CoCom

In early April a meeting of 17 CoCom states held in Wassenaar in the Netherlands formally dissolved the organization and continued work aimed at bringing in a new multilateral export control regime.

To this end, there has been a series of intergovernmental meetings which have discussed 'new multilateral arrangements to promote transparency and responsibility in the transfer of arms and other sensitive dual-use goods'.

The existing controls on exports will remain in force until the new arrangements are in place. A meeting of CoCom states on 16 November 1993 had decided that the CoCom arrangements should officially cease to exist on 31 March this year (see Trust & Verify, No. 43, December 1993).

While the outline proposal for the CoCom successor has met little criticism, there has been very little detail actually agreed. There has been concern that the new regime should not, to the extent practicable, duplicate controls covered in other arrangements, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The most likely stumbling block appears to be the fundamental question of how stringently the new controls should be applied to particular states. Coherence in policy would require either frequent meetings to discuss particular states — an option regarded by many as too bureaucratic — or to establish a set of criteria against which prospective importers could be scored — regarded by many as unworkable.

US and the CWC

On 22 March, Secretary of State Warren Christopher appeared before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

In his prepared statement to the Committee, he said that the CWC 'will significantly enhance our national security and contribute greatly to global security'.

Urging the Senate to take swift action in giving its advice and consent to ratification he said 'Ratification of the Convention is a top legislative priority for this Administration'. He added 'Every move we make on the Convention sends an important message around the world. For that reason, Senate action is now vital'.

CWC signatories

As of 11 April, 157 states have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The most recent signatories are:

- Tanzania
- Bahamas
- St Kitts and Nevis

Norway deposited its instrument of ratification to the Convention on 7 April, bringing the total of ratifications to five.

BW trilateral agreement inspections

Some information is now available regarding activities under the US–UK–Russia agreement on inspection of each others biological facilities. The agreement was signed on 11 September 1992 (see Trust & Verify, No. 31, September 1992; the agreement is reproduced in Verification 1993, pp. 323–4).

According to UK sources, British and US officials have visited five non-military biological sites in Russia since the agreement was concluded. The first visit was made in November 1992, followed by visits in September 1993 and January 1994.

Little is known about the conduct of the visits or the locations visited. The British Government has stated that the agreement, 'designed to address concerns about Russian non-compliance' with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 'only allows for information to be exchanged on a confidential basis. It is not therefore possible to reveal details of information gained through this process.'

US–Russian Pu inspection

On 16 March, the United States and Russia each agreed to allow the other to conduct a round of inspections of its storage facilities for plutonium arising from the dismantling of nuclear weapons. These inspections are to be carried out by the end of the year.

Agreement was also reached on joint studies into options for the replacement of the power generated by Russia's military plutonium production reactors.

The consultations between the two states were carried out at a high level and were concluded in March in Washington DC at a meeting between the US Secretary for Energy, Hazel O'Leary, and the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov.

UNSCOM activities

Negotiations are continuing between the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and Iraq regarding the long term monitoring and verification that is to be carried out in the country in order to fulfil the requirements of UN Security Council resolutions.
The Iraqi authorities have indicated that they feel that the long term monitoring and verification is already taking place; UNSCOM disagree. High level negotiations on the subject continue, with the latest round taking place in 14–19 March.

UN safety
Concerns have been raised about the safety of UN personnel in Iraq. On 27 March two UN guards were shot in an ambush in the north of the country, both receiving serious injuries. One of the Austrian personnel received wounds to the throat, the other to the thigh.
A total of six UN guards have been injured in Iraq since the beginning of March.

UK in UNPROFOR
One aspect on verification that is often overlooked is its contribution to peacekeeping operations. It is this vein that the editor received a query regarding the codenames used by British forces participating in the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia.
Unlike many other nations participating in these operations, the UK assigned national codenames to its contributions to these tasks.
Operation GRAPPLE is the UK operation in Bosnia; Operation CHESHIRE is the UK contribution to the Sarajevo airlift; and Operation HANWOOD was the UK field ambulance operation in Croatia which ended in September 1993.

