

Verification under duress: the case of UNSCOM

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WHEN THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION (UNSCOM) was created in 1991 most observers felt that the disarmament of Iraq would be completed in less than a year. Nine years later, however, UNSCOM no longer exists, the disarmament process is unfinished, and the future of the arms control regime is uncertain. Despite almost a decade of probing and inspections—including the identification and destruction of enormous, initially undeclared weapons of mass destruction (WMD) assets—UNSCOM was never able to declare Iraq effectively disarmed.¹ Surprisingly, the years of successful investigations and WMD destruction operations resulted in UNSCOM's elimination, rather than the end of the Iraqi WMD threat.

The history of UNSCOM is characterised by increasing investigative skill and intrusiveness in the face of constant Iraqi obstruction and dissemblance. The Commission started from scratch, with no personnel, corporate memory or experience. In a matter of months it was planning and conducting on-site inspections of chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile facilities. Most impressive was the fact that several of these early inspections managed to uncover significant Iraqi capabilities. As the disarmament regime progressed, and UNSCOM matured, the inspections became increasingly focused and proficient. Every advance by the Commission resulted in more evidence of Iraqi efforts to hide its full WMD capabilities. By the late 1990s, UNSCOM had developed sufficient investigative and inspection skills to prove repeatedly that Iraq was providing false declarations about its WMD programmes and failing to abide by the access requirements of the disarmament regime.

In the end it was politics, not arms control verification difficulties, which caused the Commission's demise. The inherent conflict between Iraq's consistent policy of retaining WMD and UNSCOM's increasingly effective investigation could only be solved by direct action in the Security Council. In stark contrast to the unanimity

of policy in 1991, the Council was no longer willing, or able, by the end of the 1990s to provide sufficient pressure to compel Iraq to comply.

Clear and conspicuous requirements (1991–93)

Soon after the end of the 1990–91 Gulf War, and as an integral part of the cease-fire agreement between the Coalition and Iraq, the Security Council created its first subsidiary body. UNSCOM began its operations with a clear, concise mandate: to eliminate Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile delivery systems.² In just a few months, Commission staff developed the plans, procedures, and resources needed to fulfil UNSCOM's mandate. With only a few exceptions the first two years of activity focused on developing operational capabilities, assessing Iraqi declarations, and creating the organisational infrastructure needed to conduct more intrusive, complex investigative tasks. Benefiting from existing international arms control experience, the Special Commission was able to field its first inspection in May 1991—one month after the creation of the disarmament regime. UNSCOM was initially not active in searching for undeclared capabilities: its early actions centred around known problems, of which there were many, rather than the more intangible search for 'hidden' items.

At first the Commission had a number of difficult, but obvious tasks. For the most part UNSCOM spent 1991–92 addressing admissions by Iraq of its WMD capabilities. Baghdad declared its primary chemical weapons (CW) factory, a huge 25-square kilometre facility, and a large stockpile of more than 46,000 filled chemical munitions and bulk agent.³ It also professed the existence of 62 ballistic missiles, 10 mobile launchers, and numerous related facilities and equipment.⁴ As part of these, and other declarations, Iraq provided data on a host of sites throughout the country. The declared WMD capabilities, all of the related sites, and many industrial/scientific aspects of the weapons programme required evaluation by the Commission. While it was soon clear that the Iraqi declarations were incomplete, the veracity of the information that was disclosed still had to be verified. There was also the complex and dangerous task of planning and executing the destruction of proscribed weapons and facilities.

Development of tools and techniques

Given its mandate and Iraq's initial declarations, the first duties of the Commission were clear. However, they were not easy. UNSCOM began its work with little more than a small executive office and 21 commissioners. The infrastructure and capabili-

ties that later inspectors would take for granted did not exist yet. In 1991 it had no staff experienced in 'anytime, anywhere' inspections, no maps, no secure communication systems, and no corporate knowledge of Iraqi industry and personnel. One important and surprisingly time-consuming requirement was the creation of health and safety procedures for the inspections.

