



Trust and Verify

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Russian Pu storage

A senior official from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), Aleksei Lebedev, has acknowledged that plutonium in interim storage areas in his country is 'not very safe'. The statement was made while he was visiting London in April.

Assistance from the US (and other Western states that are following the US line) has been prevented because the aid is prohibited while Russian production of weapons-grade plutonium continues. Russian authorities have announced that such production will cease by the end of the year, but that the relevant nuclear reactors are involved in production of power for the surrounding areas and that they cannot be shut down until replacement power sources can be arranged.

Security Council Statement

The January 1992 summit of the UN Security Council issued a statement that 'the proliferation of all weapons on mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security' and that 'on nuclear proliferation ... the members of the [Security] Council will take appropriate measures in case of violations notified to them by the IAEA'.

This statement has been cited as allowing the Security Council to use measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In the UK House of Lords, a Peer asked: 'What is the status in international law of the UN Security Council statement of 31 January 1992'.

Baroness Chalker of Wallasey, answering on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, stated:

The statement of 31 January 1992 made by the President of the Security Council on behalf of Council members was a summation of points discussed and agreed at the meeting, but was not designed to have legal effect.

The response is significant as the United Kingdom held the Presidency of the Security Council at the time of the statement.

Australian nuclear test sites

In April, the British Government published the text of its agreement with the Australian Government on payments for the environmental consequences of the

use of the nuclear test sites in Australia as Command Paper Cm 2533.

The agreement is in the form of an Exchange of Notes between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Alistair Goodlad, and the Australian High Commissioner in London, Richard Smith, on 10 December 1993.

The text of the Note from Goodlad to Smith is as follows:

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the Memorandum of Arrangements of 7 March 1956 between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as 'the Government of the United Kingdom') and the Government of Australia concerning the Atomic Weapons proving Ground at Maralinga¹ (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1956 Memorandum') and to the Memorandum of 23 September 1968 between the two Governments regarding the Termination of the 1956 Memorandum² (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1968 Memorandum'), and to the discussions between representatives of the two Governments concerning the former United Kingdom nuclear test and experimental programme sites (that is to say, at Maralinga, at the Monte Bello Islands and at Emu Field; hereinafter referred to as 'the sites') and to make the following proposals.

1. The Government of the United Kingdom shall on an *ex gratia* basis pay to the Government of Australia the sum of £20 million (twenty million pounds sterling) in full and final settlement of all claims whatsoever of the kind referred to in paragraph 2 below, the sum to be payable in accordance with the following timetable:
 - (1) the sum of £5 million shall be paid on or before 1 January 1994;
 - (2) the sum of £4 million shall be paid on 1 October 1994;
 - (3) the sum of £3 million shall be paid on 1 October 1995;
 - (4) the sum of £3 million shall be paid on 1 October 1996;
 - (5) the sum of £3 million shall be paid on 1 October 1997;
 - (6) the sum of £2 million shall be paid on 1 October 1998.

2. Subject to paragraph 3 below, the claims referred to in paragraph 1 are any claims whatsoever which the Government of Australia or any person, natural or legal, may have, now or in the future, arising out of any act, matter or thing done or omitted to be done by the United Kingdom or its servants or agents in relation to the carrying out of nuclear tests or experimental programmes

by the United Kingdom at the sites in Australia or in relation to the decontamination and clearance of the sites.

3. The Government of the United Kingdom shall indemnify the Government of Australia in respect of all claims which arise out of the death or injury of any person and which—

(i) are referred to in paragraph (c) of the 1968 Memorandum, or

(ii) result from nuclear tests or experimental programmes at the Monte Bello Islands in respect of which the cause of action occurred before 27 June 1956.

4. The Government of Australia shall indemnify the Government of the United Kingdom against any loss, costs, damages or expenses which the Government of the United Kingdom may incur or be called upon to pay as a result of any such claims by any person, natural or legal, as are referred to in paragraph 2 above.

5. If a claim covered by paragraph 3 or 4 is made, the Government against whom, or against whose representatives, a claim is brought shall inform the other Government of the claim prior to the commencement of proceedings or as soon as possible thereafter. The Governments shall consult at the request of either of them on the conduct of legal proceedings arising out of the claim and on the manner in which the claim might be settled.

6. In relation to a claim for which the cause of action occurred prior to the date of entry into of this Agreement, references to in paragraphs 2 and 4 above to any person shall not include a person who was at the time of the cause of action occurred a member of HM Forces or a person employed by the Government of the United Kingdom for the purpose of working on the sites. This paragraph has no application to members of the forces of the Commonwealth of Australia.

If the above proposals are acceptable to the Government of Australia, I have the honour to suggest that this Note and your Excellency's reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of your reply.

I have the honour to convey to your Excellency the assurance my highest consideration.

Alistair Goodlad

Notes:

1. Not published.
2. Not published.

From the past

As the agreement on the clean up of nuclear tests sites in Australia is published, and as the US Congress is poised to look at clean up costs at the Nevada test site, we continue this occasional series of statements from the past.

