CONFIDENCE BUILDING MATTERS
The CSCE, European Security and Verification
Considerations for Helsinki 1992

Patricia M Lewis and Owen Greene
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Patricia M. Lewis¹ and Owen Greene²

1. Introduction

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in Helsinki starting this March provides participants with a unique opportunity to review the volatile situation in parts of Europe such as Yugoslavia and strategies for the long term security in the wider Europe. The recent and sudden changes in the European and Eurasian map are not likely to stabilize for some while. In the process of stabilization there are many potential dangers which could lead to violent conflict. This is particularly true in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and in parts of Eastern and Central Europe.

In this document we address the role that further verification measures could play in building confidence and security in Europe and reducing the risk of violent conflict through transparency and openness. We look at the verification structures which exist in Europe and evaluate the potential effectiveness of each.

This report takes the form of a background paper in which we make suggestions and proposals. A fuller report will be published within the near future.

2. Background

The history of the Helsinki process and the CSCE has been constructive and has led to many positive benefits. In terms of security-building in Europe, the landmarks are the 1986 Stockholm Accord, the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the 1990 Confidence- and Security-building measures (the Vienna Document) and the 1990 Charter of Paris.

¹ Patricia Lewis is the Director of the Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC) in London.
² Owen Greene is a member of VERTIC's Oversight and Advisory Committee and a Lecturer at the University of Bradford.
In each of these agreements it is the process of monitoring and verification which holds the key to building long term confidence in arms reductions and stabilizing measures.

★ The Stockholm Accord was a trend-setter in the arena of arms-control and confidence/security-building measures because of its cooperative verification measures.

◊ The cooperative verification measures consisted of observation of military exercises and on-site inspections to verify the data supplied by participating states.

◊ Since the 1986 agreement there have been 53 observable military exercises and 51 inspections (including the Vienna Document inspections – see below).

◊ To date, the states taking part in inspections have come entirely from NATO and the ex-WTO. Of these, the most active in terms of carrying out inspections and being inspected, has been the FSU.

◊ Observations of military exercises have however also involved states in the CSCE which are not from NATO or the ex-WTO.

◊ The Stockholm Accord process has contributed to reducing the number of large-scale military exercises in Europe – mainly through its contributions to tension reduction but also perhaps because of the bother and expense of notification, observations and inspections. The inspections themselves have increased cooperation and reduced suspicion between states.

★ The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE Treaty) is the most far-reaching arms reduction treaty to date.

◊ The area of application is the entire land territory of States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. This territory includes all European island territories including: Faroe Islands (Denmark), Svalbard (inc. Bear Island) (Norway), Azores and Madeira (Portugal), Canary (Spain), Franz Joseph Land and
Novaya Zemlya (USSR). Turkey includes territory north and west of a line from the intersection of the Turkish border and the 39th parallel to Muradiye, Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, Dogankent, Gözne and thence to the sea.

❖ This area is called the ATTU - the Atlantic to the Urals.

❖ The ATTU zone is divided into 4 sub-zones named 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 (named after the treaty article in which they are defined) and the Flank Zone (Article V).

❖ The current treaty signatories are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, FSU, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the USA.

❖ The countries which have ratified the treaty to date (3 March 1992) are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom and USA.

❖ The treaty limits numbers of conventional armaments in Europe in the following categories: Battle Tanks, Armoured Combat Vehicles (ACVs), Artillery, Combat Aircraft and Attack Helicopters.

❖ These armaments and pieces of equipment have numerical limits such that the two groups of states (NATO and ex-WTO) are in a state of parity with each other, ATTU-wide, and there are also limits for the different sub zones.

❖ The limits for each group of states per zone are as follows:
The verification regime consists of national technical means (NTM), multinational technical means (MTM) and inspections to declared and undeclared sites, to reduction facilities and to certification facilities (where the equipment is destroyed or converted).

Each state is technically able to participate in the on-site inspection activities but not many states possess or have direct access to the technologies such as satellites which comprise NTM/MTM.

Missing from the treaty and verification protocols is the use of aircraft for overflights to inspect territory. The treaty however commits the States to negotiating an aerial inspection regime in the follow-on talks, with a view to implementation when monitoring residual equipment levels. The Open Skies Regime is expected to be completed by the Helsinki CSCE Meeting 1992.

