



Trust and Verify

The Bulletin of the Verification Technology Information Centre

No. 43 December 1993

ISSN 0966-9221

In this issue:

- Ukraine and START
- UN First Committee and verification
- UK Trident warhead numbers

Ukraine & START I

On 18 November the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, considered ratification of START I and the Lisbon Protocol.

The Rada passed a resolution 245-9 that 'ratified' START I but which contained sweeping reservations.

The reservations are:

- all assets of the nuclear forces stationed in the Ukraine, including the nuclear warheads, are the property of Ukraine;
- Ukraine does not consider Article V of the Lisbon Protocol as binding on Ukraine;
- Ukraine is to exercise administrative control over Strategic Nuclear Forces stationed on its territory;
- Ukraine undertakes 'appropriate measures' to prevent use of nuclear weapons deployed on its territory;
- Ukraine to move towards non-nuclear-weapon status once security assurances have been given by the nuclear-weapon states and the inviolability of Ukraine's borders has been recognised;
- reductions of nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory will be carried out in accordance with Article II of the Lisbon Protocol based on the calculation that 36 per cent of launchers and 42 per cent of warheads are to be eliminated. This does not rule out further elimination;
- implementation shall be possible only if sufficient international financial and technical assistance is made available;
- the treaty should not be used to prevent Ukraine having access to peaceful uses of nuclear and missile technologies;
- if dismantling of the warheads takes place outside the territory of Ukraine, Ukraine should control the process in order to ensure that materials are not used in new warheads;
- agreements to dismantle the warheads should include provisions to return components for use by Ukraine for peaceful purposes, or to provide compensation to the value of the components;
- to recommend that the President negotiates with states and international organizations agreements relating to these reservations.

The reservations make it practically impossible for Ukraine to ratify START I.

Many observers have seen the Rada's actions as symptomatic of Ukraine's economic difficulties. The demands for compensation and exchanges of materials from warheads for nuclear fuel support this view.

UN First Committee

On 19 November the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled 'Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification'. This resolution has yet to be discussed by the General Assembly itself.

The resolution notes 'that recent developments in international relations continue to underscore the importance of effective verification of existing and future agreements to limit or eliminate arms ...'.

Operative paragraph 2 calls for a follow-up to the verification study carried out in 1990 (on which the UK-sponsored expert was VERTIC Director, Dr Patricia Lewis). This study would be based on recent experience with verification gained by the UN and 'relevant international developments'.

Although the resolution as a whole was passed without opposition (127 in favour, 19 abstentions); operative paragraph 2 had been opposed in an earlier vote (120 in favour, 7 opposed, 14 abstentions), with the United States and 6 EU states – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the UK voting against.

The other 6 EU states abstained. *Trust & Verify* understands that there was an EU decision not to support this resolution.

UK Trident warhead numbers

On 16 November the British Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, announced new limits on the number of nuclear warheads to be used on the Trident missile system and that the explosive firepower of Britain's nuclear stockpile would be reduced by 25 per cent against the total in 1990.

The new warhead limit is to be 96 per submarine, down from an earlier stated maximum of 128.

The firepower calculation compared the explosive power of the operational stockpile of Chevaline and WE177 warheads in 1990 with the explosive power of the planned future operational stockpile of Trident and WE177 warheads when Trident is fully in service.

Mr Rifkind said on 23 November that changes in the number of warheads 'have only modest financial implications'.

It has also been acknowledged that the introduction into service of Chevaline brought with it a reduction in the total explosive power deployed on each Polaris submarine.

The MoD has confirmed that there are no technical difficulties in adapting the Mk IV bus, used on the UK

Trident system, to carry anything between one and eight warheads.

The Trident system is slated to carry the UK's sub-strategic nuclear forces from the early years of the next century — see last *Trust & Verify*.

Confidence building and verification

In Parliament, the Ministry of Defence was asked how it will demonstrate that it has not deployed more than 96 warheads on each of the Trident submarines when they enter service. Jeremy Hanley, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, replied: 'In keeping with the practice of successive Governments, we do not make public the number of warheads actually deployed on our submarines. The question of verification does not arise.'

VERTIC believes that this has been a lost opportunity and that confidence building and verification measures such as these could play a valuable role in international relations with negligible security considerations.

