China test
On 7 October, China carried out its second nuclear test of the year. The seismic event caused by the test was measured at approximately 6.0 on the Richter scale. The test explosion took place at 0325.58 UTC/GMT at a point 41.7° N 88.8° E.

The timing of the test in relation to the comprehensive nuclear test ban talks in Geneva could be harmful and will do nothing to enhance confidence in the process before the NPT Conference next year.

The test will also strengthen the hand of hard-liners in France who are pushing for a resumption of testing in the Pacific.

Known Chinese nuclear tests
1. 16 October 1984
2. 14 May 1985
3. 9 May 1986
4. 27 October 1986
5. 28 December 1986
6. 17 June 1987
7. 24 December 1987
8. 27 December 1988
9. 23 September 1989
10. 29 September 1989
11. 14 October 1970
12. 18 November 1971
13. 7 January 1972
14. 18 March 1972
15. 27 June 1973
16. 17 June 1974
17. 27 October 1975
18. 23 January 1976
19. 26 September 1976
20. 17 October 1976
21. 17 November 1976
22. 17 September 1977
23. 15 March 1978
24. 14 October 1978
25. 14 December 1978
26. 13 September 1979
27. 16 October 1980
28. 5 October 1982
29. 4 May 1983
30. 6 October 1983
31. 3 October 1984
32. 19 December 1984
33. 5 June 1987


BWC Special Conference/VEREX
On 19–23 September the Special Conference to consider verification measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was held in Geneva. The Conference decided to set up an ad hoc group of experts to establish measures to increase confidence in the BWC, including verification measures.

The Conference was called to consider the draft proposals drawn up by groups of experts under the 'VEREX' consultation programme.

It is hoped that the proposals will be ready for the next BWC Review Conference which is to be held in 1996.

Final document
The most significant part of the document agreed at the Special Conference is Paragraph 36 which reads as follows:

In pursuance of the second part of its mandate under Item 9, the Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group, open to all States Parties. The objective of this Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be submitted for the consideration of the States Parties. In this context the Ad Hoc Group shall, inter alia, consider:

- Definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of activities, where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention;
— The incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence building and transparency measures, as appropriate, into the regime;
— A system of measures to promote compliance with the Convention, including, as appropriate, measures identified, examined and evaluated in the VEREX Report. Such measures should apply to all relevant facilities and activities, be reliable, cost effective, non-discriminatory and as non-intrusive as possible, consistent with the effective implementation of the system and should not lead to abuse;
— Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X, which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.

Measures should be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to protect sensitive commercial proprietary information and legitimate national security needs.

Measures shall be formulated and implemented in a manner designed to avoid any negative impact on scientific research, international cooperation and industrial development.

**Yeltsin UNGA speech**

At a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 26 September, President Yeltsin of Russia made the following points and proposals:

• to speed up negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, 'Russia favours signing this treaty next year when we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the United Nations';

• to ‘give thought to further steps to limit Russian and American strategic nuclear weapons in order to provide a possibility to eventually give up the inherited balance of terror based on mutual nuclear deterrence’;

• the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) should be extended ‘unconditionally and in an open-ended way’;

• ‘more precise security guarantees will be required’ for non-nuclear-weapon states and proposed that a special Security Council meeting at Ministerial level should ‘be held to co-ordinate and adopt a renewed resolution on so-called positive security guarantees’;

• ‘a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability [should] be elaborated by the nuclear five. This treaty could provide for the ending of military fissile material production and the prohibition of the recycling of fissile materials for weapons and the further elimination of nuclear munitions and reduction of strategic carriers’;

• discussions on regional programmes to strengthen peace and security; and

• a UN conference on ‘international co-operation in the field of conversion’.

It is notable that the President did not call for the indefinite extension of the NPT, but called for a ‘open-ended’ extension. This would leave open the possibility of a rolling fixed periods extension. (For an outline of the extension options, see Trust & Verify, No. 49, August 1994)

**US Nuclear Posture Review**

The Nuclear Posture Review, a study by the US Department of Defense to take specific measures to reduce the US nuclear arsenal to the levels agreed in START II by 2003, reported in late September.

