CONFIDENCE BUILDING MATTERS
The Birth of the Georgian State:
Giving Georgia a Second Chance

Dennis Sammut
October 1994
The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance

THE BIRTH OF THE GEORGIAN STATE: GIVING GEORGIA A SECOND CHANCE

ISBN: 0 9517485 9 9

Written by Dennis Sammut. Grateful thanks to Jonathan Aves, Tamara Draghde and Ghia Nodia.


VERTIC is a non-profit making organisation of scientists conducting research into the monitoring of arms control and environmental agreements, and sub-national conflicts.


VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION CENTRE
Carrara House, 20 Embankment Place, London WC2N 6NN
Tel: +44 (0)171 925 0867
Fax: +44 (0)171 925 0861
Email: vertic @ gn.apc.org

Contents

Conclusions and Recommendations .................................. 1
Introduction ...................................................................... 3
Three Civil Conflicts in Three Years ............................... 5
The South Ossetia Conflict ............................................. 5
The Abkhazian Conflict ................................................... 5
Civil turmoil in Georgia .................................................. 6
Russian Federation: Peacemaker or Troublemaker? .. 7
The Role of the CSCE ...................................................... 9
The Role of the United Nations: "CSCE First"
in Georgia Too ............................................................ 11
A Second Chance for Georgia ......................................... 12
Appendix A ...................................................................... 13
Appendix B ...................................................................... 14
Appendix C ...................................................................... 17
Appendix D ...................................................................... 22
Conclusions and Recommendations

Georgia has paid a high price for its mistakes and the mistakes of others. If all sides recognize their share of responsibility it may be possible to give Georgia a second chance.

We conclude the following:

• The problems in Abkhazia, in South Ossetia and in the rest of Georgia are interlinked. They must be tackled as part of one overall strategy and not in isolation.
• The CSCE cannot take a back seat in any part of this issue.
• The CSCE should contribute towards the development of civil society in Georgia.
• The international community should assist Georgia to rebuild its economy.
• The separation of duties between the UN and the CSCE in Georgia has not worked well.
• The United Nations should allow the CSCE the primary role.

We recommend the following confidence-building measures:

• Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by an international treaty to which neighbouring states and other interested parties would subscribe.
• Georgia must guarantee that it will not pose a threat to the security interests of any of its neighbours.
• Russia should put its peace-keeping effort under the scrutiny of the CSCE Mission.
• There must be a clear separation of the peace-keeping forces, command and operational capability, from that of the Trans-Caucasian Military district.
• The presence of Russian Transcaucasian Forces should be subject to an international regime and should eventually be withdrawn.
• Russia should declare unequivocally non-interference in Georgia’s internal affairs.
• A new Georgian constitution should provide solid guarantees for individual and minority rights.
• The CSCE should engage itself in a process of national reconciliation and should promote a series of civilian confidence-building measures.
The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance

Introduction

The latest attempt at creating the Georgian state has been bloody and, so far, largely unsuccessful. History appears to be repeating itself. Georgians pride themselves on the fact that the first Georgian state was established in the 4th century BC by Alexander the Great. Christianity became the state religion in the 4th century AD and national mythology is based on the idea of Georgia defending Christianity against constant pressure from southern Moslem invaders. The reality is rather less consistent. From the 6th century onwards, Georgia enjoyed only short periods of independence. It was conquered by the Mongols in the 12th century and later divided into small principalities and statelets under overall Ottoman or Iranian suzerainty. Eventually, in stages throughout the 19th century, Georgia was conquered by Czarist Russia.

Following the Bolshevik revolution, Georgia became an independent state for three years between 1918-21. It was invaded by Bolshevik troops in 1921 and incorporated into the Soviet Union. As part of the Soviet Union, Georgia played an unusual role in USSR politics. It produced leaders like Stalin and Beria and later Sheverndaze. Georgians were good at working the Soviet system, both in their own republic and in Moscow. They maintained their national identity despite the repression of the Soviet state, particularly severe in Georgia during the Stalinist era.

For this reason, Georgians celebrate their break with the Soviet Union yet maintain a sense of nostalgia for the Soviet era when food and drink were abundant and Georgian networks bypassed the rigid Soviet bureaucracy making life easier and more pleasant than in the other Soviet Republics. This did not stop Georgian nationalists from being amongst the first to take the opportunity of the openness of the glasnost policy of Mikhail Gorbachev and agitate for Georgian independence. 1988 and 1989 were marked by a massive wave of nationalist euphoria and political turmoil leading to independence in April 1991 and the election of Zviad Gamsakhurda as President. Gamsakhurda’s rule was short-lived and marked by an authoritarian style leadership. Within months of being elected president Gamsakhurda was besieged by elements of the Georgian National Guard within his own Parliament building and eventually forced into exile until his recent death. Thus whilst the process leading towards independence was turbulent, but largely peaceful, the building of the state was violent from the outset.