The 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures


The provisions include: 1) an annual exchange of military information covering command organization, numbers of weapons and personnel strength of land, air, air-defence and land-based naval aviation forces and covering plans for deployment of
major weapon and equipment systems and military budgets; 2) risk-reduction meetings; 3) exchange visits of senior military/defence personnel; 4) prior notification of specified military activities (manoeuvres with 13,000 troops or more, or 300 battle tanks or more, air-force participation with more than 200 aircraft sorties, amphibious or air assault involving at least 3000 troops); 5) observation of military activities (involving 17,000 or more troops (for amphibious/air assault, 5,000 troops); 6) annual calendars of manoeuvres; 7) two-year notice for activities involving more than 40,000 troops; 8) inspections (at least 3 per annum per state must be accepted).

♦ At the time of signing the Vienna Document there were 34 states participating in the CSCE process.

♦ There are now 48 states participating in the CSCE process.

★ The 1990 Paris Charter was an important document for European Security in at least two respects:

♦ First it affirmed the commitment of states to follow-on negotiations from the CFE Treaty and Vienna Documents and to the Open Skies negotiations.

♦ Second it set up the CSCE Secretariat in Prague and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna (see below for details).

♦ The document also dealt with issues of Human Rights Democracy and Law, Economic Liberty and Responsibility, Relations between Participating States, Security, Unity and the Relationship between CSCE and the rest of the World.

♦ The Charter also outlined guidelines for the future on human rights, security, economic cooperation, the environment, culture, migrant workers, the Mediterranean and non-governmental organizations. All of these impinge on military security and the
Charter sets the backdrop for the attitudes which CSCE states should be fostering for the future.

3. The purpose of Verification

- Verification is "... a process which establishes whether the States parties are complying with their obligations under an agreement. The process includes the collection of information relevant to obligations under arms limitation and disarmament agreements; analysis of the information; and reaching a judgement as to whether the specific terms of an agreement are being met." (A study of the role of the UN in verification, A/45/372, 28 August 1990 UN General Assembly)

- There is a difference between verification, monitoring and confidence-building, although this difference is often obscure. Monitoring (including monitoring for peacekeeping under some circumstances) is part of the verification process and confidence building can form part of the process or it can be quite separate.

Verification of agreements traditionally has several functions:

- A good verification regime will, in the first place, deter would-be cheaters from cheating. It will do this because the verification measures are such that there is a high probability that any party intent on cheating would be caught red-handed.

- Because the verification regime is good enough to catch and therefore deter cheating, verification also builds confidence in the treaties. This, in turn, encourages future treaties and further cooperation.

- Verification can provide security in itself. In a world of reduced military hardware where there exists more openness and transparency, in which states were in possession of a near complete set of information about each other's capabilities, training procedures and production potential, the degree of
security would be far higher than it is today. Not only the possession of this information is required however, but the act of going to inspect facilities to check compliance with agreements and declarations ensures that states are open to foreign military experts and that they run a very high risk of getting caught if they should decide to build prohibited weapons.

- Such a situation is different from that of intelligence gathering. Verification is explicitly linked with arms control treaties or declarations. It is the act of checking compliance with the agreements which not only provides information but also provides interaction between military personnel of previously hostile countries, provides opportunities to assess capabilities and intents with a much greater degree of confidence and it increases the trust between states as they move to a situation where they cannot annihilate each other.

- Looking at verification from this point of view, the confidence-building aspects could eventually be its single and most important role. If the high defence spending states, in moving from a position of large numbers of weapons to a position of low numbers of weapons, could spend a small fraction of their defence budgets on verification requirements then we could move from a position of the threat of war as security to one of verification as security.

- In the context of a new Europe perhaps existing verification structures, established in support of arms control treaties, could make a broader contribution to European security. Specifically, they could provide an infrastructure to facilitate fact-finding and information exchange necessary for effective prevention of conflict.
4. Verification of unilateral measures

◊ Unilateral measures for arms reductions pose a problem because there are no intrusive verification measures automatically associated with them.