In August 1991 the US provided the Special Commission with the services of a U-2 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft. By making over-flights of large tracts of Iraq, the U-2 was able to provide information not readily available to inspection teams on the ground. The aerial surveillance was used to support on-site inspection planning, industrial infrastructure monitoring, and the search for undeclared facilities. While Iraq constantly protested about the over-flights, the U-2 support effort continued with little interruption over the entire life of the Commission.⁵

In 1991 and 1992, UNSCOM developed low altitude aerial capabilities. In October 1991 Germany provided it with three CH-53 helicopters and a ground support unit. The helicopters were used to move inspectors and to offer logistic support until an Aerial Inspection Team (AIT) was created in summer 1992. The AIT provided overhead security at inspection sites and conducted aerial photography.⁶

Most of the new capabilities developed by the Commission involved the collection of data about Iraq's WMD capabilities and related infrastructure. An important technique was the solicitation of relevant information from supporting governments. In many cases, such governments possessed information that could facilitate the work of the Commission, such as supplier data or technical analysis. Early in its activities, UNSCOM worked to foster their trust and assistance. As the Commission proved its trustworthiness and capability to make use of sensitive information, the quantity and quality of externally provided data increased.

Most important, the Commission created and sustained a cadre of experienced and skilled investigators and inspectors. It maintained only a small headquarters staff; the majority of inspection team members were seconded, on request, by supporting governments. As inspection efforts progressed, UNSCOM developed a pool of experienced personnel who would form the nucleus of operations throughout the existence of the Commission.

Early crises

Most of UNSCOM's early efforts were directed towards obvious and relatively uncontentious tasks, but there were a number of important exceptions. These events, which pushed the envelope of verification procedures and broke new ground for

the Commission, caused the major diplomatic crises of 1991 and 1992. They also illuminated the true nature of Baghdad's post-war WMD policies and motivated the Commission to increase further the intrusiveness of its investigations.

In June 1991, acting on information provided by a supportive government, a nuclear inspection team tried to examine two facilities suspected of containing undeclared components of the Iraqi nuclear programme. In clear violation of the requirements of resolution 687, Iraq barred the inspectors from entering both sites. At the second facility inspectors witnessed loaded trucks fleeing from the back of the site.⁷ When they attempted to follow the convoy, Iraqi personnel fired at them. The Security Council eventually passed resolution 707, condemning Iraq's actions as 'a material breach' of the cease-fire.⁸ Iraq would later admit that the materials were components of its covert uranium enrichment programme.

Three months on, another nuclear inspection, also acting on external information, raided several facilities in Baghdad. The inspectors discovered documents proving the existence of 'a programme for developing implosion-type nuclear weapons'.⁹ At one site Iraqi personnel forcibly seized the discovered documents and refused to relinquish them. The next day, Iraqi personnel would not let the inspectors leave a different site until they returned other incriminating papers. The inspection team stood firm and was detained in a parking lot for several days.¹⁰ In direct contradiction of Iraqi declarations and statements made in early 1991, the inspections proved not only that Baghdad had a nuclear weapons programme, but that it also intended to keep WMD information secret.

By summer 1992 UNSCOM had conducted 40 on-site inspections. An increasing number of these missions attempted to address concerns about hidden weapons or related documents. For the most part the missions reported little evidence of such concealment. In July 1992 an inspection team specifically tasked with searching for a cache of hidden papers attempted to inspect a facility in Baghdad, which was later discovered to be the Ministry of Agriculture.¹¹ Iraqi personnel prevented the inspectors from entering the building and a three-week stand-off ensued. As government-orchestrated protests became increasingly threatening, inspectors were withdrawn to their hotels. When an inspection team was finally allowed into the building it found only empty rooms. Years later the Commission would learn that a large archive of materials from Iraqi WMD programmes had been stored there.

While most of these inspection conflicts did not yield material evidence of hidden Iraqi WMD assets, they raised significant concerns at UNSCOM headquarters

about Baghdad's intention to comply with the cease-fire's disarmament requirements. As early as October 1991 UNSCOM reported to the Security Council: 'The elements of misinformation, concealment, lack of cooperation and violation of the privileges and immunities of the Special Commission and IAEA have not created any trust in Iraq's intentions. They have had a negative impact on relations with Iraq and have engendered an atmosphere of profound scepticism . . .'.¹² This atmosphere would colour the rest of the Commission's operations and investigations.