The main conclusions are:

• the Trident SSBN fleet is to be reduced from 18 to 14 submarines, with the four submarines currently carrying C-4 missiles to be upgraded to carry the D-5. Each missile will be armed with five warheads rather than the four originally planned;

• three wings of Minuteman III ICBMs will be retained, totalling approximately 450–500 missiles, each with a single warhead. These missile are to be upgraded in a $6 billion programme;

• the number of operational B-52s is to be reduced from 94 to 68, with a confirmation that all B-1 bombers are to be dedicated to conventional roles and that no more than 20 B-2s will be required for nuclear operations;

• nuclear weapons are to be removed from all surface combatant ships, including aircraft carriers.

In addition, a decision has been taken that all nuclear weapon systems shall be fitted with coded control devices by 1997.

The future inventories of dual-capable aircraft deployed in Europe are the subject of another study which has yet to report. It is thought that there are 450 US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe for use by aircraft.

**Climate Negotiations — INC10**

The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on the Framework Convention on Climate Change met for the tenth time in Geneva from 22 August to 2 September 1994. The aim of the meeting was to continue to flesh out the details of the Convention in preparation for the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) which will be held in Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995.

**Working Group 1**

The first substantive meeting of Working Group 1 (WG 1) started with the German delegation suggesting a fast track protocol on carbon dioxide emission reductions in time for the Berlin CoP. The move had been heralded in a speech by Dr. Töpfer, the German Environment Minister, the week before the INC when he talked of trying to achieve the Toronto Targets (a return to 1988 emission levels by the year 2000 and a 20 per cent reduction by 2005) although the draft protocol circulated by the German delegation did not specify targets or timescales.

Unfortunately, the German proposal had not been fully discussed between all of the German Ministries represented on the delegation, nor had it been fully discussed with other EU delegations. Thus, in spite of the fact the Germany is currently President of the EU (and is thus its spokesman in the INC) and the fact that it is EU policy to have a carbon dioxide protocol, the proposal failed to get the support it needed to stand a chance of being successful. It received backing from Denmark and the Netherlands but what it required was vocal support from one of the big carbon dioxide emitters in the EU (Italy, France or the UK) and this was not forthcoming. The other major emitters in the OECD, such as the USA and Japan, were not enthusiastic either and so the debate on the protocol fizzled out.
The Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) have submitted a proposal, since the INC meeting, for a protocol to be considered at the first CoP in Berlin. It proposes a carbon dioxide protocol for Annex I countries with targets the same as the Toronto targets, i.e., a reduction in anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions of 20 per cent by the year 2005.

After the INC, the Germans also submitted a protocol on the same topic. It includes no targets of its own but does mention the AOSIS targets in a footnote.

Apart from the brief flurry of activity surrounding the protocol, the first few days of the meeting were dull but productive, certainly in Working Group 1. (Working Group 2 was hopelessly bogged down in procedural matters for the first week.) The Secretariat proposals on reporting were adopted, as were most of the proposals on review processes. The implementation review processes were agreed, complete with the concept of country visits, and so, to a large extent, were the proposals for the review of the adequacy of commitments. Not surprisingly, the question of how to review states policies and measures remained a delicate one and remained open.

The Committee also decided how it would begin the mammoth task of reviewing states reports in time to have the review complete by the end of the first CoP. It was agreed that at the final INC meeting, in New York in early February, Working Group 1 will act as a proxy for the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice and that Working Group 2 will act as a proxy for the Subsidiary Body for Implementation. It was also agreed that the first week of the proposed three week meeting should be set aside for the review process. Unfortunately, this arrangement was opposed by Saudi Arabia in the final plenary session when they supported some of the poorer states complaint that it would cost some delegations too much money to have a three week session. They also objected to the timing of the review on religious grounds (see later in this report) and the first week of the New York INC was consequently abandoned.

Next, Working Group 1 discussed joint implementation (JI) in some detail. The main feature of the debate was the break-up of the previously solid G77 position which was, for a number of reasons, that they were not in favour of JI. (The basic Group position was that climate change is a problem created by the North and that they should be primarily responsible for rectifying it, the South development should not be unfairly hindered by developed countries trying to offset their emissions in the developing countries.) The traditional G77 position was first given by Brazil but then Argentina and Columbia made it clear that they were, with some qualification, in favour of it. The African position also broke up with South Africa, in particular, being in favour and the Asian positions began to disintegrate in a similar way.

