



Trust and Verify

The Bulletin of the Verification Technology Information Centre

No. 52 November 1994

ISSN 0966-9221

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US-North Korea agreement

On 21 October, in Geneva, the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an agreement on the future of the DPRK's nuclear programme.

North Korea is to suspend construction work on its new graphite-moderated reactors and is to eventually dismantle them. The US will provide the DPRK with assistance for the construction of light water reactors which are regarded as having a reduced proliferation potential.

The agreement also allows for the supply of fuel oil to the DPRK while the new power generation facilities are under construction.

In signing the agreement North Korea has agreed to remain a State Party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to implement full-scope safeguards.

Fuming red nitric acid

Allegations that a canister found abandoned by the Iraqis in Kuwait contained a chemical warfare agent were denied on both sides of the Atlantic.

The allegations surfaced after US Senator Riegle had made public two confidential British reports that the canister contained a liquid that appeared to be mustard gas.

The British Ministry of Defence said that these had been initial field reports and that, on further analysis, the canister was found to contain 'fuming red nitric acid' which was used by the Iraqis as a component of the fuel for *Scud* missiles.

Press tour

On 18 October, the Iraqi authorities led a group of media representatives on a tightly controlled tour of two facilities — a missile test site and an explosives factory. The trip has been seen as a crude attempt by the Iraqi government to appear to be behaving more openly in order to have UN sanctions lifted.

US-UK nuclear agreement

The agreement covering the transfers of nuclear weapons information between the United Kingdom and the United States of America, the 1958 *Agreement for*

Co-operation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes — commonly known as the Mutual Defence Agreement, came up for renewal this year.

The agreement is to be extended to 2004 under an amendment agreed between the two states on 23 May, the text of which was released by the British Government in October.

The amendment includes the following new paragraph F of Article VI:

F. Adequate materials control and accountability shall be maintained with respect to any nuclear material (including source material and special nuclear material) transferred pursuant to the Agreement, and with respect to any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material or equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement. Each Party guarantees adequate materials control and accountability shall be maintained so long as such nuclear material remains under its jurisdiction or control. As may be mutually agreed, the Parties shall consult with each other regarding methods and technology for providing such materials control and accountability.

The law and nuclear smuggling

Following the incidents in trafficking in nuclear materials that have occurred this year (see *Trust & Verify*, No. 50, September 1994) there have been calls for an international agreement to make theft of nuclear materials an offence.

Unbeknownst to many people, there is already such an agreement — the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material — however this covers only 'nuclear material used for peaceful purposes' and would not therefore cover materials in the military nuclear programmes of the nuclear-weapon states. A simple solution to this would be for the nuclear-weapon states to place military holdings under IAEA safeguards.

The Convention, opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987, not only sets down criteria for the protection of nuclear material but also covers illegal activities, such as threatened use of such material and the theft of it.

UK implementation

Each party to the convention implements it through domestic legislation. In the United Kingdom the implementing legislation is the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983.

Following the principles of the Convention, this Act is extra-territorial; that is it creates offences outside of the United Kingdom and outside the normal jurisdiction of British courts.

United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

The following is a summary of the returns for the 1993 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, together with the summary of returns for 1992.

State	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information
	1992				1993			
Afghanistan	no entry				—	—	yes	no
Antigua and Barbuda	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Argentina	nil	yes	—	no	yes	nil	—	no
Armenia	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Australia	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	yes
Austria	—	yes	—	yes	nil	nil	—	yes
Belarus	nil	yes	—	no	late entry			
Belgium	yes	nil	yes	yes	yes	—	—	yes
Bhutan	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Bolivia	yes	—	—	no	no entry			
Brazil	yes	yes	—	yes	yes	nil	—	yes
Bulgaria	yes	yes	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
Burkina Faso	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Canada	yes	yes	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
Chile	yes	nil	—	yes	nil	nil	—	yes
China	yes	yes	—	no	nil	yes	—	no
Colombia	yes	nil	yes	no	no entry			
Comoros	no entry				nil	nil	—	yes
Côte d'Ivoire	no entry				nil	nil	—	yes
Croatia	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	yes	no
Cuba	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	no
Cyprus	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Czech Republic	nil	yes	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
Denmark	yes	nil	—	yes	nil	yes	—	yes
Dominica	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Dominican Republic	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Égypt	yes	yes	yes	no	no entry			
Fiji	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	no
Finland	yes	yes	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
France	nil	yes	—	yes	nil	yes	—	yes
Georgia	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	no
Germany	yes	yes	—	yes	nil	yes	—	yes
Greece	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	—	—	yes
Grenada	nil	blank form	—	no	no entry			
Hungary	nil	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	yes
Iceland	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	no
India	yes	yes	—	no	nil	yes	—	no
Indonesia	no entry				yes	—	—	no
Ireland	nil	nil	—	no	nil	nil	—	no
Israel	yes	yes	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
Italy	yes	yes	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
Jamaica	no entry				—	—	yes	no
Japan	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	yes
Jordan	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Kazakhstan	nil	nil	yes	no	no entry			
Kenya	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Lesotho	nil	nil	yes	no	no entry			
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	nil	nil	yes	no	no entry			
Liechtenstein	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	no
Lithuania	yes	—	—	no	no entry			

