

## Georgia Hot Line

Following a VERTIC initiative, a dedicated telephone hotline has been established between the Parliament of Georgia in Tbilisi and the Supreme Council of South Ossetia in Tskhinvali. The idea of the hot line emerged during a meeting organized by VERTIC for

parliamentarians and youth leaders of the two sides in Vladikafkaz last December.

The equipment for the hotline was donated by the British Government following the intervention of the British Ambassador to Georgia, Stephen Nash.

## Test Ban News

### Moscow Summit statement

At the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security (19–20 April, see below), a commitment to conclude and sign a comprehensive test ban treaty by September 1996 was agreed. Four of the nuclear-weapon states — France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States of America — were in attendance.

The statement read:

We affirm our commitment to conclude and sign a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) by September 1996. We agreed that a CTBT will be a concrete step toward the achievement of one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and the fulfillment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). We also agreed that the CTBT must prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. We affirmed that this would constitute a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban.

In this connection, we recalled the importance of the Decision on Principles and Objectives for nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995.

In order for this schedule to be adhered to, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva would have to agree a text by the end of its session on 28 June.

### China's 6 June statement

During the 6 June Plenary at the CD, Ambassador Sha Zukang of China made a statement that included significant changes in the policy of his government toward the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).

The Ambassador indicated that China would go along with the text proposed by Australia on the scope of the prohibited activities under the CTBT. This text is interpreted as prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), which China, alone amongst the nuclear-weapon states, has been in favour of excluding from prohibition.

The Ambassador said that in order to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty within the proposed schedule 'the Chinese delegation is now ready to go along with a temporary ban on PNEs'. This 'temporary ban' should be reviewed at the review conference of the treaty that would be held ten years after entry into force.

The Ambassador also accepted that national technical means would have 'a supplementary role to play' in planning for on-site inspection, but it is not clear precisely how China would wish to see these referred to in the treaty language.

### China's 8 June test and statement

At 02:55:57.9 GMT/UTC on 8 June, China carried out a nuclear test at the Lop Nor test site. The event was measured at 5.9 on the Richter Scale and is estimated that the device being tested was of the yield of 20 to 80 kilotonnes. The location of the test was at 41° 37' 58.8" N, 88° 37' 40.8" E.

As the Chinese government announced the test, it also revealed that there would be one further test carried out before September and that it would be ready to sign a test ban treaty at that time.

## Moscow Nuclear Summit

The Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security took place on 19 and 20 April. It was attended by the heads of government of the G7 states, Russia and Ukraine. The summit was jointly chaired by President Yeltsin and President Chirac, who is currently chair of the G7.

Agreements reached at the Summit include: a commitment to conclude and sign a CTBT by September 1996 (see above); an increase in co-operation between states to combat nuclear

trafficking; and a commitment to conclude and adopt a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management, with Russia giving 'a firm commitment' to accede to the 1993 amendment to the London Convention which prohibits disposal of radioactive waste at sea.

It was reported that some of these issues would be revisited at the G7 summit to be held in Lyon at the end of June.

## Anti-Personnel Mines

### Geneva conclusions

The third and final session of the Inhumane Weapons Convention Review Conference took place in Geneva on 22 April–3 May. The Con-

ference adopted a replacement Protocol II to the Convention. The new Protocol, as an amendment to the Convention, will enter into force 6 months after the 20th state ratifies it.

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Key provisions of the new Protocol II are:

- a definition of an anti-personnel mine as a mine 'primarily designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person'. Concerns have been raised about the use of the term 'primarily';
- extension of restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines to non-international armed conflicts;
- parties to enact domestic legislation against serious violations of the Protocol;
- prohibition on the transfer of non-detectable mines and of any mine to a non-state entity;
- annual consultations to review the operation of the new Protocol; and
- obligations on parties to a conflict to give information to humanitarian organizations on minefields and safe routes around them.

### Ukraine

On 1 June President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine announced that on that day the last of the strategic nuclear warheads had been transferred from his country to Russia.

### EU actions vetoed

As part of its policy of 'non-co-operation' with EU institutions over the beef export bans, the UK Government has vetoed many EU measures including the following:

- EU reply to UN General Assembly resolution 50/75 [strengthening

However, the new Protocol II does not provide verification provisions that would allow confidence to be built in the new regime.

### UK statement

On 23 April, the British Government made the following statement:

The UK will work actively towards a total, worldwide ban on anti-personnel mines. Should such a ban be agreed, we would give up our anti-personnel landmines capability, and would destroy our stocks accordingly.

All our current anti-personnel mines are non-self-destructing. We intend to destroy almost half our current stockpile as soon as practicable. Until a worldwide ban on all anti-personnel mines is agreed, we shall also pursue current procurement plans to replace our existing mines with self-destructing ones. ...

