Multilateral Verification of Nuclear Disarmament

The Role of the IAEA
1. The IAEA: Mandate

Statute Article III.A.5:

The Agency is authorized ‘to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy’
1. The IAEA: Experience

Iraq

South Africa

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1. The IAEA: Experience

Libya

The Trilateral Initiative/
PMDA

IAEA

Russia

USA
1. The IAEA: Strategy

Disarmament verification has been included in all IAEA Medium Term Strategies (MTS).

MTS 2001-2005:

‘The Statute provides that the Agency shall act in accordance with United Nations policies furthering the establishment of safeguarded nuclear disarmament. For the Agency this implies promoting nuclear disarmament and furthering the universal application of safeguards’
1. The IAEA: Strategy

However, the strategic focus has evolved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>Developing the Trilateral Initiative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Advising on the FM(C)T</td>
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<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>Implementing the Trilateral Initiative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>General ‘advice and assistance’</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012-2017</td>
<td>Must remain ‘ready to assist’ with verification tasks under nuclear disarmament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. The IAEA: Strategy

IAEA Sub-programme 4.2 – ‘Other Verification Activities’:

Project 4.2.001: Verification activities in DPRK
- State evaluation report for DPRK
- Plans to implement safeguards or other monitoring/verification measures under different scenarios

Project 4.2.002: Verification activities related to the PMDA
- Verification approaches
- Inspection procedures
- Activity reports
- Equipment requirements, etc.
1. The IAEA: Programmes

IAEA Sub-programme 4.1 – ‘Other Verification Activities’:

**Figure 3.1** Budget Allocations for ‘other verification activities’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Regular Budget Allocation (€ Thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017*</td>
<td>450</td>
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1. The IAEA: Questions

The IAEA will start considering the next medium term strategy in 2016. This raises questions:

• What should the IAEA do in the long term?

• Should it look beyond the DPRK and the PMDA?

• If so, how should it prepare to verify disarmament beyond these current projects?
2. Member State Views

A detailed picture of what IAEA member states think about the Agency’s role in verifying disarmament
2. Member State Views: Survey
2. Member State Views: 
Survey

Methodology concerns:

• Ask the right questions

• Ask the right questions the right way

• Distribute these questions fairly and equally

• Offer anonymity

• Process results statistically
2. Member State Views: Survey

*Theme:* The scope of the IAEA’s role in verifying nuclear disarmament

*Questions:*
• Do you think the IAEA should verify nuclear disarmament?
• Which of these disarmament activities should the IAEA verify?
• What expertise should the IAEA maintain to verify disarmament?
• Should personnel from non-nuclear-weapon states verify nuclear weapon dismantlement?
2. Member State Views: Survey

Theme: The scope of the IAEA’s role

Chart 1: Which of the following disarmament steps do you consider that the IAEA should be involved in verifying?

- 2a. Application of safeguards to all non-sensitive forms of nuclear material in former nuclear-armed states?
- 2b. Decommissioning of enrichment and reprocessing facilities used in weapons production, or their conversion to non-military purposes?
- 2c. Decommissioning of warhead delivery systems, or their conversion to non-nuclear roles?
- 2d. Dismantlement of nuclear warheads and other nuclear explosive devices, and disposition (destruction/storage/recycling for other uses) of weapons-grade nuclear material in sensitive forms?
- 2e. Disposition of weapons-grade nuclear material in non-sensitive form?
- 2f. Cessation of nuclear weaponisation research and development and associated capabilities, including decommissioning, conversion or removal of facilities and non-nuclear items specifically involved in production of nuclear weapons?
2. Member State Views: Survey

Theme: Interest in the issues

Questions:
• Would your country like to participate in research and capacity building in these issues?
• What activities should the IAEA Secretariat and policy-making organs take to explore these issues?
• Would your country give political or other support to the IAEA’s capability to verify nuclear disarmament?
2. Member State Views: Survey

Theme: Interest in the issues

Chart 3 Would your country like to see one or more of the following steps addressing the potential role of the IAEA in disarmament verification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.a IAEA director-general report</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9.b Agenda item for the IAEA General Conference</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9.c Agenda item for the IAEA Board of Governors</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.d Referenced in the annual resolution on IAEA safeguards.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.e Dedicated resolution to be debated at an IAEA General Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.f IAEA ‘long-term plan’ specifying roles, capacity-building and resource requirements for nuclear disarmament verification.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
2. Member State Views: Survey

Theme: Additional disarmament verification options

Questions:
• Should nuclear disarmament be verified by intergovernmental organisations?

• If so, should a new international body dedicated to verifying disarmament be established?
2. Member State Views: Survey

Theme: Additional disarmament verification options

Chart 5: Does your country consider that a new international body dedicated to verifying nuclear disarmament should be established, outside the IAEA?

 RESPONSE

- No
- Not yet considered
- Under consideration

PERCENTAGE

Portion of respondents □ Extrapolation to NNWS members
2. Member State Views: Survey

Conclusions:

1. There is strong support among member states for a broad role for the IAEA in verifying future cases of nuclear disarmament.

2. Nearly all member states would feel it important to explore and engage with the IAEA’s role in verifying disarmament.

3. Opinion is split among members as to how to explore and engage on these issues.

➔ There is a demand for a more active and informed debate on the IAEA and nuclear disarmament.
3. Priming a Debate

‘This primer seeks to facilitate an informed debate [...] on the challenges and opportunities of multilateral verification of disarmament through the IAEA’
3. Priming a Debate: Features

✗ Comprehensive technical discussion
✓ Outline of activities and issues
✓ Case studies
✓ Charts
✓ Graphs
✓ Further reading
✓ Glossary
3. Priming a Debate: Structure

Section 2: Defining Disarmament

- Warhead dismantlement
- Fissile material disposition
- Stopping ‘weaponisation’
- Decommissioning facilities

Verifying the ongoing peaceful nuclear activities of a disarmed state
3. Priming a Debate: Structure

Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8: Discussing verification

1. What does this disarmament activity involve?
2. How might this be verified?
3. What case studies are there?
4. What issues are there for the IAEA?
5. Further reading
3. Priming a Debate: Structure

Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8: Discussing verification

1. How are fissile material production facilities decommissioned?
2. How might this be verified?
3. What case studies are there?
4. What issues are there for the IAEA?
5. Further reading
3. Priming a Debate: Structure

Section 3: Issues common to all disarmament activities

1. Legal issues: NPT commitments, forming agreements
2. Political issues: Securing IAEA involvement
3. Financial issues: Regular or extrabudgetary?
4. Personnel issues: What expertise is required?
5. Equipment issues: What new equipment might be needed?
3. Priming a Debate: Structure

Sections 10 & 11: Opportunities to explore these issues

Outside the IAEA:

• VERTIC project
• US-NTI International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification
• The UK-Norway Initiative

Inside the IAEA:

• Medium Term Strategy 2018-2023
• IAEA Programme and Budget
• The Board of Governors
• The General Conference