State	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information	Data on imports	Data on exports	Explanation submitted in note verbale	Background information
	1992				1993			
Luxembourg	nil	nil	—	no	nil	nil	—	no
Madagascar	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Malawi	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Malaysia	nil	nil	yes	no	yes	nil	—	no
Maldives	nil	nil	—	no	nil	nil	—	no
Malta	yes	nil	—	no	nil	nil	—	no
Marshall Islands	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Mauritania	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Mauritius	—	nil	yes	no	—	nil	—	no
Mexico	—	—	yes	no	nil	nil	—	yes
Mongolia	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	no
Namibia	nil	nil	—	no	no entry			
Nepal	yes	—	—	no	nil	nil	—	no
Netherlands	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
New Zealand	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	yes
Nicaragua	—	—	yes	yes	no entry			
Niger	see note verbale	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	yes
Nigeria	—	—	yes	no	no entry			
Norway	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	no
Oman	—	—	yes	no	no entry			
Pakistan	yes	nil	—	no	yes	nil	—	no
Panama	—	—	yes	yes	no entry			
Papua New Guinea	nil	nil	—	no	no entry			
Paraguay	—	—	yes	no	no entry			
Peru	yes	blank form	—	no	yes	nil	—	no
Philippines	yes	nil	yes	no	yes	—	—	no
Poland	yes	yes	—	yes	nil	yes	—	yes
Portugal	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	yes
Qatar	—	—	—	yes	no entry			
Republic of Korea	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
Romania	yes	yes	—	no	nil	yes	—	no
Russian Federation	nil	yes	—	no	nil	yes	—	no
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Samoa	no entry				nil	nil	—	no
Senegal	nil	nil	yes	no	no entry			
Seychelles	nil	nil	—	no	no entry			
Sierra Leone	no entry				—	—	—	yes
Singapore	yes	nil	—	no	yes	nil	—	no
Slovakia	nil	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	—	no
Slovenia	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	yes	no
Solomon Islands	nil	nil	yes	no	no entry			
South Africa	—	—	yes	no	no entry			
Spain	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	yes
Sweden	yes	yes	—	yes	yes	yes	—	yes
Switzerland	nil	nil	—	yes	nil	yes	—	yes
Tunisia	—	—	yes	no	no entry			
Turkey	yes	nil	—	yes	yes	nil	—	no
Ukraine	no entry				nil	yes	—	no
United Kingdom	yes	yes	—	yes	nil	yes	—	yes
United States of America	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Vanuatu	nil	nil	yes	no	nil	nil	—	no
Yugoslavia	nil	nil	yes	yes	nil	nil	yes	no

Section 1(1) of the Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 states:

If a person, whatever his nationality, does outside the United Kingdom, in relation to or by means of nuclear material, any act which, had he done it in any part of the United Kingdom would have made him guilty of—

...

(c) the offence of theft, embezzlement, robbery, assault with intent to rob, burglary or aggravated burglary

...

he shall in any part of the United Kingdom be guilty of such of the offences mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (d) above as are offences of which the act would have made him guilty had he done it in that part of the United Kingdom.

Other sections of the Act make the offences extraditable, with no reference to whether the state where the alleged offence takes place is a party to the Convention.

CSCE Budapest review

The Review Conference of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) began in Budapest on 10 October. It is scheduled to finish on 2 December and will be followed by a summit meeting of CSCE heads of state and government on 5–6 December.

VERTIC CSCE seminar

VERTIC will be holding a seminar entitled 'The CSCE after the Budapest Summit' on Thursday 15 December at the National Liberal Club at 11am. The seminar is expected to last two hours.

The speakers will be Dennis Sammut of VERTIC and Walter Kemp of the London School of Economics who is Assistant Press Officer to the Budapest Summit.

VERTIC also prepared three papers which were distributed at the CSCE meeting — *The CSCE and the Process of Confidence Building*, *The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance*, and *The CSCE, Security and the Successor States of the*

Former Soviet Union. Copies of these papers are available from the VERTIC office

IAEA budget

The General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), meeting in Vienna in late September, decided to continue with a zero-growth budget of US\$ 211.5 million.

The IAEA's budget has been one of zero-growth in real terms since 1983.

Convention on Nuclear Safety

The Convention on Nuclear Safety was opened for signature in Vienna on 20 September, while the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference was in session.

The Convention will enter into force once it has been ratified by 22 states, including 17 with at least one civil nuclear power plant.

One of the proposals for the conditions for the entry into force of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, currently under negotiation, is to include a minimum number of states with civil nuclear power plants.

BWC/VEREX — erratum

The BWC Special Conference took place on 18–30 September, not 18–23 as reported in the last *Trust & Verify*. The editor apologises for any confusion this may have caused.

VERTIC news

Welcome to Suzanna

Suzanna van Moyland has joined the VERTIC staff as Research Assistant to assist the Director of VERTIC, Dr Patricia Lewis, on the arms control and disarmament programme.

Suzanna has had previous experience as the Acting Director at the Council for Arms Control, based in London and has recently been studying the situation in Macedonia.

Trust & Verify is edited and produced by Richard Guthrie with additional reporting by VERTIC staff and consultants.
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Trust & Verify

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What is VERTIC?

VERTIC is an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of

verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements; and the use of confidence-building techniques in the resolution of conflict.

VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press.

VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

Other publications

In addition to *Trust & Verify*, VERTIC publishes the *Verification* series of yearbooks, in association with Brassey's, and a variety of research reports each year. Details of VERTIC publications are available on request.

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