In the past three years Georgians have learnt the hard way that creating a Georgia was not simply having a national flag and anthem. The creation of state structures, the development of civil society, the acceptance of the rule of the law and the guarantees of basic freedom to all citizens take much longer and in the end mean much more than nationalist paraphernalia. In the absence of all these prerequisites, violence became the supreme arbiter and Georgians plunged into it with fervour. In the immediate post-independence period, Georgian political structures were a mix of the western democratic model (elections, political parties, parliament) and the traditional Caucasian tradition (the charismatic leader with his armed band) The objective was political gain, but political gain was achieved through military might.

In this sense therefore, Georgia was, in this period, no different from Lebanon or Somalia. As in these countries, the Kalashnikov became the status symbol of the dissatisfied male youth who, having no car or clothes or hi-fi equipment to show off as his contemporaries in more affluent societies, found the gun gave him status with friends.
and family. In 1990, young Georgian men stopped answering draft calls to the Soviet Army and instead signed up with the Georgian National Guard and other semi-legal paramilitary groups that sprang up, ostensibly to defend the territorial integrity of Georgia, but which acted more as private armies. Thus, political battles which should have been fought on political terms ended up as military confrontations. A vicious cycle of violence started that has for all intents and purposes, destroyed the Georgian State before it has been properly established, and has given ample opportunity for outsiders with a vested interest to exploit the situation for their own benefit.

In March 1992, Edward Sheverdnadze, former leader of the Georgian Communist Party and the Soviet Foreign Minister who helped bring the Cold War to an end, was invited by a wide spectrum of political forces to return to Georgia and lead the country back from the precipice of chaos into which it was fast descending. Sheverdnadze has had a difficult task — not least because of the high expectations of Georgians — but he has also had to deal with a number of armed groups which, whilst threatening the central government, were often its only tool in the various conflicts. Ironically it was Georgia’s humiliating military defeats, widely attributed to the incompetence of the militias and their leaders, that finally rid Sheverdnadze of the influence they exercised over his administration. In the aftermath of the debacle in Abkhazia, Sheverdnadze established the Union of Georgia Citizens as a political grouping which could give political support to his ideas. The Union controls a majority in Parliament since many groups and individual members have joined the platform.
Three Civil Conflicts in Three Years

The South Ossetia Conflict

The Ossetians are of Persian origin and are descendants of the Alanian and Scythian tribes that migrated to the Caucasus in the Middle Ages. Although, Ossetia became part of Russia in 1774 after the defeat of Turkey, the area continued to be in turmoil throughout the 19th century. In 1905 the Ossetians were grouped together into one national district, Vladikazak. In the early years of the Soviet Union the Caucasian region was subject to numerous constitutional and border adjustments. By the end of the Second World War most Ossetians (around 300,000) were living in the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia, which was part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. A further 160,000 Ossetians were living in Georgia, then also a Republic of the USSR. Less than half of the Georgian Ossetians lived in the South Ossetia Autonomous Region, where by 1989 they constituted 66% of the population.

By the end of the 1980s, as a result of the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union and the increasing rhetoric of Georgian Nationalism, South Ossetia started calling to break away from Georgia and join the Russian Federation, or more accurately the North Ossetian Republic, which was part of the Russian Federation. This call started taking substance in September 1990 when the region’s council practically declared secession from Georgia.

In December 1990, the Georgian Supreme Soviet voted to abolish South Ossetia’s special administrative status within Georgia, deploying the Georgian National Guard in the region’s capital Tskhinvali and other parts of the territory. The National Guard was a motley force that imposed Georgian rule over the territory at the cost of grave human rights abuses. On 7th December 1991 South Ossetia declared its independence and elected Torez Kulumbegov as Chairman of its Parliament (President). Despite attempts by Georgia to re-impose its control on the territory, the increasing turmoil in Tbilisi, together with both overt support of North Ossetia and covert support of the Russian military to the South Ossetians resulted in the practical exclusion of Georgian Forces from South Ossetia. The intense fighting also resulted in thousands of deaths and the movement of tens of thousands of displaced persons.

On 24 June 1992, a cease fire was signed in Sochi between the leaders of Russia and Georgia. The agreement provides for a peacekeeping force from the Commonwealth of Independent States, for the setting up of a special control commission and joint Georgia-Ossetian-CIS patrols in the territory. This agreement, and the subsequent deployment of the Russian army has guaranteed a de facto cease fire. It has also for all intent and purposes, separated South Ossetia from Georgia, despite the fact that it remain legally a part of the Georgian State.