Question:

To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is the financial costs attributed to the annual defence budget and paid to the United States Government to implement environmental clean-up at the Nevada test site following the testing of United Kingdom nuclear warheads at the site; and if he will make a statement.

Response:

In the continuing absence of escapes of radioactivity from these underground tests, no

such costs arise.

{Tim Sainsbury, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement, Written Answer, 8 February 1989, *Hansard*, Vol. 146, c690}

Nearly two years later:

[Of the 14 tests 1979–90] there were operational releases of radioactive gases from three, namely Gibne, Armada and Barnwell. In none of these was any radioactivity detected at locations beyond the boundary of the Nevada test site.

{Archie Hamilton, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Written Answer, 13 December 1990, *Hansard*, Vol. 182, c506}

[Gibne = the test held on 25 April 1982, Armada = 22 April 1983 and Barnwell = 8 December 1989]

UNRCA — UK entry

On 29 April the United Kingdom submitted its entry for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

The UK provided data for the first three columns only of the standard form; for the sake of brevity the other columns are not reproduced here. Two of the missing columns are: 'State Of Origin (if not exporter)' and 'Intermediate Location'; there are two 'Remarks' columns: 'Description of Item' and 'Comments on Transfer'.

The export, imports and procurement from national production tables are reproduced below.

Exports		
Category (I–VII)	Final Importer State(s)	Number of Items
I. Battle tanks	Nigeria	21
II. Armoured combat vehicles	Philippines Saudi Arabia	7 65
III. Large calibre artillery systems		0
IV. Combat aircraft	Finland Oman Republic of Korea UAE	2 1 10 16
V. Attack helicopters		0
VI. Warships	Pakistan Portugal	2 1
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	Saudi Arabia UAE	198 328

Note:

The United Kingdom regards the transfer of title to and control over the equipment by the importing state as the appropriate criteria for recording its arms transfers.

Imports		
Category (I–VII)	Final Exporter State(s)	Number of Items
I. Battle tanks		0
II. Armoured combat vehicles		0
III. Large calibre artillery systems		0
IV. Combat aircraft		0
V. Attack helicopters		0
VI. Warships		0

VII. Missiles and missile launchers		0
Note: Equipment purchased from programmes in which the United Kingdom is a collaborative partner is declared as 'Procurement from National Production'.		

Report of Military Holdings and Procurement from National Production		
Category (I-VII)	Military Holdings (Note 1)	Procurement from National Production (Note 2)
I. Battle tanks	1027	0
II. Armoured combat vehicles	4225	192
III. Large calibre artillery systems	619	91
IV. Combat aircraft	815	5
V. Attack helicopters	506	0
VI. Warships	103	5
VII. Missiles and missile launchers	32853	9016
Notes: 1. For the purpose of calculating these statistics, a military holding is defined as all equipment in each of the seven categories covered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms owned by the Government on 31.12.93 2. Procurement from national production is defined for the purposes of this report as complete weapons systems in each of the seven categories of weapons covered by this register purchased by the Government during 1993 from suppliers within the United Kingdom or from programmes in which the UK is a collaborative partner.		

Bradford Arms Register report 4

The fourth in the series of *Bradford Arms Register Studies*, 'Developing the UN Register of Conventional Arms' was published in May by the Bradford University Department of Peace Studies.

The book, edited by Malcolm Chalmers, Owen Greene, Edward J. Laurence and Herbert Wulf, contains revised versions of papers presented at a workshop at Monterey, California, on 6-9 April 1994.

Copies of the book are available at £10 plus postage and packing from the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, BD7 1DP, UK, tel: +44 274 385235, fax: +44 274 385240.

UK Defence White Paper

On 28 April the British Government released its annual statement of defence policy, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1994* (SDE94).

Nuclear policy

The section entitled 'British Nuclear Policy' contains the following statement:

Complete and general nuclear disarmament remains a desirable ultimate goal, but nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. If at some point in the future a new global confrontation arose, the prospect of a race to re-create nuclear weapons would be profoundly destabilising. Moreover, the potential for nuclear proliferation would still exist. For a nuclear-free world to become a practicable

objective, the international community would need to develop dependable solutions to these problems.

Nuclear testing

On the subject of British policy with regard to a CTB and requirements for carrying out further tests SDE94 contains the following:

Committing ourselves to negotiate a CTBT has not been an entirely easy decision for us. We have until now relied on a minimal programme of underground nuclear testing, complemented by a range of above-ground experimental work and computer simulation, as a cost-effective means of ensuring our ability to underwrite the safety and reliability of our nuclear warheads. With the possibility of concluding a CTBT, our plans are now based on the use and further development of simulation and alternative technologies so as to provide a basis for the continued underwriting of warhead safety and reliability in a situation where it is no longer possible to conduct nuclear tests.