Development of OMV (1993–95)

A key part of the Commission's mandate was the long term monitoring of Iraq to ensure that it remained disarmed. In 1991, under resolution 715, the Security Council originally accepted the plans of UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV). But it was not until November 1993 that Iraq agreed to this requirement.

The implementation of OMV required the Commission to develop a host of capabilities and systems not previously needed. A dedicated support facility—the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC)—was created, equipped and staffed. Air samplers, monitoring cameras, and dual-use equipment inventory control tags were installed. To support the new effort, UNSCOM also brought in new personnel with backgrounds in industrial processes and academic research.¹³

The establishment of the OMV regime caused a significant drain on Commission resources. Nearly all personnel were thrown into the monitoring process, including facility evaluations, baseline inspections and data entry. In the two-and-a-half years prior to Iraq's acceptance of OMV, UNSCOM conducted 44 inspections. In the 10 months after the start of OMV, it carried out 29 inspections, all but five of which were strictly for OMV development.¹⁴ The creation of long-term monitoring led to an extended pause in UNSCOM's search for retained Iraqi WMD assets.

Revelations (July–October 1995)

As the implementation of OMV slowly became a standard part of Commission activities, the investigation of Iraq's WMD programmes took a remarkable set of turns in 1995.¹⁵ The loss of momentum in the proscribed programme investigations, the paucity of new information available to investigators, and continuing Iraqi intransigence all conspired to create a false sense of completion in early 1995. UNSCOM's leadership was becoming comfortable with the level of achievement

in the missile and chemical investigations. But investigation of the Iraqi biological programme was quite a different story.¹⁶

The biological weapons investigation

Since 1991, Iraq had steadfastly maintained that it had no offensive military biological weapons (BW) programme. Baghdad admitted that it had engaged in research of a military nature, but scaled-up production or weaponisation had not taken place—nor was it intended in the future.¹⁷ While UNSCOM's initial on-site inspections did not heighten concerns, they did not produce evidence to contradict directly Iraqi claims. However, the teams did gather important information on the nature, scale and scope of Iraq's biological industrial and research infrastructure. Following limited progress from 1992–94, by the beginning of 1995 the biological investigation had amassed significant evidence of an undeclared Iraqi BW programme.

The UNSCOM case indicating a concealed BW programme was based on three elements of information.¹⁸

- First, the Commission remained unconvinced as to the alleged peaceful purposes of the Al Hakam facility, southwest of Baghdad. Iraq had long argued that the site was intended for the production of animal feed and bio-pesticides. UNSCOM inspections, though, raised concerns about the military design and fortification of the site, the secrecy in which it had been constructed, and a number of technical features, all of which were unnecessary for peaceful applications.
- Second, UNSCOM had developed information from supporting governments, suppliers, and on-site inspections about Iraq's procurement and consumption of complex growth media—the material used to produce biological organisms. Iraq's media purchases were inconsistent with its declared peaceful projects.
- Third, UNSCOM had collected data about Iraq's acquisition of pathogenic organisms, operation of a large aerosol inhalation chamber, and the existence of filling machines and spray dryers in Iraq.

These elements, gathered from multiple Commission sources and crosschecked, were too convincing to be suppressed by Iraq.

On 1 July 1995, after four years of consistent denials, Iraq admitted to the production of significant amounts of BW agents. At a short meeting in Baghdad, Iraqi representatives admitted to the large-scale production of *Clostridium botulinum*

(essentially botulin toxin) and *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax). Iraq declared that this production had occurred at Al Hakam in 1989 and 1990. It continued to deny that the agent was loaded into weapons, however, and insisted that all BW stocks were unilaterally destroyed in October 1990.¹⁹

The chicken farm

In June 1995 the Commission had reported that it was content with Iraq's declarations of its chemical weapons and missile programmes.²⁰ The IAEA had much earlier come to a similar conclusion about Baghdad's nuclear efforts. UNSCOM's report that the outstanding chemical and missile issues were 'no longer significant' was much more part of a diplomatic arrangement with Baghdad than a strict technical assessment.²¹ Areas of inaccuracy and incomplete disclosure existed for both investigations. But in order to achieve a breakthrough in the biological investigation, the Executive Chairman, Rolf Ekéus, minimised the remaining concerns. While few in the Commission agreed with his subdued description, most were impressed by the resulting disclosure of Baghdad's BW programme.