The Abkhazian Conflict

Like the conflict in South Ossetia, the conflict in Abkhazia, although often articulated in ethnic terms, can be attributed more to the confusion reigning in Georgia on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakness of the new Georgian Republic. The conflict also has its roots in the arbitrary creation and recreation of constitutional entities in the first years of the USSR. An autonomous region of Abkhazia was created.
Abkhazians are 17% of the population of Abkhazia

after the territory came under communist rule. In the reorganisation of 1936, Abkhazia became an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. The Abkhaz are a Caucasian people, predominantly Muslim and inhabitants of the region for many centuries. Their numbers however are small. So small in fact that in the Second World War Stalin exempted Abkhazians from serving in the USSR Armed Forces for fear that they might become totally extinct. According to Georgians, this exemption was an incentive for other people to declare themselves Abkhazs thus artificially swelling their numbers. In spite of this however, by 1989 they constituted only around 17% of the population of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic.

1992 Abkhazian declaration of independence

There is no doubt that Abkhazians were alarmed by the chauvinistic expressions of Georgian nationalism that gripped the country immediately before and after independence. A separatist movement emerged in 1989, and immediately came in conflict with the local Georgian population, which numerically was much stronger. Inter-ethnic violence intensified especially after the Abkhaz declared their independence from Georgia in August 1992. The Georgians deployed the semi-official Mhedrioni militia which is accused of gross human rights violations in the capital, Suhumi and other parts of Abkhazia, stimulating anti-Georgian feeling amongst the local population. In October 1992 the Abkhaz launched an offensive, taking over the town of Gagra and establishing a front just outside Suhumi.

Three ceasefires in twelve months

Over the next twelve months three ceasefires were negotiated and eventually broken. On 16 September 1993, the July cease fire was broken when Abkhaz forces started an assault on Ochamchira, and later on the same day they attacked Suhumi. After a ten day siege, Suhumi fell, humiliating the Georgians and resulting in an exodus of nearly 200,000 Georgians, who fled for their lives across hazardous mountain roads and paths. Many old and sick people, as well as children died in the exodus.

1994 Agreements

Negotiations in New York and Geneva, mainly under UN auspices, resulted in the signing of two documents in Moscow on 4 April 1994 by the representatives of Georgia and Abkhazia in the presence of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and witnessed by the UN Special Envoy Ambassador Eduard Brunner, by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Pastukhov and by the representative of the CSCE Ambassador Vincenzo Manno.

The documents were:

(a) a declaration on measure for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict;
(b) a quadrupartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons.

Many difficulties have subsequently been encountered in putting these agreements into effect.

Civil turmoil in Georgia

After his flight from Tbilisi in December 1991, President Gamsakhurdi sought refuge in the North Caucasian republic of Chechnya from where he launched an offensive against the new government in Tbilisi. Throughout 1993 large parts of Western Georgia came under the control of his forces which by September 1993, threatened to cut
Georgia in two. It was at this point that the Georgian Government decided to join the
Commonwealth of Independent States, leading to a "miraculous" comeback by
Georgian forces. Although it took some months for Gamsakhurdia's forces to be routed,
his eventual death practically brought an end to the armed rebellion, which has, like the
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, left its scars on Georgia and its people.

Russian Federation: Peacemaker or Troublemaker?

In the Caucasian Region, Russia is very much the former imperial power. Like other
empires it retains extensive interests in its former territories. Georgia is of particular
importance to Russia from a security and strategic viewpoint. The Russian Federation
maintains a large military presence in Georgia. Georgia is the headquarters of the
Russian Transcaucasian Forces. There are around 20,000 Russian troops stationed in
Georgia, as well as 3,000 troops in "peace-keeping" roles in Abkhazia. President
Gamsakhurdia had called for the withdrawal of the Russian troops. Under President
Sheverdnadze, the Georgians have stopped calling for the withdrawal of the troops, and
are seeking to enter into an agreement with Russia that would clearly outline the status
of these troops.

Russia is now pressing for a long term agreement that basically guarantees to them all
the rights that they had prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Georgian political
leaders, of different political persuasions, claim that the Russians intervened openly on
the side of the South Ossetians, and even more blatantly on the side of the Abkhaz in
their conflicts with the Georgian government forces. Some also claim that they were
behind the offensive of the forces of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in the Menghri region of
Western Georgia in 1993. Most independent observers agree that the Russian forces
were not innocent onlookers in the conflicts. Privately, even Russian officials confirm
that there was a degree of Russian involvement, but blame it on independent-minded
generals in the Trans-Caucasian Military district. However, the military humiliation of
the Georgian State, and its subsequent crawl to membership of the Commonwealth of
Independent States, has fitted perfectly into Russian political and strategic interests in
the region.

