Export controls form an important part of the global effort to stem the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and materials. For this reason it is important for states to ensure that their national implementation measures encompass effective export control systems.
Certain states have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their national export systems with regard to the transfer of NBC material, equipment and related technologies to limit proliferation:
The information below offers further information about these groups as well as other export control resources, including:
Interested parties are advised to visit these organizations’ websites regularly to check for updates and further information.
The Australia Group, comprised of 39 states and the European Commission, is a voluntary, informal arrangement to coordinate national export controls to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents and related equipment, technologies and knowledge to states and non-state actors suspected of biological or chemical weapons capabilities. It was established in 1985.
Its control lists (see below) continue to provide an international benchmark for best practice controls on chemical and biological agents, being used increasingly as a guide for international action in this area, including in the coverage and application of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions such as UNSCR 1540. The Australia Group plenary in 2007 emphasized its commitment to ensuring that non-proliferation export controls do not hinder legitimate trade and technical cooperation in the chemical and biological sectors.
The following AG common control lists are also available in languages other than English through the respective Australia Group website links (see above). States should also consult the AG website for the latest updates and other relevant information.
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established in 1987 to encourage the limitation of the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for biological, chemical and nuclear attacks. The regime has 34 members.
As of August 2007, the Chairman of the Regime is Special Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Per Fischer, of Denmark. He can be contacted at mtcr@um.dk.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) comprises 45 nuclear supplier states that voluntarily coordinate their export controls governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related equipment and technology to non-nuclear weapon states.
The NSG Guidelines (see below) aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices which would not hinder international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field. The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms.
The guidelines were originally agreed to in 1977, and transmitted to the IAEA for publication in 1978. They set out fundamental principles for export controls, and define an export control trigger list and agreed common criteria for technology transfers. The guidelines prohibit the use of exports from being used in any nuclear explosive device. The guidelines also touch upon the transfer of facilities and technologies used for the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, uranium enrichment and heavy water production. The guidelines sets up a requirement for physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, mandate re-transfer controls as well as general acceptance of the Zangger Committee Trigger List.
This revision clarified parts of the trigger list, and brought it up to date with the more detailed Zangger Committee list, but also adds a new category of goods to be put under export controls (namely so-called dual use items). Some 65 items are on the dual use list. Composed of two parts, the revised INFCIRC/254 describes the export control regime for nuclear and nuclear-related dual use items, and lists these commodities. The new regime became effective on 1 January 1993. All subsequent revisions build on this revision.
This revision only applies to part one of the guidelines. Part two remains at its seventh revision.
The NSG is an informal arrangement and as such has no central contact point to address general inquiries.
For specific information on the national export control policies and regulations for Governments participating in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, please contact the appropriate national authorities in that country.
The Zangger Committee, sometimes referred to as the ‘NPT Exporters’, harmonize implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s requirement to apply International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to nuclear exports. The Committee has 35 state members.
The Zangger Committee Understandings were reached in 1974, and published by the IAEA as two separate memoranda. The memoranda, known as ‘trigger lists’, contribute to the understanding of article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT. They give definition to the provisions contained in this article and provide procedures for the export of materials and equipment described therein.
Developments in nuclear technology bought about the need to clarify parts of the trigger list contained in Memorandum B of INFCIRC/209. Four modifications were made under this first revision which are contained in INFCIRC/209/Rev.1/Mod.1,2,3, and 4, and consolidated in INFCIRC/209/Rev.1.
The first modification clarified parts of the trigger list which refer to plants for the production of heavy water deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment especially designed or prepared therefore.
The second modification clarified parts of the trigger list which refer to equipment especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium; and to primary coolant pumps.
Developments in nuclear technology bought about the need to expand the trigger list. The second revision to INFCIRC/209 amended the trigger list to include a new entry entitled plants for the conversion of uranium and plutonium and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor.
NB: The following documents are available in the 19 European Union languages through the above website by clicking on the icon for the preferred language.
Council of the European Union
Rue de la Loi, 175 B-1048
Brussels
Belgium
Telephone (32-2) 281 61 11
Fax (32-2) 281 69 34
The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program is the United States Government's initiative to help other countries improve their export control systems. The EXBS program is a U.S. Government interagency program, managed by the Department of State's Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, designed to help prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their missile delivery systems, conventional weapons, and related items by assisting foreign governments to establish and implement effective export control systems that meet international standards.
The materials listed below may also be accessed in Russian through the EXBS website.
Office of Export Control Cooperation
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
USA
+(1) (202) 647-0224
The Department of Commerce's Office of International Programs (OIP) works to strengthen foreign national export control systems to facilitate legitimate trade in high-technology goods, and to prevent proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Website—there are two sections:
Bureau of Security and Information
U.S. Department of Commerce
1401 Constitution Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20230
USA
Phone: +1 (202) 482-2000
www.bis.doc.gov/
The SIPRI Non-proliferation and Export Control Project conducts research into issues of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and arms control, disarmament, proliferation and non-proliferation.
Current research interests include:
Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 70 Solna
Sweden
Phone: +46-8-655 97 00
Fax: +46-8-655 97 33
E-mail: sipri@sipri.org
www.sipri.org
The Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) strives to address dangers posed by the security of, and trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies and materials, and other military-related transfers. It offers a wide range of publications, training programmes and other resources. See below for selected highlights.
The Academy provides a comprehensive overview of export control concepts, issues, and standards from an international perspective. Unlike other fora on export control which focus exclusively on one particular country’s export control regulations, the CITS Academy offers a comparative perspective that allows participants to understand the range of “how to” options or tools available to them for implementing export controls.
The Center’s WMD Security Policy Program conducts policy research, training, and outreach aimed at improving the security of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological materials that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction. The program’s objective is to strengthen the international standards that pertain to these deadly materials and to persuade governments and international institutions to work together to control them.
The International Core Group on Nuclear Security Culture was established as a follow-up to the October 2005 NATO Advanced Research Workshop "Nuclear Security Culture: From National Best Practices to International Standards." The main objectives of the CG are:
Center for International Trade and Security (CITS)
120 Holmes/Hunter
Academic Building
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602
USA
Tel: +1 706-542-2985
Fax: +1 706- 542-2975
E-mail: cits@uga.edu
http://www.cits.ucsb.edu/
ISIS produced an electronic report, ‘Roadmap to Responsible Export Controls’, in 2003 to meet a need for case studies about illicit procurement and the problems facing companies in creating effective internal systems to prevent illegal sales. It describes how proliferant states illicitly obtained key items and technologies in the past in order to help in the development and implementation of controls to prevent such transfers in the future.
The audience for this information is primarily those who are establishing or seeking to improve export controls systems in companies or governments. It is intended to be useful to officials and scientists in private companies and nuclear facilities that sell sensitive items, officials from nuclear facilities that are seeking to implement nuclear export controls, government officials, customs officials, members of the academic community, other experts, and the public.
(Text adapted from www.exportcontrols.org)
Institute for Science and International Security
236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20002
Tel: +1 202-547-3633
E-mail: isis@isis-online.org
Minimum physical protection levels in respect to nuclear materials in international transport
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