Throughout early 1995, the Special Commission had pressed Iraq on its poorly explained VX nerve gas project and its efforts to indigenously produce ballistic missile engines (known as Project 1728). UNSCOM investigators were actively pursuing both issues, although sparse available data and consistent Iraqi denials had slowed progress significantly.

On 7 August 1995 General Hussein Kamal Hassan—a son-in-law of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, a senior figure in the Iraqi leadership, and the former head of Iraq's WMD programmes—fled Iraq for Jordan. While Hussein Kamal would eventually provide few details and little specific evidence to the Commission, his mere presence in Amman had a major impact on Baghdad's approach to disclosure of its WMD activities.²² Six days after Kamal's defection, Baghdad notified the Commission that he had been responsible for concealing information related to the country's WMD programmes.²³ Rolf Ekéus was asked to return to Iraq as soon as possible.

During three days of meetings in Baghdad, he was provided with new information about Iraq's biological and missile programmes, notably that the country had, in fact, loaded biological agents into aerial bombs and missile warheads. Iraq also revealed that its indigenous efforts to produce SCUD-type missiles had progressed much farther than had previously been disclosed.²⁴

The most amazing aspect of Ekéus' trip came on the last day, as the delegation was preparing to depart for Bahrain. Responding to an urgent request by Iraqi personnel, Ekéus' party visited a chicken farm about 35 kilometres south-east of Baghdad. According to a note by the UN Secretary-General: 'The Chairman and his team found, in a locked chicken house, numerous metal and wooden boxes which were packed with documentation, together with microfiches, computer diskettes, videotapes, photographs and prohibited hardware components'.²⁵ The documents contained about 680,000 pages of original Iraqi records from its chemical, nuclear and missile programmes. There was also a much smaller amount of material pertaining to its biological programme.

Throughout autumn 1995 the Commission translated and assessed the documents and conducted interview missions in Iraq. The inspectors discovered—to the horror of some and to the satisfaction of most—that Iraqi WMD programmes were much more advanced than the country had acknowledged. Iraq also declared a number of additional BW research and production facilities. The new information proved that Baghdad had concealed at least an active VX research and trial production effort.²⁶ Furthermore, the documents provided new data on CW munitions research and development, invalidating the 'material balance' of Iraq's chemical programme. The new information showed that Iraq was not content with regional delivery systems.²⁷ The inspectors found plans for a 3,000 km-range missile system—capable of reaching Europe. Included in the farm documents was evidence that Iraq had conducted clandestine missile research at least until 1993. Most problematic, Iraq admitted that its Project 1728, of long-standing Commission interest, had succeeded in producing SCUD-type missile engines.

Significant increase of intrusiveness (1995–98)

The August disclosures, and the collection of accompanying documents, provided the Commission with long sought after materials and raised concerns about how much might still be hidden. On-site inspections and other investigative techniques developed by UNSCOM during its early operations were fully developed by the end of 1995. The Commission routinely conducted facility searches, interviews, technical assessments, and seminar-style discussions with the Iraqis. These methods yielded significant new information between 1991 and 1995 and established a sound basis for analysing the new data provided by Iraq in 1995. By February 1996, however, Iraq's willingness to provide and to discuss new data waned.²⁸ The Commission,

therefore, was left with major unresolved weapon issues and a set of investigative tools that had failed to detect significant parts of the concealed WMD programmes.

In order to address this situation, UNSCOM embarked on a series of new investigations and developed more intrusive investigative techniques. To collect information still being concealed by Baghdad, the Special Commission established new approaches to interviews, on-site inspections, forensic sampling and analysis.