This puts a big question mark on the role of Russia as a peace-maker and a peace-
keeper in Georgia. Despite the readiness of the Georgian government to take a
pragmatic view of the situation and to accept reality for what it is, the Georgian people
are finding it hard to stomach the fact that the forces that were behind their defeats are
now back as peace-keepers. This in itself is likely to be a cause of instability in the
country in the future. Russia has received the endorsement of the United Nations for its
peace-keeping role in Georgia. It now also seeks the political and material support of the
CSCE for its operation.

If Russia wants the moral high ground in the Georgian situation, it must pay the price
for it. The international community may not have the desire nor the ability to limit
Russian interests in the Caucasus, but neither should it simply endorse Russian action
unreservedly.
The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance

If Russia now genuinely wants to restore peace and stability on its Georgian doorstep, it should be encouraged to take certain concrete steps, that should include:

- transparency of peace-keeping operations in Georgia by putting its peace-keeping effort under the scrutiny of the CSCE Mission;
- a clear separation of the peace-keeping forces, command and operational capability, from that of the Trans-Caucasian Military district;
- recognition of Georgia's independence and territorial integrity, as well as the right to pursue an independent foreign policy and a willingness to enter into an international agreement recognising this status;
- declaring unequivocally non-interference in Georgia's internal affairs.

On its part, there has to be a recognition on the Georgian side of the security interests of Russia and an understanding that Georgia will not prejudice these interests. However, similar guarantees also have to be offered to other neighbouring countries. Such agreements and declarations are important confidence-building measures that will contribute to peace and stability in the region.
The Role of the CSCE

The CSCE council of Ministers agreed to admit Georgia as a member State of the CSCE on 24 March 1992. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers the previous January, it was agreed to establish a CSCE Rapporteur Mission to Georgia. The mission led by former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens visited Georgia from 17 to 22 May 1992.

With the benefit of hindsight, one could say that this mission failed to appreciate the urgency and seriousness of the situation, as well as the complexity of the Georgian situation. Although the CSCE was less equipped then than it is now to deal with such a situation, one cannot but note that there was little sense of urgency in the report of the CSCE mission to indicate what was to unfold in subsequent months. This flaw may have resulted from the nature of the mission's mandate, which was "to report to the participating States on the progress in the Republic of Georgia towards full implementation of CSCE commitments and provide assistance toward that objective", and from the narrow interpretation that the mission gave to this mandate. The mission subsequently made no recommendations to the CSCE as to how to deal with the situation in Georgia.

The situation seriously deteriorated in the period immediately after the visit of the fact-finding mission, leading to a decision of the 17th Committee of Senior Officials taken on 6th November 1992 to establish a long-term CSCE mission to Georgia. The mission started work on 3rd December 1992. According to the modalities of the mission, as approved by the 18th Committee of Senior Officials in December 1992, the objective of the mission was "to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia which are aimed at reaching a peaceful political settlement." In practice, the mission concentrated on the conflict in South Ossetia. It has helped to facilitate a dialogue between the authorities in Tbilisi and the South Ossetian authorities in Tskhinvalli.

However, the mission failed to achieve a major breakthrough in the situation. An international dimension was introduced to the effort to achieve a permanent solution to the conflict. The objective to establish a permanent presence in Tskhinvali has failed, ostensibly because the South Ossetian authorities could not guarantee the safety of the mission. Again with the benefit of hindsight, it may be possible to conclude that the mission may have been boxed in by the mandate given to it by the Committee of Senior Officials and by the targets that it set for itself, once established on the ground.

Whilst initially welcomed with great expectations by the Georgians, the mission was in its first years a disappointment to the Georgian government. This is perhaps due to unrealistic levels of expectations of what the mission could achieve. The CSCE is however not blameless either. The mission may have been too eager to promote the CSCE ideals and not eager enough to learn and understand the Georgian situation. This may have been due to the fact that members of the mission were attached to it for relatively short periods, and sent, without a proper briefing of either the complex Georgian situation, or the role the CSCE sought to play in it.

To its credit the CSCE seems to recognise these shortcomings and is taking steps to rectify them. The present Head of Mission Ambassador Hansjorg Eiff has brought a
new spell of life to the CSCE Mission in Georgia, and this fact is recognised and welcomed by all the parties concerned. This is due to the personality of Ambassador Eiff, as well as to the expanded mandate of the mission as decided by the CSCE Rome Council Meeting in December 1993.¹

The mandate now does not limit the mission to dealing with the South Ossetian conflict. This is of crucial importance, considering that all three conflicts in Georgia are interlinked, and have more to do with the process of State-building in Georgia than with ethnic problems.

The mission is currently engaged in the process of constitutional development in Georgia. It should also engage itself in a process of national reconciliation and should promote a series of civilian confidence-building measures aimed at achieving national reconciliation not only between the different communities in the Georgian State (Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhazs and others), but also within the majority Georgian population, where years of political instability have contributed to the fragmentation of society.

