NPT

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Outline

• Treaty fundamentals
• Non-proliferation
• Peaceful uses
• Disarmament
• The review process
• Outliers
• Future
Treaty fundamentals
Obligations

- Article I: Nuclear weapon state undertaking.
- Article II: Non-nuclear weapon state undertaking.
- Article III: Verification.
- Article IV: Peaceful uses.
- Article V: Peaceful nuclear explosions.
- Article VI: Effective measures on disarmament.
- Article VII: Regional measures.
- Article VIII: Amendments and treaty review.
- Article IX: Signatures, ratification, accession and entry into force.
- Article X: Withdrawal, review and extension.
- Article XI: Authentic copies.
United Kingdom (1968)
United States and the Soviet Union (1970)
France and China (1992)
North Korea (1985)
North Korea (1993)
Often said:

The treaty has three pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful uses and nuclear disarmament.
I: Non-proliferation
II. Peaceful uses
Article IV debate

• “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” (Article IV.1)

• What does this mean?

• Article IV.2 calls for “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”

• Is this happening?
III: Disarmament
Stockpiles by weapons state

- **U.S.**: approximately 7,260 weapons
- **Russia**: approximately 7,500 weapons
- **All others**: approximately 1,000 weapons

Source: SIPRI
### Stockpiles and review cycles

#### No. 1
1968-1975

#### No. 2
1975-1980

#### No. 3
1980-1985

#### No. 4
1985-1990

#### No. 5
1990-1995

#### No. 6
1995-2000

#### No. 7
2000-2005

#### No. 8
2005-2010

#### No. 9
2010-2015

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**R² = 0.475**
Members and stockpiles (in k’s)
The review process
Articles I & II: What’s discussed?

• Review language usually centres on compliance, but often avoids pointing fingers.

• In most cases, fairly short statements emphasising the importance of states keeping to the treaty’s terms, and highlighting the severe consequences if they don’t.
Article III: What’s discussed?

- Usually notes the conclusion of safeguards agreements, and calls on members to conclude at the earliest opportunity.

- Often discusses the IAEA’s work to improve on the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. Lately this discussion has focussed on ‘state level approaches.’

- Sometimes discusses the financing and staffing of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

- Sometimes judges the merits of safeguards improvements or attempts to strengthen safeguards.

- From time to time touches on compliance and enforcement issues.

- Often discusses the application of safeguards in nuclear weapon states.

- References to nuclear transfers and supply arrangements.

- References to Nuclear Security and Illicit Trafficking
Article IV: What’s discussed?

- Rights and Obligations of Parties
- Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation and Development
- Sustainable Development
- Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection
- Attacks on Nuclear Facilities
- Safe Transportation of Radioactive Materials
- Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste
- Technical Cooperation and Assistance
- Supply Assurances
- Conversion of Nuclear Materials to Peaceful Purposes
- Multinational Fuel Cycle Arrangements
Article V: What’s no longer discussed?

- **1975** The members noted that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes ‘is still at the stage of development’, and so refrained from making further statements.

- **1985** Members recognise that there is no technical distinction between peaceful nuclear explosions and nuclear weapon tests. They note that ‘the potential benefits of nuclear explosions have not been demonstrated.’

- **1996** The conclusion of the CTBT means that any development of peaceful nuclear explosives would be contrary to that treaty. Since that time, Article V has been a dead clause.
Article VI: What’s discussed?

• Compliance
• Comprehensive Test Ban
• Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
• Anti-Ballistic Missiles
• Irreversibility
• Legality of Nuclear Weapons
• Nuclear Doctrine
• General and Complete Disarmament
• Unilateral Reductions
• Other Nuclear Weapon States
• Reports and Verification
Article VII: What’s discussed?

- Security Assurances
- Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
- Middle East
- South Asia
- East Asia
- South Africa (until the 1995 conference)
Article X: What’s discussed?

- Adherence
- Accession
- Definition of nuclear weapon state: “States not currently States parties may accede to the 85 Treaty only as non-nuclear weapon States”
Outliers
State parties to the NPT

As told by Wikipedia
South Sudan: New state with internal strife. Likely to ratify at some point.

Pakistan conducted its first weapons test in 1998.

India conducted its first test in 1974, and claimed it was peaceful. Conducted weapons test in 1998.

The D.P.R.K finally withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and detonated it’s first device in 2006.

Israel is believed to have nuclear weapons. Never tested one.

Pakistan conducted its first weapons test in 1998.
Future
What lies ahead?

• Expect continued, increasing, pressure on the nuclear weapon states to fulfil actual and perceived Article VI commitments as time goes on.

• Expect continued, and potentially troublesome, debate on universality - especially in regards to Israel, India and Pakistan.

• Conference management - 190 parties - will continue to be a headache.

• Expect a proliferation of related initiatives intended to demonstrate movement in all three pillars.

• Expect continued reluctance to substantially strengthen IAEA safeguards.

• However, unlikely that the treaty itself is in material danger for the next 4-5 review cycles.
Discussion