New investigative techniques

Beginning in early 1996, UNSCOM began to use its extensive rights and privileges in new ways. Following years of asking for documentary evidence and of searching for possible hidden documents, the Commission undertook operations that, in one case, seemed more like archaeology than arms control. In February 1996, it dispatched a team to the Muthanna State Establishment, Baghdad's primary CW research, production and weaponisation facility.²⁹ Over two weeks, a team of 26 inspectors excavated the remains of a number of structures, including CW research laboratories, quality control offices and production plants. The mission yielded more than 5,000 pages of records and some 80 pieces of CW munitions and related components.³⁰ The materials provided a valuable, uncensored view of the site's activities and helped to answer a number of questions about the timing and extent of Iraqi CW research and production.

The inspectors also placed increasing emphasis on interviews with Iraqi personnel, as a means of gathering data. Discussions with Iraqi counterparts had always been a part of the Commission's investigative process. With the revelations of 1995 and the increasingly focused areas of UNSCOM interest, inspection teams were increasingly able to request specific Iraqi personnel by name, rather than extending a blanket invitation to anyone who could address a given issue or to personnel already named by Iraq. The ability to question specific individuals was combined with an improved understanding of how to conduct interviews, providing a robust and effective means to collect information—even data that Iraq was not disposed to release. The strengths of the interview process, used by all the investigations, also caused significant political problems. In one instance Iraq refused to co-operate with a biological inspection interview team.³¹ Baghdad would not provide it with named individuals or accept UNSCOM's interview modalities.

Another lingering area of Commission concern was the verification of Iraq's declared unilateral destruction of proscribed items in summer 1991. In many cases,

Baghdad provided inspectors with piles of debris as evidence of its claims. For example, Iraq declared that it had unilaterally destroyed hundreds of SCUD-type ballistic missile warheads by detonating explosives on top, burning them, and burying the remnants. A cursory examination of the metal fragments indicated that they were indeed warhead components, but a quantitative evaluation of the total number of warheads destroyed required the excavation of the entire burial site. From summer 1997 until the middle of 1998, UNSCOM teams surveyed these sites with ground-penetrating radar, magnetometers and other detectors to locate and retrieve all related materials. Final accounting revealed that some 50 warheads were missing.³²

Another new technique used to verify Iraqi declarations was the analysis of historical imagery from the U-2 aircraft and other sources. Once Iraq had declared specific locations and activities, UNSCOM photo interpreters and analysts, assisted by a supporting government, were able to retrieve relevant imagery. For example, Iraq declared that it had used about 10 trucks in 1991 to move WMD materials to a secret hide site near Tikrit. Historical imagery of the site, taken on the days in question, showed that more than 100 trucks had been used.³³

The concealment investigation

In addition to the many technical concerns raised by the 1995 revelations was the question of how Iraq had managed to conceal the documents and related materials from UNSCOM for four years. The Commission had long suspected that Iraq had a process for ensuring that hidden materials stayed hidden, a conjecture corroborated by information from supporting governments. The provenance of the chicken farm material, however, brought the concealment issue to the fore.

In 1996 the Commission began a series of inspections, interviews, and related investigations to uncover, understand and eliminate the 'Concealment Mechanism'. By the end of 1996 Iraq had admitted that concealment activities had taken place, but that only Hussein Kamal and several of his subordinates had been engaged in them. In late 1997, however, following 15 months of denials, Iraq acknowledged that elements of the Special Republican Guard (SRG) and Iraqi Intelligence Service were involved in the concealment of proscribed materials.³⁴

The Commission's investigation of the Concealment Mechanism focused in large measure on the organisations involved—those admitted by Iraq and those identified by UNSCOM. For more than two years, using 17 inspection missions, the

Commission investigated the central elements of Iraq's presidential and national security infrastructure. Inspection targets included the Iraqi Intelligence Service's headquarters, numerous SRG facilities, Special Security Organisation locations, and suspected concealment sites.