◊ A way around this problem is that, in making a declaration of intent to unilaterally reduce weapons systems, states can deposit those declarations with other states or with an international body, for example the United Nations or the CSCE.

◊ Within the declaration the states can include details of where the weapons are located, how they will be reduced and include an invitation to other states to witness their removal/destruction.

◊ Some of these inspections could already be part of the inspections for an existing treaty such as CFE or the 1990 Vienna document.

◊ In this way the unilateral declaration takes the form of a quasi-legal document to which a state is committed; including its offers to facilitate inspections for the purposes of determining compliance.

5. Existing and Possible Verification Structures in Europe

★ National Governmental Arrangements

◊ Currently all the verification arrangements for conventional forces verification in Europe are carried out by national agencies which notify each other of inspections that are to be carried out and then later of the results from each inspection. Notification and coordination however is also carried out through other institutions listed below.

◊ Verification arrangements for nuclear forces in Europe have been, until now, bilateral between the USA and FSU with bilateral arrangements between the USA and NATO countries which
allowed the deployment of US nuclear forces on their territories and likewise between the FSU and ex-WTO states.

✧ Arrangements will now have to change to include the appropriate Sovereign Republics of the CIS. Verification of mutual unilateral reductions in short-range nuclear forces (SNF) will involve several nations within the wider Europe.

✧ The CFE process although yet to be implemented will involve multinational teams of inspectors which may well include a mix of nationalities from across the old East-West divide.

✧ Trial inspections for CFE have involved national and multinational teams including on occasions a mix of personnel from NATO and the ex-WTO nations.

* The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

✧ The NATO Verification Coordination Committee (VCC) was established to coordinate efforts in verification of CFE and CSBMs (and other treaties in the future) between the NATO states.

✧ The VCC is a political/military body. It consists of up to two representatives from each of the 16 nations.

✧ The VCC is chaired by the Director of Verification, Information Systems and Council Operations. One of the sections in this Directorate is the Verification Support Staff (VSS) which supports the VCC and takes on the operational aspects of coordination between the 16 nations.

✧ The VSS is currently composed of 12 staff from 10 nations with more staff being added by 1993. The staff are either from NATO international staff or they are donated by member nations.

✧ The budget for the VSS comes from donations in kind from national governments (secondment of expert staff) and from
NATO's international staff budget. To date there has been no attempt to work out the real cost of the VSS or the VCC.

◊ The VCC and the VSS could also help coordinate the on-site inspections between states which fell into the same group within the CFE framework and the NATO states so that there is less risk of clashes of interest and greater efficiency in inspection efforts. There have already been a number of such "deconfliction exercises" as contemporary jargon would have it.

◊ The VSS also plays a useful role in providing information to member states and to research organizations.

◊ The formation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) provides another potentially important structure for information exchange and mutual reassurance. This organization has only very recently been formed but it is already clear that it could provide an important framework for military links between ex-WTO states and established security organizations such as NATO.

★ The Western European Union (WEU)

◊ The Western European Union carried out verification activities between 1956 and 1985 under the auspices of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA). As a result the WEU through the ACA has a long history of monitoring agreed levels of conventional weapons.

◊ The ACA/WEU has however only played a role in verification within a very limited number of states within one alliance.

◊ Over recent years the WEU has focused attention on the role of satellites for verifying arms reductions in Europe. In June 1991, the WEU decided to set up a Satellite Data Centre to start collection and analysis of data for verification purposes. The Centre is to be situated in Spain with a British director.
Data for the Centre will be provided by commercial satellites SPOT (France), LANDSAT (USA), ERS-1 (European Space Agency), KFA-1000 (FSU—now Russia) and other commercial satellites as they come on-line.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The CSCE Secretariat consists of a Director, three officers and administrative staff. It provides support to the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Committee of Senior Officials and the CSCE Executive Secretaries. In addition, the Secretariat provides documentation and information to the CSCE states and to the general public.

The Secretariat’s budget in 1991 was approximately US$1 million and in 1992 its budget will be about US$1.8 million.

The Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna consists of a Director, two officers and administrative staff. It assists the Council of Foreign Ministers in reducing the risk of conflict and provides support for the implementation of the CSBMs.