Although JI is still a hot political topic in the INC, much of the urgency which previously characterised debates on the issue was dispelled when the Committee decided that there should be a four year pilot phase, without credits, in which to try out JI schemes and come up with an agreed way of making them work fairly and effectively.

**Working Group 2**

Working Group 2 briefly discussed what form the multilateral consultative process, mentioned in Article 13 on the Convention, might take but substantial discussion of the topic was shelved until the next INC meeting.

VERTIC held a workshop on Article 13 prior to the debate. John Lanchbery chaired the session at which the principal speakers were Owen Greens (Bradford University, UK) and David Victor (IIASA, Austria). The meeting was well attended and debate centred on the role of the process in relationship to the implementation review and dispute resolution processes.

The INC meeting wound up with two interesting debates in the Plenary session. The first was about where the secretariat to the Convention should be located and the second was the now traditional discussion about the INC February meetings clashing with Ramadan. The main candidates for hosting the secretariat were Montevideo (with a building formerly used for GATT available), Bonn (with former Federal Ministry buildings available as the German Government moves to Berlin), New York (a cheaper and easier venue for some developing countries as the UN headquarters is there) and Geneva (where most INC business has taken place). The Bureaux will consider detailed proposals from the states concerned.

**INC11 and Ramadan**

The question of the clash between the next INC and Ramadan was raised by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis pointed out that it was difficult to meet during Ramadan, because of fasting and needing to pray before sunset. The Chairman said that he appreciated the problem but was sure that it must also be a problem in other UN meetings that take place in February. Eventually, the Chairman ruled that the Committee was not competent to rule on religious matters and that it could not, rearrange its meetings to suit them, however sympathetic the INC might be to religious beliefs. He also ruled that it was not the function of the Committee to raise religious matters with the UN General Assembly but suggested that the Saudis might do so if they wished.

**Biodiversity Convention**

The first Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity will be held from 28 November to 9 December, in the Bahamas.

**Recent publications**

**OPCW PrepCom docs**

Complete bound sets of the major documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) issued in 1993 are now available from the OPCW at a price of 200 Dutch Guilders plus postage.


**Reports from BASIC and BITS**

The British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the Berlin Centre for Transatlantic Security (BITS) have recently published *NATO Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, Report 94.1. BASIC has also published *Deciding the CSCE's Future: Prospects for the 1994 Budapest Summit*, Report 94.3.
Both reports are available from BASIC at either Carrara House, 20 Embankment Place, London WC2N 6NN or 1900 L St NW, #401, Washington, DC 20036. BITS may be contacted at Rykestrasse 40, 10405 Berlin.

CW destruction
The Henry L. Stimson Center has published a report authored by Amy E. Smithson with the assistance of Maureen Lenihan entitled The US Chemical weapons Destruction Programme: Views, Analysis, and Recommendations.

Copies of the report are available from the Henry L. Stimson Center, 21 Dupont Circle, NW, Fifth Floor, Washington, DC 20036.

VERTIC News
Welcome to Dennis
Dennis Sammut, who has been working with VERTIC as a consultant on the Conflicts and Confidence-Building Measures project has now joined the organization full time.

Dennis is a former Member of Parliament in Malta and has also worked for the Maltese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Welcome to Andrea
Andrea Moran joined VERTIC on 3 October to conduct research on international environmental agreements.

She has joined VERTIC straight from an MSc course on Environmental Monitoring and Assessment at the Southbank University.

Initially, Andrea will be working mainly on VERTIC's EU-sponsored project on greenhouse gas inventory compilation systems in Europe.

Trust & Verify — Policy on Reproduction
In the light of a recent incident in which 1,700 words of the Trust & Verify special edition on the options for the NPT (issue 49, August 1994) were reproduced with neither permission nor attribution in another publication, here is a statement on VERTIC's policy on reproduction.

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Farewell to Kim
Kim Tay is leaving VERTIC in November to move to Sydney, Australia to take up studies there.

Kim has been working with VERTIC in a variety of roles for nearly three years. Her most recent work has been on the entry into force requirements for a comprehensive test ban treaty.

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VERTIC is an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements; and the use of confidence-building techniques in the resolution of conflict.

VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press.

VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

Other publications
In addition to Trust & Verify, VERTIC publishes the Verification series of yearbooks, in association with Brassey’s, and a variety of research reports each year. Details of VERTIC publications are available on request.