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NPT/DPRK
On 11 June, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea/DPRK) placed in ‘suspension’ their withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The state had given a three month notification of withdrawal on 12 March and suspended this only hours from the deadline.

On the 11 May, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 825 urging the DPRK to reconsider its position and implying a threat of economic sanctions if it did not do so.

The withdrawal issue became a de facto bilateral issue, even though its origins lie in international nuclear safeguards inspections, as the DPRK took a position of accusing the US of manipulating the IAEA inspection process. Bilateral negotiations between the DPRK and the US are continuing.

At the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting (see below) the DPRK Ambassador to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, made a statement on his country’s rationale for withdrawal:

... it is the machinations and nuclear threat by the United States to strangle our socialism and the unjust action by some pro-US officials of the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that have led to the decision by our Government to withdraw from the NPT.

According to the Ambassador, any solution to the crisis had to be found by the United States and North Korea as they were the only two parties directly involved:

... the so-called ‘nuclear issue’ is the bilateral issue between the DPRK and the United States, and its solution should be sought at the DPRK-US negotiations.

Security Council action
The Ambassador stated:

The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea resolutely rejects the unreasonable UN Security Council ‘resolution’ 825, considering it an interference in its internal affairs and a grave infringement on its sovereignty.

The Ambassador drew comparisons between the current situation and the situation in the 1950s ‘when the Korean issue was discussed illegally at the UN Security Council’ and stated:

If the ‘resolution’ 825 of the United Nations Security Council was adopted from motives of following the example of the ‘resolution’ in the 1950s, the situation could get worse. The United States and its followers, some other member nations of the UN Security Council, must not mistake for an expression of weakness the DPRK’s stand and efforts to solve the problem through negotiations on the basis of mutual trust. If the UN Security Council finally puts such unreasonable ‘pressure’ upon us as ‘sanctions’ on the basis of this ‘resolution’, we cannot construe it other than a ‘declaration of war’ against the DPRK.

NPT PrepCom I
The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee ( PrepCom) for the 1995 Conference on the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was held in New York on 10–14 May.

This first PrepCom session dealt primarily with procedural matters. Its first decision was to elect Mr. Jan Hoekema (Netherlands) as its Chair. The second session is to be chaired by Andre Erdos (Hungary).

Among the other decisions taken were:

• The 1995 Conference is to be held in New York from 17 April to 12 May 1995.
• Future PrepCom sessions have been scheduled for 17–21 January 1994 (New York), 12–16 September 1994 (Geneva) and 23–27 January 1995 (New York).
• The United Nations Secretary-General has been invited to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 1995 Conference. (This nomination would have to be confirmed by the Conference itself.)
• The Secretariat has been requested to supply an estimate of the costs for the 1995 Conference in time to be considered by the second PrepCom session. (This is, in part, an attempt to defer some of the questions relating to funding.)

Yugoslavian accreditation
One of the major procedural problems was the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Many states did not recognize the FRY as a party to the NPT. Discussions on this situation occupied the first day of the PrepCom, but did not reach a conclusion.

The situation was resolved temporarily as the Yugoslav Ambassador returned to Belgrade for further instructions and thus missed the last three days of the PrepCom.

Finances
The funding for the 1995 Conference has not yet been resolved. The pattern of funding for the Review Conferences had been that the Depositary states paid 55% of the costs, with the rest being paid by the other participants.

The extra payments made by the Depositaries are to cease. The Russians have apparently indicated that they would find their share difficult to fund. The suggestion has been made that the Conference should be funded according to the UN scale of contributions.
This would make it more expensive for some states to attend.

Discussion on funding took place behind closed doors. Part of the reason for deferring some of the decisions on funding was that any list containing an indication of contributions would have to include, or not include the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Either way, this would have led to more difficulties.

**Conference Rules of Procedure**
As reported in the last *Trust & Verify*, Draft Rules of Procedure were circulated at the PrepCom.

**US testing plans**
A draft schedule for nuclear testing by the US for the next three years has been presented informally to Congress. The schedule is contained within the first Annual Report required under the US testing legislation (see *Trust & Verify*, October 1992).

Reports circulating in Washington, DC, indicate that the draft contains a proposal for nine tests in the period to September 1996. Three of the tests would be conducted by the British. The report also gives a timetable for negotiations on a CTBT.

**US Tests**
Indications are that three of the six US tests would be for design and installation of safety features for the W80 warhead currently deployed on air-launched cruise missiles.

The other US tests are likely to be one each for the W76 (Trident I), W87 (MX Peacekeeper) and W88 (Trident II) warheads. It is not clear what the purpose of these tests will be. The W89 is equipped with each of the modern safety devices that Congress requires. The W76 and W88 warheads lack some of the safety features but there appears to be no programme to fit them.

**British tests**
According to the testing legislation:

- The President may authorize the United Kingdom to conduct in the United States, within a period covered by an annual report, one test of a nuclear weapon if the President determines that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so. Such a test shall be considered as one of the tests within the maximum number of tests that the United States is permitted to conduct during that period ...