There is direct linkage between the strengthening of state and democratic institutions in Georgia and the willingness of the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to link themselves to that state. This is now well within the mandate of the mission, which states that the mission should: "promote respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, assist in the development of legal and democratic institutions and processes, provide advice on the elaboration of a new constitution, the implementation of a legislation on citizenship and the establishment of an independent judiciary, as well as monitoring elections". The Mission has already made an important contribution in developing a constitutional framework for South Ossetia. Here again it is clear that no real progress on this matter can be achieved until the situation in Abkhazia is clarified and the CSCE cannot therefore take a back seat in this issue. The problems in Abkhazia, in South Ossetia and in the rest of Georgia are interlinked. They must be tackled as part of one overall strategy and not in isolation.

¹. See Appendix B.
The Role of the United Nations: "CSCE First" in Georgia Too

The United Nations is also involved in Georgia, mainly with regards to the conflict in Abkhazia. Two UN fact-finding missions were sent in September and October 1992, after which in May 1993, the General Secretary, Boutros Boutros Ghali appointed as Special Envoy for Georgia the Swiss Ambassador, Eduard Brunner. Apart from a fact-finding role Ambassador Brunner is also entrusted with negotiating a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict as well as developing proposals for a peacekeeping operation. The United Nations opened an office in Tbilisi in November 1992. The current UN representative is Ivan Starcevic. The Security Council has issued various statements on the Abkhazian situation. In September 1992, October 1992 and January 1993, the statements called for the respect of the Moscow ceasefire agreement of 3 September 1992 and requested that the Secretary General send fact-finding missions on the battlefield. A fourth statement on 2 July 1993 called for the respect of the ceasefire agreement of 14 May 1993.

After the escalation of the conflict in Abkhazia the United Nations established a UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Many looked at this mission as preparing the way for a UN Peacekeeping operation in Georgia. On 3 May 1994 the General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali presented a report to the Security Council in which he outlined various options before the council for dealing with the Abkhaz situation. The long awaited UN peacekeeping mission in Georgia however, failed to materialise and instead, after months of inertia, the Council gave the green light for a Russian peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. The failure of the UN to take any decisive action in the political field contrasts sharply with the speed and effectiveness of its humanitarian effort, co-ordinated by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs with the participation of a number of UN agencies. The separation of duties between the UN and the CSCE in Georgia has not worked well.

This is mainly because it is really a single problem, albeit with many angles. The concept of CSCE FIRST should work in Georgia, as with other circumstances and the United Nations should recognise this fact and allow the CSCE the primary role in Abkhazia, as in South Ossetia.

---

2. See Appendix C
The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance

A Second Chance for Georgia

It is clear that Georgia missed its first chance to build a state for all its citizens at the end of the cold war period. This was due to the lack of experience of some of its leaders and the greed of others, and Georgia has paid a high price for its mistakes. On the other hand, Russia not only did not help at crucial times, but in part contributed to the problem that would eventually return Russia to Georgia as a saviour. The international community is not without blame either. It failed to anticipate the problems, and when they occurred it responded neither quickly nor decisively enough to deal with them. Western countries may have exacerbated the problem by sending misleading signals to Georgia that the West was ready to stand by it in its hour of need. But Western help never materialised.

If all sides recognise their share of responsibility it may be possible to give Georgia a second chance. Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by an international treaty to which neighbouring states and other interested parties would subscribe. For its part, Georgia must guarantee that it will not pose a threat to the security interests of any of its neighbours. The presence of Russian Transcaucasian Forces should therefore be subject to the sort of international regime anticipated under various CSCE agreements and mechanisms, and should eventually be withdrawn.

The International community should assist Georgia to rebuild its economy. This issue is closely linked to the desire for harmony amongst ethnic groups in the country. The CSCE should contribute towards the development of civil society in Georgia, particularly the healing process after three civil wars in three years. Here the role of young people is essential. Georgian youth bore the brunt of the conflict, suffering casualties in war, and deprived of a peaceful future, they are eager for a return to normality. They are therefore at the forefront of civil society and the quest for national dialogue and reconciliation. The recent establishment of the National Council of Georgian Youth Organisations as a non-governmental forum for young people of different political and ethnic backgrounds to come together and deal with common problems symbolises a new era in Georgian politics. The new Georgian constitution should provide solid guarantees for individual and minority rights. This is an essential prerequisite not only for the reintegration of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian State system, but also to avoid conflict with Georgia’s other minority groups and communities, such as the Armenian, the Azeri and the Adjarian communities. Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must also be guaranteed, otherwise the wrong message could very easily be sent to those countries that are prone to meddling in the affairs of their neighbours. If this occurs many ethnic problems can soon become ethnic conflicts.
Appendix A.
Some basic geographical data on Georgia

The Republic of Georgia lies on the southern foothills of the Greater Caucasus Mountain range. It covers an area of 27,000 sq. miles (70,000 sq. kms) and according to the last census (1989) has a population of 5,443,359. As a union member of the former USSR, Georgia was known as the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, which included two autonomous republics, Abkhazia and Adzharia and The Autonomous Region of South Ossetia.

