These background articles offer a more scholarly, in-depth discussion of some of the issues related to national implementation of NBC obligations.
‘…many issues remain unresolved concerning the implementation of UNSCR 1540, and the risks of complacency loom large. If UNSCR 1540 is not implemented, and/ or if states do not adhere to OP 4 and other portions of the resolution that potentially enhance the importance of export controls and make such systems more transparent, then the result may well be a fatal weakening of the nonproliferation regime. Because of the importance of these issues, this brief seeks to propel three questions to the forefront of the debate on 1540, and to prompt a larger discussion about what might be done to complement the eff orts of the so-called 1540 Committee, which was set up to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540, in its future work.’
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) was adopted in 2004 to address the risk that non-state actors will acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It requires all states to implement a wide range of domestic legislation to prevent such proliferation. This comprehensiveness makes 1540 an important tool, but a piecemeal approach to implementation may lead to its underutilization. This study provides a risk-based framework, focusing on the implementation of the resolution in a set of states which are the most relevant for WMD proliferation and highlighting a set of 1540 obligations which are the most important for each state to fulfill. An evaluation of implementation progress so far reveals that the vast majority of these states have few of their key obligations in place. While the universal implementation of 1540 is an important goal, ensuring that these key provisions are carried out should be a priority.
This study, commissioned by the WMDC, examines international obligations to implement national measures governing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, related materials and delivery systems. It outlines the status of best practice guidance for the adoption and enforcement of national measures and considers the difficulties in assessing the present state of implementation, enforcement and availability of technical assistance. It concludes by offering some thoughts on means to improve national implementation and compliance with WMD obligations.
National and international law was identified in Chapter 2 [of this report] as an essential component of the array of measures serving to protect against the hostile release of biological or chemical agents, and to help to mitigate the consequences should such a release nevertheless take place. The present chapter describes the pertinent features of that law. At the international level, the most important legal instruments are the BWC and the CWC. Both provide for international cooperation in order to prevent the use of chemical and biological weapons, and for assistance and cooperation where breaches of these treaties are suspected, especially when such weapons have been used. The chapter begins with an account of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which for several decades was the principal international treaty in the field. The two conventions are then described in turn, information being given about the international obligations that they establish and the national measures required to fulfil those obligations.
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Summary forthcoming.
Regulatory approaches and techniques will become an important focus of future arms control efforts. This article identifies its main elements and illustrates this recent development on the basis of current multilateral arms control negotiations. It shows that this new approach is very resilient to changing political developments, has a strong preventive component and is crisis resistant. Furthermore, the success of the new regulatory approach is closely linked to an effective implementation of the agreements whether they are politically or legally binding. The emphasis is no longer on intrusive international verifications or diplomatic high-level conferences but on the ability and capability of each state to effectively implement the concluded agreements. Success is no longer measured in terms of the number of ratifications but on the basis of the effectiveness and thoroughness of national implementation efforts. Because national implementation is an important element, the new approach can more effectively deal with the non-state actors than traditional arms control approaches. In addition, if necessary, the international community should provide technical, legal and financial assistance to promote implementation in less developed countries.
A significant number of states face challenges fulfilling obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)—a nonproliferation resolution aiming to prevent non-state actors from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. Many countries lack the capacity to, inter alia, comply with basic reporting duties as required by the resolution. In light of current 1540 implementation obstacles, this initial report, part of a larger study,* discusses the framework of African regional and sub-regional organizations and the role they can play implementing resolution 1540.
This is the final report of VERTIC's project surveying the status of national implementation legislation in all 151 states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). VERTIC's survey focused primarily (although not exclusively) on national legislation to enforce the treaty's core prohibitions, specifically those in Article 1 relating to the requirement never to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain biological weapons.