UK Classifications
The British Government has announced the new definitions for levels of classification of Government information and other assets. The new definitions took effect on 4 April.
A statement by the Prime Minister, John Major, said that 'in recent years, the nature of threats to national security has changed'. He said that the new classifications 'will allow fewer Government documents to be classified, particularly at the higher levels'.
The new definitions are:
TOP SECRET: the compromise of this information or material would be likely: to threaten directly the internal stability of the United Kingdom or friendly countries; to lead directly to widespread loss of life; to cause exceptionally grave damage to the effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied forces or to the continuing effectiveness of extremely valuable security or intelligence operations; to cause exceptionally grave damage to relations with friendly governments; to cause severe long-term damage to the United Kingdom economy.
SECRET: the compromise of this information or material would be likely: to raise international tension; to damage seriously relations with friendly governments; to threaten life directly, or seriously prejudice public order, or individual security or liberty; to cause serious damage to the operational effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied forces or to the continuing effectiveness of highly valuable security or intelligence operations; to cause substantial material damage to national finances or economic and commercial interests.
CONFIDENTIAL: the compromise of this information or material would be likely: materially to damage diplomatic relations (ie cause formal protest or other sanction); to prejudice individual security or liberty; to cause damage to the operational effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied forces or to the continuing effectiveness of valuable security or intelligence operations; to work substantially against national finances or economic and commercial interests; substantially to undermine the financial viability of major organisations; to impede the investigation or facilitate the commission of serious crime; to impede seriously the development or operation of major government policies; to shut down or otherwise substantially disrupt significant national operations.
RESTRICTED: the compromise of this information or material would be likely: to affect diplomatic relations adversely; to cause substantial distress to individuals; to make it more difficult to maintain the operational effectiveness or security of United Kingdom or allied forces; to cause financial loss or loss of earning potential or to facilitate improper gain or advantage for individuals or companies; to prejudice the investigation or facilitate the commission of crime; to breach proper undertakings to maintain the confidence of information provided by third parties; to impede the effective development or operation of government policies; to breach statutory restrictions on disclosure of information; to disadvantage government in commercial or policy negotiations with others; to undermine the proper management of the public sector and its operations.

Naval arms control
At a recent seminar discussing integration of armed forces in Europe and the implications for agreements such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the question of the Benelux states was raised. Sparked by reports that Belgium and the Netherlands were studying various options for integrating their naval forces.
A participant, who has an (up to now) impressive track record in arms control matters, found it curious that Luxembourg was not included in these discussions, considering the close co-operation between the three states.
This raises some important questions. VERTIC would be interested in any novel proposals for specialized measures that could be used to verify compliance with a naval arms control agreement by Luxembourg; as these could also be applied to other states such as Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary!

In the News

Libyan CW plant
According to US sources, the Libyans have been working on a plant capable of producing chemical warfare agents. The plant is at Tarahunah, 40 mile south-east of Tripoli.
Another CW capable plant in Libya, at Rabta, has been 'dormant' for several years according to the same sources.

German CW court case
In Germany, employees of Preussag AG have been found guilty of selling equipment for filling bombs and shells with chemical warfare agents to the Iraqis.
Georgia accedes to the NPT
On 7 March Georgia deposited its instrument of accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in Washington DC. The deposition coincided with a visit to the city by the Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze.

Georgia becomes the 163rd state party to the NPT.

UK aid to Russia
It is expected that the first deliveries of equipment to Russia to assist with the disposal of nuclear weapons will be made in the near future (see Trust & Verify, No. 33, November 1992 and No. 36, March/April 1993).

The equipment consists of 250 nuclear-weapon containers and 20 vehicles. The latest estimated cost for this aid is £35 million.

Bradford Arms Register report
The third in the series of Bradford Arms Register Studies, 'Background Information: An analysis of information provided to the UN on military holdings and procurement through national production in the first year of the Register of Conventional Arms' was published in March by the Bradford University Department of Peace Studies.

The report, by Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, contains a compilation of the background data supplied by some of the states for the arms register.

Unlike the information supplied by states on the imports and exports of the seven classes of equipment listed on the standard form the background data was submitted in a variety of formats. While the returns on the standard forms has been published by the United Nations, the background data has not.

Copies of this and earlier reports are available from Kim Tay, Bradford Arms Register Project, c/o VERTIC.

VERTIC Project News
VERTIC begins work for EU
In April VERTIC began work on an EU project entitled 'Greenhouse Gas Inventories national reporting processes and implementation mechanisms in the EU'.

The work is funded by Directorate General (DG XI) of the European Commission, under the 'Environment' research programme, and is being carried out in collaboration with KFA, Jülich in Germany; Laben, Bilbao in Spain; and Bradford University in the UK.

The aim of the project is to examine and develop implementation review and verification procedures for the EU and its member States in support of the EU environment ministers decision of 22 March 1993 (Council Decision 93/389/EC) to establish a joint surveillance system to monitor Community emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.