British Government statements at the end of 1992 indicated that testing would be related to the safety of future systems, rather than current systems.

Some voices in Congress have questioned whether development of new systems by the British, even for safety purposes, is in the national interests of the US, especially as the US is not testing any future systems.

Baroness Chalker, a Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office told the House of Lords on 26 May:

> While under the current legislation there is the opportunity for the UK to conduct three tests between July 1993 and September 1996, which will allow us to complete important safety-related work—and it is safety-related work—I do not necessarily know whether we will or will not take up the opportunity.

Baroness Chalker had said earlier that day:

> We must also bear in mind the importance of ensuring that any ban on testing contributes as effectively as possible to non-proliferation. One cannot separate the issues and one must keep working towards an extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

**Talks timetable**
Within the report is a draft timetable for test ban negotiations. Current plans are to try to begin multilateral negotiations in the third quarter of this year with the aim of having a draft ready by the time of the NPT extension decision in April/May 1995. This would then allow a Treaty to be signed by 30 September 1996.

**Annual report requirements**
According to the legislation, the first annual report should have been submitted by 1 March and should cover the period between the end of the moratorium and 30 September 1994. Each annual report thereafter shall cover the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which it is submitted.

Each annual report should contain:
- A schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks with Russia.
- A plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before 30 September 1996.
- An assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons on 30 September 1996.
- A description of the safety features of each warhead type.
- A plan for installing one or more modern safety features in each warhead type that is to remain in stockpile.
- An assessment of the number and type of nuclear weapons tests that are necessary in order to ensure the safety of each nuclear warhead in which one or more modern safety features are installed.
- A schedule for conducting the tests.

In the calculation of the 90-day period, the days on which either the House or the Senate are not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days shall be excluded.

The legislation's annual report periods are: 1 July 1993 to 30 September 1994, 1 October 1994 to 30 September 1995 and 1 October 1995 to 30 September 1996.

**Threshold Test Ban Treaty notifications**
Further complications for the testing plans being considered by the Clinton administration are that the bilateral US–Russian Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed in 1974 requires notifications of planned nuclear tests. These notification periods are contained in the verification protocol agreed in June 1990.

On 1 June each year, each party should inform the other of certain details of its plans for testing in the following calendar year, including the numbers of tests having a planned yield of more than 35 or 50 kilotons.

At least 200 days before the carrying out of certain tests the other party must be informed of the designation, date, location and configuration of the test, amongst other details. Because the TTBT contains special provisions for its first five years of operation, it is likely that all proposed US tests will have to be notified.

**Nuclear testing dispute**
The dispute over liabilities for the clean-up of the Maralinga test site continues. The Australian site was used for atmospheric testing of British nuclear weapons.

Following a clean-up effort, Operation Brumby, in 1967, the Governments agreed in 1968 that no more claims for costs could be made against the British. However, in recent years, further information about the scale of
contamination has come to light. This lead to the establishment of a Royal Commission on the subject, which reported in 1986, and further claims for compensation. The ability to survey a former test site for radiological activity with precision could be a valuable tool for ascertaining whether further testing activity has taken place to aid the verification of a test ban. One of the lessons from Maralinga is that such technologies and techniques, though within our grasp, have not yet been utilized.

**Russian CW allegations**

Vladimir Uglev, a former worker at the State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry (GSNIIOK) in Moscow, has alleged that the institute has been involved in the development of a binary chemical agent. The new agent, Novichok, is reportedly formed from compounds that are not specified in the Schedules to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Uglev was dismissed for speaking to the Russian media in February.

These allegations follow other disclosures of chemical weapon activities in Russia, most notably allegations made by Vitaly Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov that, contrary to public statements, chemical weapons development had continued throughout 1991.

**Soviet CW dumping**

The Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, has reported that at least 30,000 tons of mustard gas was dumped in the Sea of Japan by the Soviet armed forces in the late 1940s. There are fears that the containers in which the agents were dumped are starting to corrode and leak. The paper also noted that stocks of Japanese agents had been dumped at sea.

**CWC signatories**

Since the last issue of Trust & Verify, three more states have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are:
- Latvia: 6 May
- Laos: 12 May
- Rwanda: 17 May

**Scott Inquiry**

The Scott Inquiry took oral evidence for the first time on 5 May, with former Foreign Office Minister, Sir Richard Luce, as the first witness.

Later in May, Sir Hal Miller, a former Conservative MP, told the Inquiry that in 1990 he approached the then-Attorney-General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, about the arrest and possible prosecution of employees of the engineering firm, Walter Somers, who were exporting steel pipes to be used in the 'supergun' project. Sir Hal stated that he had alerted Government departments and the intelligence services in June 1988 of the suspicions of the company regarding the end-use of the pipes.

Sir Hal stated that he had told Sir Patrick that he would, if necessary, go to court and give evidence that the Government had been aware of the uses for the Walter Somers pipes. According to Sir Hal, Sir Patrick’s response had been ‘You wouldn’t do that, would you?’ to which Sir Hal replied ‘Just watch me’. The charges against the employees were dropped in November 1990.