The UK's armed forces do not currently use anti-personnel mines op-

erationally, anywhere in the world. Nor will they use our current stocks of non-self-destructing anti-personnel mines in future operations unless, in exceptional circumstances, Ministers are satisfied that their use is essential to ensure that British troops are properly protected and there are no alternative ways of achieving that end. ...

We shall also, as a matter of priority, pursue the development of alternatives to anti-personnel mines. Should viable alternatives ...

In addition, we shall with immediate effect extend the scope of our export moratorium, to prohibit the export of all types of anti-personnel mines to all destinations.

The British Ministry of Defence said later, on 1 May, that: 'No final decision about which types of anti-personnel mines will be destroyed.'

### In the News

security and co-operation in the Mediterranean] (28 May)

- Presidency discussion paper on IAEA 93+2 programme (5 June)
- Draft EU contribution to Nuclear Suppliers Group paper (5 June)
- Common position/joint action on chemical and biological weapons (10 June).

### Airborne CBW detection

Teams from the US Los Alamos national Laboratory have been involved with the development of two aircraft-

based laser systems for detecting chemical and biological agents.

One system, fitted to a UH-60 black Hawk helicopter, is claimed to be capable of detecting clouds of biological warfare agents at distances of 'nearly 20 miles'. The second, being developed in association with the Phillips Laboratory (USAF) and the Edgewood Research and Development Engineering Center (US Army), is to be mounted on a KC-135E aircraft for testing purposes and is intended to be able to detect chemical warfare agents at a distance of some tens of kilometres.

### Editorial — Obsessions with Cold War levels of secrecy

During the years of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, along with other nuclear-weapon states, pursued a policy of refusing to comment on whether nuclear weapons were at any given location. This policy — 'neither confirm nor deny' (NCND) — has continued in the United Kingdom.

On 14 May, an old news story resurfaced, that HMS *Sheffield*, sunk in the South Atlantic in 1982 by an Argentine Exocet missile, had gone down with nuclear weapons on board. The ship sank some 350 miles east of the Falkland Islands, and is lying at a depth of some 2,000m.

The source of this information was a draft International Atomic Energy Agency report prepared in 1991 entitled 'Inventory of radioactive wastes entering the marine environment'.

The draft report merely acknowledges that there has been speculation from other sources that there may have been a nuclear weapon on board; it also acknowledges that there has been no official confirmation of this.

The British Government's response to questions from the media and in Parliament has been to avoid a clear statement on the lines of 'there were no nuclear weapons on board when she sank' as this would breach the NCND rules. Instead, more convoluted responses are forthcoming to specific questions on HMS *Sheffield*:

It has been the practice of successive Governments neither to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons in specific locations at specific times. I can, however, confirm that the UK has never lost such a weapon, nor lost and subsequently recovered one. [MoD, 17 May]

In the circumstances of the Cold War, the NCND policy may have had some logic. However, with the end of the Cold War and the removal and destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships of the Royal Navy, is it not time to question whether NCND should remain the blanket policy it has been in the past?

While VERTIC has no special knowledge of whether the frigate was carrying nuclear weapons or not, the organization knows that ambiguous answers may lead to concerns being raised unnecessarily.

## Non-Parties to Environmental Treaties

The following is a list of states that are not parties to one or more of the three most significant treaties controlling the environment — the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer/Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (VC/MP).

A similar list for the treaties controlling weapons of mass destruction was published in *Trust & Verify*, no 63, January 1996.

	CBD	FCCC	VC/MP
Afghanistan	S	S	—
Albania	P	P	—
Andorra	—	—	—
Angola	S	S	—
Armenia	P	P	—
Azerbaijan	S	P	—
Bahrain	S	P	P
Belarus	P	S	P
Belgium	S	P	P
Belize	P	P	—
Bhutan	P	P	—
Bosnia and Herzegovina	—	—	P
Brunei Darussalam	—	—	P
Burundi	S	S	—
Cambodia	P	P	—
Cape Verde	P	P	—
Central African Republic	P	P	P
Congo	S	S	P
Cook Islands†	P	P	—
Croatia	S	P	P
Cyprus	S	S	P
Djibouti	P	P	—
Dominican Republic	S	S	P
Equatorial Guinea	P	—	P‡
Eritrea	P	P	—
Estonia	P	P	—
Gabon	S	S	P
Guinea-Bissau	P	P	—
Haiti	S	S	—
Holy Seet	—	—	—
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	S	S	P
Iraq	—	—	—
Israel	S	S	P
Kazakhstan	P	P	—
Kuwait	S	P	P
Kyrgyzstan	—	—	—
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	—	P	—
Liberia	S	S	P
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	S	S	P
Liechtenstein	S	P	P
Madagascar	P	S	—

