Engagement and Cooperation on IAEA Safeguards – Additional Protocol: VERTIC Initiative and Methods

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Summary

• VERTIC’s Project on the Additional Protocol and Safeguards

• The need for experience-sharing in safeguards implementation

• VERTIC’s safeguards database – a knowledge base on implementation approaches
Implementing IAEA Safeguards

- Nuclear Safeguards are an important international instrument, and are widely applied throughout the world. As of September 2014:
  - 181 States have brought a CSA into force;
  - 95 have operative SQPs;
  - 144 States have signed an AP, and 124 have brought one into force.
Implementing IAEA Safeguards

• Implementing Safeguards requires an understanding of several specific areas:
  – The content and obligations of safeguards agreements;
  – The kind of activities, materials and items that are covered by safeguards;
  – The kind of measures a country needs to take to identify, account for and report on the controlled materials and activities.

• It is also important that safeguards implementation is both effective and efficient, to avoid a waste of resources and efforts.
VERTIC’s Additional Protocol and Safeguards project

- VERTIC’s project focuses on raising awareness and building capacity in countries:
  - Research & analysis on implementation practices:
    - countries without AP (gap analysis);
    - countries that have already implemented AP (as examples);
  - In-Country Visits:
    - On invitation by governments only;
    - Awareness-raising and implementation assistance on Safeguards and AP
VERTIC’s Additional Protocol and Safeguards project

• VERTIC also offers similar assistance on other instruments:
  – Convention for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM);
  – International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT);
  – IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources;
  – UN Security Council Resolution 1540
National Approaches to Implementation

• Certain key provisions and arrangements are common to all states with safeguards agreements

• However: states adopt different approaches in implementing safeguards, based on different criteria:
  – Legal tradition;
  – National institutions;
  – Nuclear activities.

• Countries differ in their familiarity with safeguards instruments and capacity to engage with implementation:
  – Countries with less experience need to build a base of capacity before tackling the issue;
  – Even countries with significant experience need to review their processes and approaches
The Need for Experience-Sharing

• Building capacity can be a time- and resource-consuming process

• Knowledge-building and experience-sharing tools can **facilitate** this process as they work to:
  – **remove barriers** to knowledge;
  – **Increase** understanding of different approaches.

• This kind of tool can be useful for countries at various stages of the implementation process:
  – At the **start** of the ratification and implementation process;
  – As a country considers **revising** its own legislative framework;
  – As a country reviews its institutional practices to **improve** and **rationalize** an already-established system
Experience-Sharing to date

• Cross-fertilization and experience-sharing is common in many sectors

• Review of practices against international standards is important in many areas

• This is already going on in nuclear safeguards, through workshops and technical meetings

• VERTIC’s database tool will complement these activities by providing a single, comprehensive repository of knowledge
VERTIC’s Safeguards Database

An information resource on safeguards implementation which facilitates knowledge- and experience-sharing, by collecting information on various approaches to safeguards implementation in a flexible and searchable database.
Contents of the Database

• Country overview, including:
  • Geographical region;
  • General legal system and tradition;
  • Current and planned nuclear activities.

• Adaptation of Specific provisions in the CSA and AP:
  – Highlighting the way single provisions have been translated in the national legislative framework;
  – Including relevant legal references.
Contents of the Database

• Information on the organizational structure of safeguards regulators and on practical implementation aspects

• Overall description of implementation approach through narrative analysis, looking at evolution, practices and (when possible) underlying rationale.
Advantages of the database format: **Flexibility and Usability**

- Ability to generate tailored reports and result forms from information base;
- Different type of focus possible:
  - Overall information on country approaches;
  - In-depth analysis on the implementation of specific provisions, including by area (e.g. export controls, inspections, reporting);
  - Comparative analysis on implementation of selected provisions and areas across different countries.
- Ability to select countries with specific profiles to focus comparison
Concepts and Methodology

• Implementation information examined and categorized according to range of criteria:
  – *When*: identifying time-line of legislative implementation (e.g. before or after signature, EIF?)
  – *How*: identifying if provisions are implemented through
    • laws, regulations, or other instruments,
    • dedicated measures or use of other pre-existing measures?
  – *Who*: what institutions oversee or are involved
  – *Why*: what are underlying factors and rationale for the way a state has chosen to implement the AP and specific provisions?
Beneficiaries

• This tool is intended to help states and other stakeholders to share experiences, practices and lessons learned.

• It can help state officials directly involved in implementation:
  – Radiation protection and nuclear regulators;
  – Custom officials;
  – Legislators;
  – Diplomats.

• It can also be of assistance to institutions relevant to safeguards activities, but not involved in implementation:
  – Departments of energy, industry and mines;
  – Research and higher education;
  – Defence;
  – Public health officials.
Future perspectives:

• The database is currently under development, and its launch will be announced by VERTIC
• Criteria for external access to the database are being finalized
• The database is being designed with flexibility and future extension in mind.
• Initial prospects are being considered to extend additional areas:
  – Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security to create an integrated 3S Database
Thank you!

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