The Consultative Committee of the CPC is responsible for the annual implementation assessment meetings, seminars on military doctrine and other seminars, unusual military activities meetings and the communications network for the CPC.

There have been 18 meetings, so far, of the Consultative Committee (by 10 March 1992) with the nineteenth scheduled for March 16 1992.

The CPC’s budget for 1991 was approximately US$1 million.

At present the CPC is mainly focused on traditional inter-state military transparency, in line with the requirements of CSBMs and the CFE Treaty. However, it could act as a valuable resource.
centre for any conflict prevention structures that may be established during the CSCE review meeting.

★ The European Community (EC)

♦ Following on from Maastricht the EC is likely to acquire a formal involvement in security issues although not, as yet, in defence planning.

♦ The EC has some recent experience with monitoring the conflicts and ceasefires in Yugoslavia (see below).

♦ The experiences of the EC in monitoring the Yugoslavian attempts to cease fire were mixed for reasons outlined below. The EC, particularly because of the attack on a helicopter carrying EC monitors, may well think twice before carrying out such an operation again. Nevertheless its experience is a useful one in terms of verification and peace-building.

For completeness we outline other institutions, less relevant to the CSCE right now but relevant to other disarmament measures in Europe:

★ Euratom

♦ The European Atomic Energy Community or Euratom was established in 1957.

♦ Euratom operates from Luxembourg and the Director is based in Brussels.

♦ Part of its remit is to ensure that ores, raw materials and special fissile matter are not diverted from their intended use as declared by their consumers and that arrangements for their supply and any special control measures accepted by the Community in an agreement with a non-Community state or international organization are observed.
◆ Euratom inspectors can check on declarations and transactions and impose sanctions where necessary.

◆ Since 1973 Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have had formal agreements over the issues of safeguards so that there are joint safeguards systems.

★ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

◆ Based in Vienna the IAEA was founded in 1957 and part of its statute authorizes it to:
  - establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials made available by the agency should not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose.
  - to establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received by the Agency to ensure that they would be used only for peaceful purposes.

◆ All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enter into a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

◆ Some states which are not party to the NPT also have safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

◆ The safeguards budget for the IAEA in 1991 was US$61.9 million out of a total budget of US$179 million for the entire agency.

◆ Membership of the IAEA is open to all members of the UN and the IAEA reports annually to the UN General Assembly and, when appropriate, to the Security Council.

★ The United Nations (UN)

◆ The UN has not been directly involved with verification of agreements in Europe but it does have experience which could be relevant in the future.
The experience of the UN in verifying the use of Chemical Weapons under the auspices of the Secretary General to determine whether or not there has been compliance with the Geneva Protocol will be very useful for European security in the near future.

The UN Special Commission which has carried out the inspections in Iraq since the end of the Gulf war in 1991 has a wealth of experience, organizational, political and technical, to offer Europe in the future. This experience covers decisions on where to make on-site inspections (using information from a variety of sources), the on-site inspections themselves, missiles destruction, warhead (chemical) destruction, removal of nuclear materials and handling of biological agents.

The UN, since the study of the role of the UN in verification (A/45/372, 28 August 1990 UN General Assembly), is collating a data-base on verification techniques, methodologies, experiences and expertise. This data-base is particularly aimed at those states which have little experience in verification and issues pertaining to verification. The study also recommended that the UN assist in the training of personnel for verification.

The UN peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia currently underway could yield useful experience for monitoring similar situations as the new Europe evolves.

6. Transparency, Verification and the Emerging CIS Republics

Since the 1991 August Coup in the FSU and the subsequent breakup of the Union, one of the overriding concerns has been the stability of the region and the potential risk of war either within the republics – such as in Nagorny Karabakh – or, in the longer term, between the republics themselves (perhaps sparked by the ethnic conflicts within the republics).
There have been several proposals to reduce the risk of violent conflict breaking out in the new CIS. Most of these proposals have centred on the longer term reduction of nuclear missiles and the immediate removal of short-range nuclear forces to Russia. Some attention has been paid to the issue of the CFE equipment levels and how they might be shared amongst the affected states in the CIS.