US unannounced tests

On 7 December US Department of Energy released details of 204 previously unannounced nuclear tests carried out at the Nevada Test Site.

Some of the unannounced tests had been previously identified by seismic detection methods, especially those carried out in the last decade or so. Many tests predate the establishment of more capable networks.

The production of the list of tests has caused a flurry of activity as researchers with access to seismic records go back to look at whether previously unidentified events may be nuclear tests.

The lessons learnt from such exercises can only increase the chance of future seismic detection of covert nuclear testing.

UK unannounced test

Included in the unannounced US tests is one carried out by the British, codenamed Courser, at Nevada on 25 September 1964.

The UK Ministry of Defence denied that the test was secret, but said that the test 'did not proceed as planned and did not produce a nuclear yield. For this reason it has not been included in lists of nuclear tests carried out by the United Kingdom.'

Curiously, the US Department of Energy defines a nuclear test explosion as including 'the release of nuclear energy' and has given event 'Courser' a yield of between 0 and 20 kt.

London Convention

The 16th Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, otherwise known as the London Convention was held on 8 to 12 November. The meeting adopted four resolutions. The resolutions established: a ban on the disposal of radioactive wastes at sea; a ban on the sea disposal of industrial wastes; restrictions on the incineration of wastes at sea; and a commitment to undertake a thorough review of the other provisions of the convention.

Britain, France, Russia, China and Belgium abstained on the resolution regarding nuclear dumping, while the US voted in favour of the ban.

UK position

While the UK supported three of the resolutions, it abstained from the resolution concerning nuclear dumping. The official UK position is: 'We are currently considering the implications of the Convention's decision

on this matter, but we have no immediate plans to carry out sea dumping of radioactive waste.'

The UK believes that the option of sea disposal of 'bulky wastes' arising from the decommissioning of nuclear submarines and nuclear power stations 'should not be foreclosed as it may represent the best practicable environmental option for these wastes.' The UK is also 'actively pursuing a land-based option.'

Russian dumping

The London Convention also agreed to assist Russia with its nuclear waste problems.

Russia has continued to dispose of radioactive waste at sea, even while this has been prohibited. It has been estimated that the quantity of radioactive waste products dumped at sea by the Russians could total as much as 2.5 million curies (the Chernobyl accident is estimated to have released 6 million curies).

Iraq confidentiality agreement

Further to the Editorial Comment in the last *Trust & Verify*, more details have emerged of the agreement between Iraq, the IAEA and UNSCOM.

The following is the text of a letter dated 8 October 1993 from the IAEA Action Team Leader and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission addressed to the Foreign Minister of Iraq and reproduced as attachment II to Security Council document S/26571:

In view of the fact that Iraq has provided the information required by the Special Commission and IAEA on critical foreign suppliers as defined in document S/26451, annex I, the Commission and IAEA hereby declare that they will use the said information solely in order to identify all the elements of Iraq's previous programmes in the proscribed fields, to clarify related technical and scientific issues for the purposes of resolution 687 (1991), and to assist the Commission and IAEA in the planning and conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification. The information will be treated as confidential and will not be published. The Commission and IAEA will, in conformity with their usual practice, require all those having access to the information to respect this confidentiality and to use it solely for the purpose just identified.

CWC passed to US Senate

On 24 November President Clinton formally submitted the CWC to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

At the same time details of the US National Authority were given. The Authority will be chaired by National Security Council staff and will consist of 'all government agencies who have activities affected by CWC implementation or have oversight of of civilian activities that are affected'. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) will serve as the administrative centre of the National Authority.

The National Authority is defined in Article VII of the CWC as the point of liaison between each state and the international verification body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

UK and CWC

Douglas Hogg, Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office stated on 23 November that: 'The necessary implementing legislation will be introduced when parliamentary time permits.'

The CWC had been given a passing mention in the Queen's Speech on the State Opening of Parliament on 18 November. However, it had been hoped that Her

Majesty's Gracious Speech would contain a reference to the bill that would need to be introduced for UK ratification; bills referred to in the Speech are those that are given priority in the legislative calendar for that Parliamentary year.

Trust & Verify understands that, at present, the bill for CWC ratification has not secured a place on the legislative calendar.