The work will begin with a review of national reporting and inventory compilation systems in the EU and selected neighbouring states. The aim of the review will be to identify types and characteristics of national reporting systems and to identify significant discrepancies between them. Detailed case studies will then be conducted in Spain, Germany and the UK.

The study will pay particular attention to informal systems and those which have arisen due to peculiarities of national culture or style.

The findings of the case studies will be compared and their compatibility assessed together with their consistency with international systems. Based on this analysis, proposals will be developed for improving and developing EU implementation review procedures and monitoring mechanisms for greenhouse gas emissions.

For further information about this project contact John Lanchbery at VERTIC who is the project co-ordinator.

Chinese test tracking
There are signs that the Chinese may be prepared to carry out a nuclear test in the coming months.

Following VERTIC's success last year in identifying the Chinese nuclear test of October last year (see Trust & Verify, No. 41, October 1993 and 'Tracking Down a Chinese Nuclear Test' by Vipin Gupta and Philip McNab in Verification 1994), the organization is again monitoring the situation.

Ethnic Conflicts Project
VERTIC has recently embarked on a new research project in confidence and security building measures as tools for solutions to conflicts within and transcending national boundaries, particularly ethnic conflicts.

Working in close collaboration with national governments, community leaders, international and regional organizations, as well as other NGOs, the study will analyse the best way to identify and study the different concerns and aspirations of different communities in ethnic conflict situations. Due regard will be given not only to minority concerns and aspirations, but also to those of the usually dominating majority, as they also have an important impact on such conflicts.

The project aims to provide a useful set of tools for mediators and negotiators who are trying to bring different sides to take measures to address these concerns and reconcile different aspirations. This may also involve the verification of agreements and monitoring of events. The project will therefore look at various mechanisms that may be put into place and various review procedures that will ensure that agreements remain valid in changing situations.

The project is to be co-ordinated by Dennis Sammut. He brings to the job considerable experience of working in conflict situations on behalf of various NGOs. He studied at Ruskin College, Oxford and at the London School of Economics and is a specialist on the politics of North Africa and the Middle East.

The project is being overseen by Patricia Lewis, Director of VERTIC, and Owen Greene, Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University.

The project has seed funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

Verification 1994
Production work on the latest in VERTIC's series of yearbooks, Verification 1994, has now been completed. The book should be returned from the printers sometime in June, ready for immediate publication.

The book covers the range of topics covered by Trust & Verify. For example, readers interested in the items in this issue regarding activities of UNSCOM in Iraq, the replacement of CoCom, or the work of UNPROFOR would find the chapters in Verification 1994 by Tim Trevan, Owen Greene and Edward Cowan, respectively, of particular interest.

Contents
Verification 1994 contains the following:
J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie, 'Introduction', 'The Year in Context'
Section I — Arms Control
John Simpson, ‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime in 1993’
John Edmonds, ‘At Last, a Total Ban on Nuclear Tests?’
Vipin Gupta and Philip McNab, ‘Tracking Down a Chinese Nuclear Test’
David Fischer, ‘The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency after Iraq and North Korea’
Jessica Eve Stern, ‘Stalking Two Varieties of Poisonous Snake: a Comparison of the Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Anti-proliferation Regimes’
Stephen Pullinger, ‘Britain’s Nuclear Weapons Policy and Non-Proliferation’
John Pike and Eric Stambler, ‘The Clinton Administration and Revisions to the ABM Treaty’
Daniel T. Plesch, ‘Memoirs of a Nuclear Inspector’
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, ‘A Regime to Monitor Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention Moves Closer’
John R. Walker, ‘Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: the UK’s Practice Compliance Inspection Programme’
Peter L. Jones, ‘Open Skies in Other Regional Contexts’
Jane M.O. Sharp, ‘Will the CFE Treaty Survive the Cold War?’
Tim Trevan, ‘The UN Special Commission’s Verification and Monitoring Activities in Iraq: 1993’
Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, ‘The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: the first year of operation’
Owen Greene, ‘The Missile Technology Control Regime and CoCom: Supplier Regimes in Transition’

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Trust & Verify
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What is VERTIC?
VERTIC is an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements. VERTIC co-ordinates six working groups comprising 21 UK consultants and 11 overseas advisors.

ERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press. VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

Other publications
In addition to Trust & Verify, VERTIC publishes the Verification series of yearbooks, in association with Brassey’s, and a variety of research reports each year. Details of VERTIC publications are available on request.