Sir Hal also indicated that the intelligence services had briefed witnesses appearing in front of a Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry inquiry into the supergun affair.

In testimony to the Scott hearings a few days later, Sir Patrick, now Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, stated that he had ‘never attempted ... to persuade [Sir Hal] not to go to court and produce documents if Somers were charged’ and that his comments with Sir Hal were of the character of ‘so be it’ or ‘that is up to you’.

Other witnesses that have been called include former Trade Secretary, Paul Channon (who was Secretary of State while Alan Clark as a junior minister in that Department) and officials from the Export Credit Guarantee Department and the Ministry of Defence.

**THORP reprocessing plant**

Key decisions remain to be taken on the future of the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) at British Nuclear Fuels’ Sellafield (formerly Windscale) site. The most important of these is whether the plant should start operations at all.

Since THORP was given approval in 1978, many of the circumstances surrounding the politics and economics have changed. While the issue of radioactive discharges is currently top of the agenda, wider issues of nuclear proliferation, the dangers of stockpiling plutonium and the economics of decommissioning the plant are waiting to be addressed.

**Ukraine and nuclear weapons**

Ukraine’s nuclear intentions remain unclear. Although President Kravchuk has stated that he intends to ratify START I and join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, numerically significant sections of the Parliament of Ukraine have voiced concerns that, without nuclear weapons, Ukraine cannot guarantee its borders.

Western analysts have put various interpretations on the different stances taken. Some have suggested that nationalist elements are merely using the nuclear issue as a focus; others have suggested that political moves are being made to increase the volume of Western aid. There does appear to be an underlying concern that the treaties establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States do not recognize the existing internal borders and that, until the Russia/Ukraine border issues are resolved, progress may be slow on the nuclear issues.

Bohdan Hawrylyshyn, of the Council of Advisers to the Parliament of Ukraine said in a letter to the Financial Times: ‘Any newly-independent country is bound to be somewhat sensitive about its independence.’ He said that there were four main reasons for Ukrainian hesitation: costs of moving the weapons; Russian political fragility; ownership of the materials in the weapons; and lack of international security guarantees.

**Ballistic missile defence**

In May, the US Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was retired the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, called the changes ‘an re-emphasis of the missile-defence programmes to ground-based systems in preference to those based in space.

The new organization will come under an Under-Secretary in the Department, rather than to the Secretary of Defense, reflecting a reduction in its political importance. The SDIO was formed in 1984. It has been noted in the past by some cynics that there was only one thing sophisticated enough to defeat the ‘Brilliant Pebbles’ concept and that was ‘brilliant taxpayers’.
European Safeguards
The 15th Symposium of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association was held in the Vatican City in May. Full proceedings of the conference are to be published.

Plutonium to Japan
It has been revealed that shipments of plutonium from the UK to Japan were made in financial years 1979–80, 1980–81 and 1981–82. All shipments were made under safeguards.

Global Environment Facility
The governing body of the Global Environment Facility, the Participants Assembly, met in Beijing from 26 to 28 May.

Australian Seismic System
Chinese nuclear tests at the Lop Nor test site will be more accurately monitored after new equipment is installed at an Australian seismic array in the middle of this year. The Warramunga Seismic Array, part of the Australian National University, is part of a global network currently being tested by the Group of Scientific Experts established by the Conference on Disarmament as a verification tool for a nuclear test ban.

Early-warning weather
Another new use for a military system has been found at the end of the cold war. An Australian 'over-the-horizon' radar, Jindalee, has been shown to be capable of tracking weather patterns. Cyclone tracking is of particular importance to the Australian economy as cyclone damage costs that country millions of dollars. The capability of the system has aroused sufficient interest from the Bureau of Meteorology, who carried out the tests, that it is now interested in a southwards facing radar.

CWC Centre
An International Centre for Support of the Chemical Weapons Convention has been established with initial funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. For further information contact Richard Clarke +1 (212) 541 3745 or Amy Smithson +1 (202) 223 5956.

OPCW lessons from the IAEA

MOSCON '93
On 19–21 May the internationally sponsored 'Moscow Conference on Chemical and Biological Disarmament, Demilitarization and Conversion' (MOSCON '93) was held at the Hotel President.
The Conference was called to address technical, industrial and scientific challenges involved in CW destruction, as well as concerns of national obligations in implementing the Chemical and the Biological Weapons Convention.

MOSCON '93 highlighted technological advances in recent years that offer new techniques for CW destruction. Although the new technologies may provide economic advantages and open up new fields of civilian research, the costs of refining these technologies will have to be weighed against the costs of the minimum destruction requirements for the CWC.
The main Russian sponsor was President Yeltsin's Committee on Matters Pertaining to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, headed by Academician Anatoly D. Kuntsevich. The main US organizer was the EAI Corporation (contact: Kyle Olson, tel: +1 703 739 1033).

VERTIC News
Verification 1993
VERTIC is happy to announce that the next in its series of Verification Report yearbooks is to be published in association with Brassey's.
The co-publishing deal includes a change in name for the series to Verification 1993: Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the Environment.