Red Mercury

On 13 April, a 'Dispatches' programme on Channel 4 television made claims regarding a substance known as 'red mercury'. The programme claimed that, in addition to other properties that this material is supposed to have, red mercury could be used to create a purely fusion nuclear weapon, and to make it very small.

There have been calls for further investigation of these claims, while others have treated the report with scepticism. While the physics seems questionable, the programme alleged that President Yeltsin himself had signed a document authorizing a Mr Sadykov to export red mercury.

In the view of at least one Western government, red mercury is a 'scam or hoax', that this is 'aimed at obtaining money from those wishing to obtain nuclear materials and developing their own nuclear weapons' and that claims that the substance may be used to construct a miniature nuclear device are 'strongly believe[d] to be completely untrue'.

British T-80U tank

In the 1992 UN Register the UK acknowledged that one battle tank had been imported from the Russian Federation. It appears that the details of this transfer were agreed during President Yeltsin's visit to Britain in the latter part of that year.

Although the British Ministry of Defence has stated that a T-80U tank 'was imported for defence research and development purposes', no other information is available on the record.

British sources have indicated that this transfer was a gift, while Russian sources have said that \$5 million was paid for the tank (a T-80U is reputed to cost \$3 million on the open market).

VERTIC Project News

Miguel Marin-Bosch seminar

On 6 May, VERTIC hosted a seminar addressed by Ambassador Miguel Marin-Bosch, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The Ambassador is Chair of the CD's *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, the forum that is currently negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The Ambassador was introduced by John Edmonds, former UK Ambassador to the tripartite test ban negotiations in 1978-80, and chaired by Dr Patricia Lewis, Director of VERTIC.

Acronym report

The Acronym Consortium has published a report on the first session of the test ban talks at the CD entitled *A Comprehensive Test Ban within reach* by Rebecca Johnson and Sean Howard.

The report summarizes the events of the first session (January 25 to March 31), from the formal convening of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on 1 February with Amb. Marin-Bosch in the chair, the establishment of working groups and the submissions of draft texts, to the areas of contention such as peaceful nuclear explosions, test preparations, hydro-nuclear tests, safety tests and verification.

The Acronym Consortium is made up of VERTIC, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), the International Security Information Service (ISIS) and Dfax with financial support from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

Copies of the report are available from VERTIC.

Greenhouse gas workshop

On 28 and 29 April VERTIC held a workshop with KFA, Jülich, at the Stresseman Institute in Bonn on 'Greenhouse Gas Verification - why, how and how much'. The meeting was intended primarily for experts in greenhouse gas emission inventory compilation and was attended by 34 people from around the world.

After brief introductions by Gotthard Stein (KFA) and John Lanchbery (VERTIC), the workshop was opened by Dr Wagner (Director of the Energy Department and the German Research and Technology Ministry, BMFT) who stressed the importance of having compatible and consistent inventory compilation systems in different states and outlined work being done by the German government in this area.

The first part of the workshop was directed at giving the participants some background information on the

state of implementation review and verification processes in environmental agreements in general and the Climate Change Convention in particular. To this end, David Victor from IIASA in Austria gave an outline of what was going on in terms of verifying environmental agreements and also on lessons that might be drawn from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Dr Palm-Risse from the German Environment Ministry (BMU) then described the latest developments at the INC on climate change and George Strongylis from DG XI of the European Commission (Environment) gave a revealing account of how Brussels was trying to monitor greenhouse gas emissions, which stimulated considerable discussion amongst the participants.

The workshop then moved on to consider some views of verification from the standpoints of non-governmental and intergovernmental bodies. Jan Corfee-Morlot from the OECD gave an account of his organization's experience in this area, and Professor Jim Harrison (President of the Institute of Energy) gave his views on the practicability and acceptability of verification of the Climate Convention from an industrial perspective. Bill Hare from Greenpeace International then rounded off the first session with an outline of the views and activities of Greenpeace in this area. The discussions following the second session of the workshop continued until after midnight over a buffet dinner provided by the BMFT.

The second day of the workshop was devoted mainly to a discussion of problems in inventory compilation and verification in particular countries. German, Polish and US cases were discussed in detail following presentations from Dr Rolf Sartorius (BMU), Dr Edward Radwanski (Polish Foundation for Energy Efficiency) and Bill Hohenstein (US Environmental Protection Agency).

VERTIC would like to thank the BMFT for providing facilities for the workshop.

The proceedings of the workshop are to be published in June 1994. For further details contact John Lanchbery at VERTIC or Dr Ing. Werner Katscher at KFA, Jülich.

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Trust & Verify

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What is VERTIC?

VERTIC is an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of

verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements.

VERTIC co-ordinates six working groups comprising 21 UK consultants and 11 overseas advisors.

VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press.

VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

Other publications

In addition to *Trust & Verify*, VERTIC publishes the *Verification* series of yearbooks, in association with Brassey's, and a variety of research reports each year. Details of VERTIC publications are available on request.

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