	CBD	FCCC	VC/MP
Malta	S	P	P
Mauritania	S	P	P
Namibia	S	P	P
Naurut	P	P	—
Niuet	P	P	—
Oman	P	P	—
Palau	—	—	—
Qatar	S	P	P
Republic of Moldova	P	P	—
Rwanda	S	S	—
St Vincent & the Grenadines	—	—	—
Samoa	S	P	P
San Marino	P	P	—
Sao Tome and Principe	S	S	—
Saudi Arabia	—	P	P
Sierra Leone	P	P	—
Singapore	P	S	P
Slovenia	S	P	P
Somalia	—	—	—
South Africa	P	S	P
Suriname	P	S	—
Swaziland	P	S	P
Taiwant	—	—	—
Tajikistan	—	—	—
Thailand	S	P	P
The former Yugo. Rep. of Macedonia	—	S	P
Togo	S	P	P
Tonga†	—	—	—
Trinidad and Tobago	S	P	P
Turkey	S	—	P
Turkmenistan	—	P	P
Tuvalu†	S	P	P
Ukraine	P	S	P
United Arab Emirates	S	P	P
United States of America	S	S	P
Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]	S	S	P

— = has taken no action with regard to the treaty

P = is a party to the treaty

S = has signed, but not yet ratified, the treaty

† = not a member of the UN

‡ = Equatorial Guinea is a Party to the Vienna Convention but not the Montreal Protocol

**Note:** not all entities in this list are recognized as states by all other states; notable examples are Taiwan and Israel. Care should therefore be exercised when attempting to give the number of parties to a treaty.

The criterion used in this list is that a depositary for a Treaty has accepted an instrument from the 'state'.

Andorra is a member of the United Nations and has a seat in the General Assembly.

This list is produced in the same alphabetical order as that of the list of members of the United Nations.



## VERTIC News

### VERTIC Conference

VERTIC held its tenth anniversary conference—'Building Trust Through Verification'—in London on 3 May.

The conference was opened by VERTIC's founding director Jeremy Leggett, now Director of the Solar Initiative, Greenpeace International.

The first session of the conference was focused on arms control and was addressed by Andrei Kozyrev, former foreign minister of the Russian Federation and currently a member of the Duma, on 'Mutual Verification as the Key to Mutual Trust'. Michael Krepon, Director, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, spoke on 'Moving Towards a World Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction'.

The second session dealt with confidence building and peacekeeping issues with speakers Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, and Ambassador John Maresca, former US ambassador to the CSCE, addressing 'Building Confidence in Bosnia' and 'Confidence-Building as the Key to Security Concerns'.

The final session was dedicated to the environment with Sarah Parkin, Di-

rector of Forum for the Future, speaking on 'Environmental Diplomacy' and José Goldemberg, Brazilian Minister of Science and of Environment at the time of the Earth Summit, on 'Renewable Energy — the Possibilities'.

### Greenhouse Gas Inventories

As part of a collaborative project, VERTIC is publishing case studies on Greenhouse Gas Inventories: National reporting processes and implementation review mechanisms in the EU.

The participants in the project were: VERTIC; KFA Jülich, Germany; LABIEN Technological Research Centre, Spain; Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK; Russian Academy of Sciences; and Russian Academy of Transport.

The project was funded by the European Union (EU) with the aim of improving knowledge of the accuracy of greenhouse gas inventories compiled under the Framework Convention on Climate Change and to aid the development of a monitoring mechanism for CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the EU. Neighbouring eastern European countries were included so that rec-

ommendations could be made within the context of a wider Europe.

Case studies were compiled for: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Issues considered in the case studies include: data acquisition and management; reliability of emission estimates; methodologies and emission factors; verification procedures; and the roles played by both governmental and non-governmental organizations.

The VERTIC environment team may be contacted via the VERTIC office or e-mailed on [verticenv@gn.apc.org](mailto:verticenv@gn.apc.org).

### Correction

The article on CSBMs for Bosnia in *Trust & Verify* no. 65 incorrectly named US diplomat Robert Frowick as the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman in office. Mr Frowick is the Head of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungarian diplomat Istvan Gyarmati is the Personal Representative.

## A sideways look — verification of mad cows

Following the controversy over bovine spongiform encephalopathy — BSE or mad cow disease — it has become clear that there are insufficient verification measures in place to be confident of the lineage of each cow. In many cases it is clear that it is not possible to trace the herds which cows may have previously been part of before trading.

This is significant as there have been claims that, in addition to the most popular theory that BSE was spread by contaminated feedstuffs, the disease may be transmitted from mother to calf. Maternal transmission, if proven, would have implications for any programme to eradicate BSE.

However, proving maternal transmission is difficult without accurate

knowledge of which cows are related to each other. In theory, a system for the tracking of cows through the use of unique tags and records of transfers should be simple and cheap to establish.

As with all verification schemes, political will is required before resources are committed to such a system.

### Trust & Verify

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### What is VERTIC?

VERTIC is the Verification Technology Information Centre, an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements.

VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press.

VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

### Other publications

In addition to *Trust & Verify*, VERTIC publishes the *Verification* (formerly *Verification Report*) series of yearbooks and a variety of research reports each year. Details of VERTIC publications are available on request.