8 republics fall into the area under the CFE Treaty – the ATTU area: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Of these Russia and Kazakhstan fall partly within the ATTU and partly outside it. Kazakhstan is particularly affected by the geographical limit – a very small fraction of the republic comes under the treaty limits (see the map on page 16). All the other republics are completely within the boundaries of the ATTU area.

How the previous military districts correspond to the new autonomous republics so that the equipment levels can be redistributed is crucial. In the map on page 16 we show how the old Military Districts map onto the CIS Republics.

Verification methods leading to transparency, openness and lessening of tensions between the CIS republics could be the single most important contribution of arms control to stability in the region.

If states with suspicions do not know what there is to fear then they will fear the worst. In fearing the worst they will act accordingly and a new arms race in the FSU could ensue.

Good information, confidence-building inspections, notification and observation of manoeuvres and exercises will decrease the risk of worst-case analysis.
The CFE Zones, The ex-USSR Military Districts and the new CIS Republics
The issue of the withdrawal of FSU troops from the Baltic States and the status of these states within the CSCE/CFE framework has yet to be resolved. Although the the Baltic States fall within the ATTU and are explicitly covered by the Treaty, the Baltic States have so far shown little interest in joining the CFE Treaty.

The political and technical difficulties confronting the project to maintain a single-command CIS military (replacing the Soviet military) raises severe problems for many of the republics. The issue of overall equipment levels for the CIS area within ATTU does not, however, have to have any connection with a single CIS military or army. The overall equipment holdings for the region can be divided up in a similar fashion to how the Group of Six divided up the allowed levels into national holdings in 1990/91.

The fact that part of Russian forces are outside the ATTU area complicates these negotiations. Kazakhstan is clearly also in a special and awkward position. On the one hand the proportion of its territory which falls into the ATTU region is so small as to make the CFE Treaty seem irrelevant to the republic. On the other hand, although Kazakhstan may increasingly look East and South in the future, any opportunity which can reduce the risk of future tension between its near neighbours should be considered very carefully.

Recommendations on how the Independent Republics could participate in the CFE Treaty and in the wider CSCE framework are given below.

7. Transparency, Verification and a Yugoslavian Peace Settlement

When the civil war erupted in Yugoslavia, many calls were made within the CSCE, particularly to the newly formed Conflict Prevention Centre, to step in and help to resolve the conflicts.

The Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and the CSCE Secretariat in Prague had been set up less than six months
previously. They had and still have very few staff and a small operational budget.

♦ In early July 1991, Austria and Italy invoked the “unusual military activities mechanism” of the CSCE to require Yugoslavia to account for its army’s movements. Meetings of the CSCE subsequently addressed the issue of a ceasefire which led to an endorsement of the EC Hague Peace Conference.

♦ From that process came the Brioni agreement and EC monitors were sent to Slovenia and then to Croatia to observe the “ceasefire”.

♦ This was the first occasion that the EC had carried out such action.

♦ The process suffered a major blow in January 1992 when one of the EC Monitors’ Mission helicopters was shot down, killing five members of the observer team. Such incidents serve to show that the job of monitor/observer/inspector is not a trivial one and can subject the highly trained personnel to grave danger.

♦ Not only were the EC monitors subjected to direct physical attack, they were also constantly under attack from sections of the media who seem to have expected them not only to monitor activities but to enforce a ceasefire.

♦ From mid-January 1992, 50 UN military observers started the task of peacekeeping in the troubled region. So far the peacekeeping operation has been somewhat more successful than other attempts. This is partly a result of time passing, energy flagging and further discussions and partly a result of the vast experience of UN Peacekeeping.

♦ In the longer term, what ever form a Yugoslav Peace Settlement takes, verification techniques and methods could contribute to the lasting stability in the region.

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The procedures set up within the CSCE framework for confidence and security-building (the Stockholm and Vienna Accords) could be applied to the sovereign republics emerging out of Yugoslavia.

This would not be difficult to administer because as independent states they could independently join the CSCE, as have the ex-FSU states, and sign up to the Vienna document. This would give them the ability to check each other's military equipment and manoeuvres within the CSCE framework and such a process would lessen tension and help to restore trust between the republics.