Georgians constitute 70.1% of the population. The other ethnic groups are Armenians (8.1%), Russians (6.3%), Azerbaijanis (5.7%), Ossetians (3%), Greeks (1.8%), Abkhazians (1.8%), Ukrainians (1%), Kurds (1%), Jews (Georgian) (0.3%), Jews (Ashkenazi) (0.2%), White Russians (0.2%), Assyrians (0.2%) and Tatars (0.1%).

The Georgian language is one of the world's most ancient and is of a non Indo European origin. Georgians are mainly Orthodox Christians and have a great sense of pride in the history and traditions of their country.

South Ossetia has an area of 3,900 sq. km and a population of 99,000, two thirds of which are Ossetians. Before the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia around 100,000 Ossetians lived in the other parts of Georgia. The republic of North Ossetia is an autonomous republic in the Russian Federation were a further 300,000 Ossetians live.

Abkhazia has an area of 8,600 sq. km and a population of 525,061, of which only 17.8% were Abkhaz. The major ethnic group in Abkhazia were the Georgians (45.7%). Other ethnic groups included Armenians (14.6%), Russians (14.2%) and Greeks (2.8%). The Abkhazians are Muslims. The ethnic composition of Abkhazia may have changed considerably as a result of the conflict.

Adzharia has an area 3,000 sq. km and has a population of 382,000. Although ethnically Georgian (80.1%) the Adzharians are mainly Moslems.
Appendix B.
CSCE Mission to Georgia

1. Basic decisions

Modalities 18th CSO meeting, 13 December 1992, Journal No 3, Annex 1 (3)

2. Deployment

The Mission started to work on 3 December 1992. The MOU with the Georgian Government was signed on 23 January 1993, the MOU with the "Leadership of the Republic of South Ossetia" was agreed by an exchange of letters on 1 March 1993.

3. Tasks

According to the original Modalities and Financial implications approved by the CSO in December 1992, the objective of the Mission was "to promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia which are aimed at reaching a peaceful political settlement".

At the 14th meeting of the Permanent Committee on 29 March 1994\(^4\), new Modalities were decided for an expanded CSCE Mission to Georgia, based on recommendations submitted by the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office in accordance with the decisions of the Rome Council, which provided for a strengthening of the Mission. The original objective was complemented by a series of new objectives, namely to "promote respect for human rights and assist in democratic institution building throughout the country; to monitor and promote free media principles; to facilitate cooperation with and among the parties concerned and, with their consent, to monitor the joint peacekeeping forces established under the Sochi Agreement of 24 June 1992, in order to assess whether their activities are carried out in conformity with CSCE principles, in particular those mentioned in chapter II, 3 of the Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting".

The above objectives for the expanded Mission are specified in a mandate consisting of the following points:

- In relation to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict:
  - facilitate the creation of a broader political framework, in which a political settlement can be achieved on the basis of CSCE principles and commitments;
  - intensify discussions with all parties to the conflict, including through the organisation of round tables, in order to identify and seek to eliminate sources of tension;
  - in pursuit of the monitoring role concerning the joint peacekeeping forces, establish appropriate forms of contact with the military commanders of the forces, gather information on the military situation, investigate violations of the

3. As adopted on a preliminary basis by the Consultative Committee on 23 November 1992.
4. Subject to a silence procedure which expired on 1 April 1994, at 12 noon, without an objection.
existing ceasefire and call local commanders' attention to possible political implications of specific military actions;
- be actively involved in the reconvened Joint Control Commission;
- establish contacts with local authorities and representatives of the population, maintain a visible CSCE presence throughout the area.

- In relation to the conflict in Georgia/Abkhazia:
  - promote respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, assist in the development of legal and democratic institutions and processes, provide advice on the elaboration of a new constitution, the implementation of a legislation on citizenship and the establishment of an independent judiciary as well as monitoring elections.

4. Duration

The original Modalities provided for an initial operating period of 3 months. With effect from 24 February 1993, the mandate was extended for 6 months at the 19th CSO meeting on 4 February, and for an additional period of 6 months at the 22nd CSO meeting on 30 June 1993, until 23 February 1994. At the 10th meeting of the Permanent Committee on 24 February 1994, the mandate was prolonged for an interim period until 4 March 1994. At the 25th meeting of the CSO on 3 March 1994, a decision on a prolongation until 30 June 1994 was reached. The new Modalities, decided at the 14th Permanent Committee meeting on 29 March, were valid until 30 September 1994. They were prolonged at the 34th meeting of the Permanent Committee on 22 September until 31 March 1995.