The concealment investigation caused near constant friction with Baghdad. Not only were the inspectors successfully delving into a topic that Iraq had long sought to keep secret, but they were also putting pressure on the very institutions used to maintain the security of Saddam's regime. In a bid to resolve the conflict between UNSCOM's lawful right to conduct its investigations, and its requirement to respect Iraq's legitimate security concerns, Rolf Ekéus, following a particularly heated series of stand-offs, issued, in June 1996, instructions governing the inspection of sensitive sites.³⁵ Access was to be limited to a four-person survey team; the team was to be accompanied by a senior Iraqi representative; the team would only survey documents and files; and it would endeavour to spend as little time on-site as possible.³⁶ Even these adjustments to UNSCOM's 'anytime anywhere' inspection rights—accepted by Iraq at the time—were not enough to secure Baghdad's full co-operation. Conflict over inspector access to sensitive sites continued up to and including UNSCOM's last mission in the country in December 1998.

Inevitable conflict (1997–98)

By 1998 UNSCOM's knowledge of Iraqi WMD programmes, as well as areas of uncertainty, were as developed as they would ever be. Based on seven years of inspections, hundreds of thousands of pages of Iraqi documents, hundreds of interviews, and all of the newly developed investigative techniques, Commission experts had verified much of Iraq's declarations. But they had also identified significant gaps.

The Special Commission's mandate to ensure Iraqi disarmament, its operational rights and privileges, and the investigative techniques it developed, combined to create a verification process that could not be misled. There was no longer a possibility that Iraq could—through dissemblance and subterfuge—achieve a clean bill of health from UNSCOM.

Confronting the Commission's strong investigative stand was an unrepentant Iraq. In 1991 Baghdad's policy was to retain as much of its WMD capabilities as possible, yielding only that which was absolutely necessary.³⁷ During the 1990s UNSCOM was able to chip away at Iraq's concealed WMD capabilities, although the fundamental policy in Baghdad never changed.

When UNSCOM and Iraq found themselves at an impasse, both turned to the Security Council for relief. The latter body had established the cease-fire, created the Special Commission, provided it with a clear mandate and given it appropriate rights of inspection and investigation. UNSCOM looked to the Council for enforcement, either through additional sanctions or military action. For its part, Iraq believed that the Council of 1998 was very different from the body that had created the disarmament regime. Baghdad realised that several members of the Security Council had no interest in enforcing compliance. It was also clear that, given the comprehensive sanctions already in place, there was little else the Council could do short of military action.

The disarmament regime experienced a series of challenges between November 1997, when Baghdad ejected all US nationals working for the Commission, and October 1998, when Iraq announced that it would stop or cease all UNSCOM activities, including monitoring. The Security Council found itself unable, or unwilling, to react effectively to Iraqi non-compliance. The international political environment needed to compel Iraqi compliance had long since vanished.

When UNSCOM conducted its final mission in December 1998 it encountered all the same problems and acts of non-compliance incurred by many inspection teams. The inspectors found rooms sanitised, access was restricted, and questions were not answered. This time, however, the result was unilateral military action by two permanent members of the Security Council: the US and the UK. Following the attacks, Baghdad stated that Commission inspectors would never again be allowed to enter the country.

Conclusion

In December 1999, after a year of debate among Security Council members, UNSCOM was disbanded and a new organisation was created to oversee the elimination of the Iraqi WMD threat. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was established by Security Council resolution 1284. The political environment in which it will start its work is quite different to that in which UNSCOM started its work. The autonomy granted to the Special Commission no longer exists, and UNMOVIC will be forced to operate in a political arena where every decision is second-guessed and many 'supporters', including several members of the Security Council and some high-level UN officials, apparently have no desire to see the spirit of the mandate satisfied. Given that Iraq's basic

policy towards WMD has probably not changed, and given the extensive understanding of the Iraqi WMD programme and its suspected hidden components that UNMOVIC has inherited from UNSCOM, it will be interesting to see what part of the fundamental stand-off reached in 1998 changes.

UNSCOM was a watershed experience for arms control. It was certainly coercive disarmament, but it used all of the tools of cooperative arms control verification. The Commission's investigative efforts showed that verification has become a mature science. It was also a valuable test-bed for new arms control verification methods. All of the tools and techniques needed to verify effectively arms control declarations are now available to co-operative disarmament regimes, if negotiators have the political will to use them. It is no longer an issue of determining non-compliance, but, rather, what to do after such a finding has been made.