8. Conclusions and Recommendations

There are many possible structures within the existing Europe which could be applied to verification, confidence-building and security within the evolving "New Europe". These include the established bilateral government-to-government inspections and observations, NATO (through the VCC/VSS structure), WEU, CSCE (through the Secretariat and the CPC), EC, Euratom, IAEA and the UN.

All of these institutions can and should be used where appropriate. Each has different expertise and experience can be applied to different situations accordingly.

In the long term however, thought must be given to the way in which Europe is evolving and those institutions which encompass the largest number of states will have the greatest applicability in the future. This means that currently the government-to government bilaterals, the CSCE, the IAEA and the UN have the most obvious appeal. However a rapidly extended NATO or EC could also contribute in the long-term future as well as in the short term. The clear advantage of the CSCE, the IAEA and the UN is that the important Euro-Atlantic link is kept open (with all its considerable expertise and experience.
in these areas) and the CIS and East/Central Europe is also included in the process.

Verification, transparency and confidence-building should be seen as one of the most important political-military activities for ensuring stability in a rapidly changing Europe. Such activities must not be side-lined and treated as an "extra". They are crucial in building trust between otherwise warring factions. They also provide an infrastructure for fact-finding and information exchange which is a critical component for international mechanisms for conflict prevention.

Verification and confidence-building activities should therefore be funded properly. Verification is an inexpensive way of improving security. The more resources wisely invested in verification and confidence-building the greater the collective security of the states involved. Security can reliably be increased with increased funding (wisely spent) in this area. This is not true for increases in spending on military equipment – security may or may not increase as a result of military equipment spending, the outcome is uncertain and expensive.

The application of verification and confidence-building measures to the newly independent CIS Republics would lead to greater transparency and trust between them. The most appropriate institution for the CIS states is clearly the CSCE through the 1990 Vienna Document and the 1990 CFE Treaty.

The treaties apply straightforwardly to the militaries of each independent state in that through the notification, evaluation and inspection procedures they can check each other’s declarations and satisfy themselves that there is no threat.

Where difficulties arise is in the prevention of conflict between different ethnic groupings within one state. It should be possible, through the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, for representatives from the different groupings within a state to settle disputes before they reach violence.
However this mature state of affairs is clearly unlikely to occur for some time. In the meantime, the CPC should intervene in violent clashes within a state and set up a mechanism for resolution and confidence-building procedures to take place.

- To fulfil this function, the CPC and the CSCE Secretariat should be better resourced and funded. The two centres should be able to draw on the expertise that exists within the member states and within other institutions, such as NATO and the WEU, and put it to full use for short periods of time.

- Similar measures in the longer term could also be applied to the final outcome of the Yugoslavian civil war. As the republics end up as independent states then they can join the CSCE as such. However there will be further disputes whatever the situation and these could be resolved through a stronger and more powerful CPC.

- The CPC could establish a mechanism for representatives of the different ethnic groupings and regions within the republics of the CIS or Yugoslavia to inspect each other's military facilities and to talk with each other about further confidence-building measures. To avoid controversial singling out of states however, such measures should apply equally to all CSCE states in principle.

- The expertise in coordination and cooperation in the field of political-military decisions and in the field of verification which has been built up by NATO and by the WEU should not be allowed to go to waste. Care must be taken now to institute links between the verification sections of these two organizations and the CSCE/CPC Secretariats. Joint inspections for CFE/Vienna Document would clearly be a sensible, cost-saving exercise and should be considered as an option for the near future.

- The WEU satellite data centre and all the work behind that (such as the European Space Agency decision to include verification as part of its peaceful activities) should be well funded. The WEU,
the USA, France and Russia should consider extending the sharing of their satellite data to all the CSCE states.

- States making unilateral reductions of military equipment, nuclear, chemical or conventional should declare those reductions and deposit the declaration with the UN and with the CSCE. Attached to the declaration should be provisions for states within the CSCE structure to inspect and monitor the reductions.

- The CFE Treaty should be joined by all the CIS states which are affected by it, including Kazakhstan. It should also be joined by the Baltic States. In signing the treaty, these states will help to ensure the long term stability of their regions and they will be involved in follow-on negotiations and so be able to influence future decisions.

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