According to both MOUs, the Mission is established for an initial period of 3 months from the date of signature; extension of this period may be decided by participating States.

5. Composition and Location

Originally, the authorised strength of the Mission was 8 members (including the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office). The CSO approved an increase by 3 members at its 19th meeting on 4 February 1993. A human rights/legal expert and an administrative officer were included in the Mission by a decision of the 25th CSO meeting on 3 March 1994. The decision reached at the 14th Permanent Committee meeting on the new modalities provided for additional civilian and military personnel, bringing the total authorised strength up to 17.

The Mission is based in Tbilisi and will establish a permanent office in Tskhinvali soon. The present Head of Mission is Amb. Hansjörg Eiff, Germany.

6. Financial Implications.

- Budget I: Adopted on a preliminary basis by the Consultative Committee on 23 November 1992, final approval by the CSO on 13 December 1992, valid for a period of 3 months from 1 December 1992 to 28 February 1993 (ATS 3,000,000.–)

- Budget II: Adopted by the CSO Vienna Group on 11 February 1993, valid for a period of 6 months from 1 March to 31 August 1993 (ATS 3,988,000.–)
Budget III: Adopted by the CSO Vienna Group on 16 September 1993, valid for the period from 1 September to 31 December 1993 (ATS 2,812,000.—; actually billed ATS 812,000.— due to savings on the previous budget)

Budget IV: Adopted on 29 November 1993 at the 24th CSO meeting, valid from 1 January 1994 to 3 March 1994 (ATS 1,137,107.—)

Budget V: Adopted on 17 March 1994 at the 12th Permanent Committee meeting, valid from 4 March to 30 June 1994 (ATS 6,412,492.—)

Budget VI: Adopted on 14 April 1994 at the 15th Permanent Committee meeting, valid from 15 April to 30 September 1994 (ATS 9,745,010.—; after deduction of the operational costs already budgeted for this period in the previous budget)

Budget VII: Adopted on 29 September 1994 at the 35th Permanent Committee meeting, valid from 1 October to 31 December 1994 (ATS 5,674,414.—)
Appendix C. UN Security Council resolutions


RESOLUTION 934 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3398th meeting, on 30 June 1994

The Security Council,

Having considered the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 1994 (S/1994/725),

Recalling the letter of 16 June 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General (S/1994/714),

Noting the letter of 21 June 1994, from the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation to the Secretary-General (S/1994/732),

Noting that talks between the parties on a comprehensive political settlement will resume shortly and urging the parties to achieve substantive progress towards a political settlement consistent with the principals set out in its previous resolutions,

1. Welcomes the Secretary-General's report of 16 June 1994;

2. Notes with satisfaction the beginning of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) assistance in the zone of conflict, in response to the request of the parties, on the basis of the 14 May 1994 Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces (S/1994/583, Annex I), in continued coordination with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), and on the basis of further coordinating arrangements with UNOMIG to be agreed by the time of the Council's consideration of the Secretary-General's recommendations on the expansion of UNOMIG;

3. Decides to extend until 21 July 1994 the existing mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) at its current authorised strength, within which period the further expansion of UNOMIG as recommended in the Secretary-General's report of 6 June 1994 (S/1994/529/Add.1) will be addressed;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, in the light of the letter of 16 June 1994 from the President of the Security Council (S/1994/714), to report to the Council on the outcome of discussions between UNOMIG, the parties and the CIS peace-keeping force designed to reach an agreement on the arrangements which would exist on the ground for coordination between an expanded UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force;

5. Reaffirms its readiness to consider detailed recommendations on the expansion of UNOMIG along the lines of the ideas set out in paragraph 7 of the Secretary-General's report 6 June 1994;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION CENTRE
The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance


RESOLUTION 937 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3407th meeting, on 21 July 1994

The Security Council,
Recalling the letter of 16 June 1994 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General (S/1994/714),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 12 July 1994 (S/1994/818 and Add.1),

Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, and the right of all refugees and displaced persons affected by the conflict to return to their homes in secure conditions, in accordance with international law and as set out in the Quadripartite Agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons (S/1994/397, annex II), signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994,

Welcoming the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 (S/1994/583),

Recognizing the importance of consistent and full compliance with the Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict (S/1994/397, annex I) and the Quadripartite Agreement,

Stressing the crucial importance of progress in the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and with the assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with the participation of representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict, including on the political status of Abkhazia, respecting fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia, based on the principles set out in its previous resolutions

Stressing also that this progress would allow the Council to reconsider the possible establishment of a peace-keeping force in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, as proposed in the letter of 7 September 1993 from the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Georgia and of the Russian Federation to the Secretary-General (S/26478),