The wider political and diplomatic experiences of the Iraqi case show that the sticking point of arms control may now be enforcement of regimes. What actions must governments and international organisations take to ensure the maintenance of disarmament regimes in the face of known or suspected non-compliance? The international bodies charged with implementation of arms control agreements must view their operations in terms of the entire disarmament regime, including enforcement. This will require that they risk a level of participation in global politics that most have assiduously avoided. If international organisations want to be regarded as more than paperwork generators and financial 'sinkholes' they will need to take on the ethical burden of their responsibilities, not just the legal mechanics.

Finally, and most important, states parties to arms control regimes must understand the need for continued active involvement. The tasks cannot simply be turned over to an international bureaucracy with no compulsive power and no direct security concerns of its own.

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Endnotes

¹ The full text of all UNSCOM reports to the Security Council and relevant Council resolutions can be found at www.un.org. The site also includes a collection of photographs and other basic information.

² While the International Atomic Energy Agency was tasked with investigating Iraq's nuclear programme, the Special Commission was the senior partner in the overall disarmament regime. The Commission designated sites for inspection, provided logistic support to all inspections, and held pride of place in political and diplomatic interactions.

³ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/23165, 25 October 1991.

⁴ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/23165, 25 October 1991.

⁵ 'Letter Dated 6 August 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General', UN document S/22899, 6 August 1991; 'Letter Dated 13 August from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General', UN document S/22939, 14 August 1991; and 'Letter Dated 11 January 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General', UN document S/25093, 14 January 1993. These are just three examples, but they capture the general content of the numerous protests.

⁶ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/23165, 25 October 1991; and 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/24984, 17 December 1992. The CH-53s were later replaced by five UH-1s, provided by Chile.

⁷ 'Letter Dated 26 June 1991 From the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN document S/22739, 26 June 1991; and 'Letter Dated 28 June 1991 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN document S/22743, 28 June 1991.

⁸ Security Council resolution 707 (1991).

⁹ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/23122, 8 October 1991 (Report of the 6th IAEA inspection team).

¹⁰ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/23122, 8 October 1991 (Report of the 6th IAEA inspection team).

¹¹ 'Note by the President of the Security Council', UN document S/24240, 6 July 1992; and 'Letter Dated 27 June 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN document S/24443, 14 August 1992.

¹² 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/23165, 25 October 1991; and 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/24984, 17 December 1992.

¹³ 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special Commission's Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)', UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

¹⁴ 'Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special Commission's Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq's Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)', UN document S/1994/1138, 7 October 1994.

¹⁵ Stephen Black, 'UNSCOM Activities in 1995', in John B. Poole and Richard Guthrie (eds.), *Verification 1996: Arms Control, Peacekeeping and the Environment*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996.

¹⁶ See Stephen Black, 'UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control', *Politics and the Life Sciences*, vol. 18, no. 1, March 1999.

¹⁷ Iraq told the first biological inspection team that it had conducted biological research for military defensive and offensive purposes. It later retracted this statement, saying that it had only undertaken defensive BW research.

¹⁸ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/494, 20 June 1995.

¹⁹ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/494, 20 June 1995.

²⁰ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/494, 20 June 1995.

²¹ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/494, 20 June 1995.

²² 'Further Comments on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction', CIA 404583, August 1995. See www.gulfink.mil.

²³ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

²⁴ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

²⁵ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

²⁶ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

²⁷ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/864, 11 October 1995.

²⁸ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/258, 11 April 1996.

²⁹ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/258, 11 April 1996.

³⁰ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/258, 11 April 1996.

³¹ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1995/848, 11 October 1996.

³² 'Letter Dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Slovenia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN document S/1999/94, 29 January 1999.

³³ 'Letter Dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Slovenia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN document S/1999/94, 29 January 1999.

³⁴ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1997/774, 6 October 1997.

³⁵ 'Note by the Secretary-General', UN document S/1996/848, 11 October 1996.

³⁶ 'Modalities for the Inspection of Sensitive Sites', unpublished UNSCOM document, 22 June 1996.

³⁷ 'Letter Dated 27 January 1999 from the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Slovenia to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council', UN document S/1999/94, 29 January 1999.