearbook on verification and the CTBT.

Kristian Goeting, a third year chemistry DPhil student at Oxford University, and since August an intern at VERTIC, is researching the verification of chemical and biological disarmament, including: the role of intelligence in CBW verification; problems in verifying the use of CBW; and limitations on verification of compliance. From 25-27 September he attended a Wilton Park Conference on ‘CBW Disarmament: Achieving and Ensuring Compliance’. He also attend the Third Meeting of the Conference of States Parties of the Chemical Weapons
Suzanna van Moyland visited Vienna in October for discussions with officials of the CTBTO on progress in establishing the CTBT verification system. While in Vienna she also met with officials of the IAEA to discuss progress in the agency’s strengthened nuclear safeguards programme. The trip was funded by the John Merck Fund as part of VERTIC’s project on implementation of the CTBT. Her publications during the period included ‘India’s Nuclear Capabilities and Options’ with George Paloczi-Horvath for RUSI International Security Review 1999. She also finalised her update on the safeguards programme which will be published as VERTIC Research Report No. 5. Suzanna has finished her contract with VERTIC to work on completing her PhD thesis on Macedonia. Suzanna was with VERTIC for four years, first as a research assistant and then as Arms Control and Disarmament Researcher. VERTIC is grateful for her devotion and contribution to the organisation and wishes her well in her studies and future endeavours.