Stressing further the need to prevent any resumption of hostilities in the area,

Deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation, and the dangers which could arise within the region if the large numbers of refugees and displaced persons are not able to return to their homes in secure conditions,

and recognizing that the deployment of a CIS peace-keeping force to the area is predicated upon the request and consent of the parties to the conflict,

Noting the statements in the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to the Secretary-General of 21 June 1994 (S/1994/732, annex) concerning the mandate of the CIS peace-keeping force and its duration,

Noting with satisfaction the readiness of the Russian Federation to continue to inform the members of the Security Council on the activities of the CIS peace-keeping force,

Welcoming the closer cooperation and coordination envisaged between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE, in particular as regards their efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement in the Republic of Georgia,

Underlining the importance of the relevant provisions of the documents of the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE of 1992 (S/24370) and of the ministerial meeting of the CSCE held in Rome on 30 November and 1 December 1993 (S/26843), including those concerning peace-keeping activities in the CSCE area,

Noting the assurances given by the parties and the representatives of the CIS peace-keeping force concerning the full freedom of movement for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in the performance of its mandate, both within the zone of operations of the CIS peace-keeping force and in other relevant parts of the territory of the Republic of Georgia,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 12 July 1994;

2. Calls upon the parties to intensify their efforts to achieve an early and comprehensive political settlement under the auspices of the United Nations with the assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with the participation of representatives of the CSCE, and welcomes the wish of the parties to see the United Nations continue to be actively involved in the pursuit of a political settlement;

3. Commends the efforts of the members of the CIS directed towards the maintenance of a cease-fire in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, and the promotion of the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in accordance with the Agreement signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 in full cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement;

4. Welcomes the contribution made by the Russian Federation, and indications of further contributions from other members of the CIS, of a peace-keeping force, in response to the request of the parties, pursuant to the 14 May Agreement, in coordination with UNOMIG on the basis of the arrangements described in the Secretary-General's report of 12 July 1994, and in accordance with the established principles and practices of the United Nations;

5. Decides to authorize the Secretary-General to increase the strength of UNOMIG, as required, up to 136 military observers with appropriate civilian support staff;

6. Decides also that the mandate of an expanded UNOMIG, based upon the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report, shall be as follows:
The Birth of the Georgian State: Giving Georgia a Second Chance

(a) To monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994.

(b) To observe the operation of the CIS peace-keeping force within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement.

(c) To verify, through observation and patrolling, that troops of the parties do not remain in or re-enter the security zone or the restricted weapons zone and that heavy military equipment does not remain or is not reintroduced in the security zone or the restricted weapons zone;

(d) To monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the security zone and the restricted weapons zone in cooperation with the CIS peace-keeping force as appropriate;

(e) To monitor the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori valley to places beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia;

(f) To patrol regularly the Kodori valley;

(g) To investigate, at the request of either party or the CIS peace-keeping force or on its own initiative, reported or alleged violations of the Agreement and to attempt to resolve or contribute to the resolution of such incidents;

(h) To report regularly to the Secretary-General within its mandate, in particular on the implementation of the Agreement, any violations and their investigations by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant developments;

(i) To maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CIS peace-keeping force and, by its presence in the area, to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons;

7. Notes to the Secretary-General's intentions to write to the Chairman of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS on the respective roles and responsibilities of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force and requests the Secretary-General to establish an appropriate arrangement to that effect, and requests the commanders of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force to conclude and implement the appropriate arrangements on the ground described in the Secretary-General's report of 12 July 1994 (S/1994/818) for coordination and cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force in the implementation of their respective tasks;

8. Calls upon the parties to the conflict to extend full support, necessary protection and freedom of movement to UNOMIG in the performance of its mandate both within the zone of operations of the CIS peace-keeping force and in other relevant parts of the territory of the Republic of Georgia for it to fulfil its mandate, and requests that a status of mission agreement with the Government of the Republic of Georgia and necessary arrangements with the Abkhaz authorities be concluded without delay;

9. Reaffirms its support for the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in secure conditions, in accordance with international law and as set out in the Quadripartite Agreement, calls upon the parties to honour the commitments they have already made in this regard and to accelerate the process as far as possible, and requests
UNHCR to give its full assistance to the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement on the return of refugees and displaced persons;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to establish a voluntary fund for contributions in support of the implementation of the Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 and/or for humanitarian aspects including demining, as specified by the donors, which will in particular facilitate the implementation of UNOMIG's mandate, and encourages Member States to contribute thereto;

11. Decides on this basis to extend the mandate of UNOMIG to 13 January 1995;

12. Requests also the Secretary-General to report within three months of the adoption of this resolution on the situation in Abkazia, Republic of Georgia, and on the implementation of all aspects of the above mentioned agreements;

13 Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Appendix D.
Georgia and surrounding region with ethnolinguistic groups

3Map courtesy of Document Expediting Project, Library of Congress, Washington DC, USA