Although officials are quietly confident that the UK will have ratified the CWC before it enters into force, it is notable that, in the days of debate following the Speech that were dedicated to foreign affairs and defence, the CWC was mentioned once in the House of Commons and once in the House of Lords. In neither case was the reference by a member of the Government.

CSCE meeting

The Council meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) took place in Rome on 30 November and 1 December.

The Rome Council agreed to establish the CSCE Permanent Committee, consisting of representatives of participating states, which will be responsible for the day-to-day operational tasks of the CSCE. The Permanent Committee has been tasked with undertaking a review of the structure of the CSCE and its organs.

A secretariat is also to be established in Vienna. Although the Prague office will remain *in situ*, its relative importance will wane as more functions are carried out from Vienna.

While the underfunded CSCE will have found it difficult to have refused the offer of facilities in Vienna, it may discover serious disadvantages and deficiencies from being based in too many locations.

Marsh Arabs

Allegations have been made that Iraq has been using chemical weapons in attacks on the Marsh Arabs in the southern part of the country.

The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), established after the Gulf War to inspect Iraq's programme's to develop weapons of mass destruction, has become involved in investigating these allegations.

UNSCOM inspection 65 visited the region in November, interviewing eye-witnesses and taking soil, water, flora and fauna samples. It is understood that the results from these samples may not be available for some months.

Scott Inquiry

The UK Ministry of Defence was rebuked by Lord Justice Scott for withholding documents from his inquiry into the exports of defence-related equipment to Iraq.

On 2 November Alan Barrett, an MoD official with responsibilities for the monitoring of arms and equipment sales, cited comments by the then Secretary of State for Defence, George Younger, that 'current intelligence reports' should be considered a factor in deciding whether to approve exports to Iraq. This comment did not appear in the documents presented to the inquiry.

The Judge gave the MoD 24 hours to present the documents.

In late November William Waldegrave, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, said: 'Departments have been instructed to make available to Lord Justice Scott's inquiry all material upon request, irrespective of classification, and have not been issued with specific instructions concerning requests for classified material.'

The Prime Minister has stated that his office has provided 184 documents to the Scott Inquiry and that no documents from his office have been withheld.

UN Compensation Commission

Under the terms of the United Nations Compensation Commission, companies that have suffered under the embargoes against Iraq can claim compensation payments for loss of trade.

One of the companies that has now applied is MC Realisations (Birmingham) Ltd. This company, now in receivership, is better known as Matrix-Churchill — the company taken over by the Iraqis and at the centre of the machine tools to Iraq scandal.

Anthrax vaccines

The subject of exports of anthrax vaccines from the United Kingdom remains confused.

On 16 June, officials from the Public Health Laboratory Service's Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research (CAMR) at Porton Down appeared before the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons.

The officials were asked whether CAMR had exported anthrax vaccines to Iraq. The officials responded that they could not answer this in public session.

When transcripts of the private session held later were published, they showed that the officials had said that no anthrax vaccines had been exported to Iraq. The reason stated for this reticence to comment on exports, or lack of them, in public has been one of commercial confidentiality.

The CAMR evidence indicated that additional income of some £3 million had been generated from sales of vaccines and related royalties arising out of the Gulf War. It has been commonly believed that one of the vaccines involved in these sales was against anthrax.

In late November, the Department of Trade and Industry was asked in Parliament about exports of anthrax vaccines since 1987. The response was: 'The information requested is not available from official sources because the United Kingdom trade classification does not separately identify anthrax vaccines. The manufacturers of anthrax vaccines in the United Kingdom report no exports during the last five years. Information prior to that could be obtained only at disproportionate cost.'

When asked a few days later about export licences for anthrax vaccine over the same period, Parliament was told: 'Anthrax vaccine was made specifically licensable in the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1992, which came into force on 31 December 1992. Prior to that it was controlled under a general military heading—ML7—relating to defence against biological agents. For the period in question, the total number of licences issued specifically for anthrax vaccine could be provided only at disproportionate cost.'

CoCom dissolves

On 16 November CoCom members, meeting in The Hague, agreed that the CoCom arrangements should be terminated as soon as alternative arrangements could be made to cover armaments and dual-use technologies. The earliest expected date for this is 31 March 1994.