The first part describes the survey method, presents the results with regard to the status of national legislation adopted, and provides comparative analysis of the various ways in which this legislation has dealt with the treaty provisions. An indicative, but unattributed, list of reasons given by states parties for their failure to adopted national legislation is also included. The second part contains recommendations for strengthening national implementation legislation by establishing avenues for states parties to share their understanding and experiences and to provide each other with assistance.
Despite thirty years since entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) the majority of States Parties still have not implemented effective national measures to ensure compliance with Convention obligations. The combined lack of a multilateral organisation with responsibility to monitor Convention compliance and the growing threat of bio-terrorism highlight the imperative for more effective and widespread national implementation measures. This article briefly outlines Convention obligations and suggests alternative approaches to States Parties to ensure compliance. The article does not propose a model implementing legislation package because of the authors’ shared view that one model simply cannot suit all States Parties. Individual states will need to consider existing legislative regimes – particularly those dealing with biological materials and activities – to determine the extent to which existing regulatory regimes might be adapted or amended to effectively cover BWC obligations. The authors discuss the explicit Convention obligation for the enactment of penal legislation but also discuss the practical issues to ensure compliance with Convention obligations such as the prohibition on transfers of biological agents and toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes and the requirement to gather, collate and share confidence building information with other States Parties. The article concludes with an overview of Australia’s national implementation of BWC obligations to illustrate one particular State Party’s approach to its treaty obligations.
Summary forthcoming.
Summary forthcoming.
This Yearbook chapter analyzes the ‘Action Plan Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations’ by the Conference of States Parties (CSP) at the First Review Conference of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in October 2003. Scott and Tabassi look at the national implementation requirements of the CWC as established by Article VII, why the CSP felt additional action was needed, and the four parts of the Action Plan: identification and analysis of problems and needs, the overall timeframe, intermediate steps and target dates for implementation, and oversight by the CSP and the Executive Council. The chapter includes discussion of the OPCW Network of Legal Experts, the National Legislation Implementation Toolkit, and cooperation with other organizations.
This document was prepared as a report from IUPAC to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to provide an evaluation of scientific and technological advances in the chemical sciences relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The report is intended to assist OPCW and its Member States in preparation for the First Review Conference to be held on 28 April 2003. The CWC, now ratified by 145 nations and in effect since 1997, totally prohibits the production, storage, or use of toxic chemicals as weapons of war. This report is based on an IUPAC Workshop held in Bergen, Norway, 30 June to 3 July 2002. The report highlights developments in organic synthesis and changes in chemical plant design that will pose new challenges to the Convention, but it also describes recent and probable future developments in analytical chemistry that should assist in implementation of the Convention. The key issues identified at the Workshop
Actual implementation of the complex CWC text requires interpretation by OPCW organs. This book draws together in a single volume the text of the Convention, the interpretative decisions and understandings reached by the organs, the policies, model agreements, rules of procedure, regulations and key background texts. The intention of this work is to provide a comprehensive view of the Convention regime, two years into its implementation.
Co-publication with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague.
Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute, surveys the history of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty before discussing the most recent Review Conference, held in May 2005 in Vienna, Austria. While noting that the treaty ‘has effectively constrained proliferation’, he summarizes the many ups-and-downs of the NPT and its review conferences. He pays particular attention to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as well as the thirteen practical steps ‘agreed to commitment to lower the salience of nuclear weapons in policies, reinforce nonproliferation measures, and move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons’ agreed by all states at the 2000 Review Conference.
The following is an extract from the article:
‘The 2005 NPT Review Conference agenda stalled along several fault lines. The United States would not permit the commitments already made under the treaty review process to be the basis for a working agenda and focused instead on the proliferation threats posed by Iran and North Korea. Conversely, Egypt demanded clear expositions based on previous commitments, focusing on the need to work to make the treaty universal. Additionally, Iran baited the NWS on their failure to make progress on disarmament and specifically the United States for its development of low-yield nuclear weapons and pursuit of space weaponization. In the end, no consensus document was generated.’
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