States that have been suggested as participants in the new arrangements include Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Ireland. It has been indicated that China may be invited to join.

CoCom chair, Frans Engering, said that entry to the new arrangements would be dependent on that state's non-proliferation policies.

Further discussions are to take place in January on the new arrangements.

In the News

Montreal Protocol

The fifth meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol took place in Bangkok from 17 to 19 November.

The meeting agreed to set the protocol's multilateral fund's budget for 1994-96 at \$510 million. Agreement was also reached that production of halons in developed countries should cease. Previously such production had been allowed for 'essential uses'.

Biodiversity

The Convention on Biological Diversity has been ratified by more than thirty countries and will come into force on 29 December 1993.

Climate Change

The next meeting of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) on Climate Change is in Geneva and will run from 7 February to 18 February 1994. VERTIC will again hold a workshop on matters relating to implementation review and verification at the INC.

The UK is to deposit its instrument of ratification 'shortly' according to a Government spokesman on 3 December.

UK intelligence services

The British Prime Minister, John Major, has stated that: 'Countering the threat from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a priority task for the Secret Intelligence Service [MI6], Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ] and the Security Service [MI5] and the resources of the agencies devoted to that task have been increased.'

Although there has been a move within Whitehall towards putting people in positions of responsibility on 'performance-related pay' as an incentive to carry out their tasks more efficiently, it has been revealed that the Director General of the Security Service, Stella Rimington, will not be put on such a scheme.

Organization or organisation?

Trust & Verify has been taken to task for referring to 'organisation' as being the 'continental spelling'; the respondent claiming that the word with the 's' is the proper usage in English English.

As editor, and as an acknowledged pedant, I would like to point out that the word is derived from the Medieval Latin word *organizare* and that many dictionaries, for instance, Oxford and Collins, spell the word with a 'z' in preference to the alternative.

VERTIC News

Subscription reminder

Whilst we appreciate that many *Trust & Verify* readers have severely limited budgets, we hope that few are in the parlous situation of a European defense ministry which recently called VERTIC seeking a free subscription due to inability to pay.

Recent substantial increase in postal charges have greatly increased the cost of distributing *Trust & Verify*, and VERTIC would like to remind readers that 1994 subscriptions are now due. Rates are as advertised at the bottom of this page.

Publications

The December 1993 issue of *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* includes an article entitled 'Sleuthing from Home' by Vipin Gupta and Philip McNab on the ups and downs of VERTIC's monitoring of the Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nor.

In the forthcoming January 1994 issue of *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vipin Gupta's article 'The Status of Chinese Nuclear Testing' examines China's nuclear programme in greater depth.

VERTIC environment seminar

On 10 February 1994 VERTIC will hold a one-day seminar on the role of verification in environmental agreements at Chatham House, London. The seminar will examine the scope and success of verification provisions in existing treaties, including the FCCC, the MP and the Biodiversity Convention.

It will also address the importance of verification for strengthening existing and future agreements. Further details from the VERTIC office.

VERTIC greenhouse gas workshop

VERTIC and KFA Jülich will be holding a two-day workshop in Bonn on 28 and 29 April 1994 entitled 'Workshop on Greenhouse Gas Verification: Why, how and how much?'

Trust & Verify is edited and produced by Richard Guthrie with additional reporting by VERTIC staff and consultants.
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Trust & Verify

Trust & Verify is produced by VERTIC 10 times a year. Anyone wishing to contribute information for inclusion in *Trust & Verify*, or to comment on its contents, should contact the VERTIC office.

Subscriptions

Annual subscription rates are £15 (individual) or £25 (organization) per year. Payments may be made by cheque or credit card.

Carrara House
20 Embankment Place
London WC2N 6NN
Telephone 071 925 0867
Facsimile 071 925 0861

What is VERTIC?

VERTIC is an independent organization aiming to research and provide information on the role of verification technology and methods in present and future arms control and environmental agreements. VERTIC co-ordinates six working groups comprising 21 UK consultants and 11 overseas advisors. VERTIC is the major source of information on verification for scientists, policy makers and the press. VERTIC is funded primarily by grants from foundations and trusts and its independence is monitored by an Oversight and Advisory Committee.

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